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Letter from the Editor
Morgantown, West Virginia
July 15, 2020
It is my great pleasure to present the inaugural volume of the West Virginia University Historical Review, the university’s only journal dedicated exclusively to undergraduate student research in History. In this volume, we
feature capstone papers honored with the History Department’s Romine Award
and Maxwell Prize.
This journal came together quickly thanks to the help of a number of individuals. Ian Harmon at WVU Libraries has been invaluable with his guidance
in setting up the digital platform. I would like to thank him for sharing his
expertise and his enthusiasm. I would also like to express my gratitude to the
members of the History Department’s Undergraduate Committee (also listed as
the journal’s Editorial Board), for their thoughtful deliberation over the awardwinning capstone papers and for their support launching the Historical Review.
Finally, I would like to thank and congratulate Professors Elizabeth Fones-Wolf,
William Hal Gorby, Mark Tauger, and Matthew Vester, who mentored the students whose work is featured in this volume of the journal.
Every year, the Undergraduate Committee’s most rewarding task is to determine the recipients of the History Department’s student awards. Two awards
recognize excellence in student research and writing – the Romine Award and
the Maxwell Prize. Collectively, these two honors recognize the strongest undergraduate research produced during the academic year. This year’s awardwinning capstone papers do not disappoint. They engage with topics that span
continents and centuries, from sixteenth-century Europe to twenty-first-century
Bangladesh, speaking to the diverse interests of our majors and their dedication
to the historian’s craft. On behalf of the Undergraduate Committee and the
History Department, I extend heartfelt congratulations to all of the 2019-2020
award winners.
Sincerely,

Jennifer Thornton
Teaching Assistant Professor
WVU History Department
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Jovanna Shirky
36
4 China’s Illegal Organ Trade: From Executed Prisoners to Organ Tourism to Falun Gong
Adrienne Thompson
53
5 The Role of Women within the Mine Wars
Kirsten Hylton

72

6 The American Public’s Reaction to the Japanese American Internment
Nicholas Taylor
86

iv

West Virginia University Historical Review Vol. 1, Romine Award Winner, 2020

Riots Contra Global Capital: Globalization and the
Bangladeshi Workers’ Movement
ADAM BE NJAMI N
“Fast fashion” and “globalization,” often mentioned in the same sentence, make their way to the headlines fairly frequently.
While the conditions of low-wage garment workers are a subject of criticism for clothing brands, few know of the active
workers’ movement in Bangladesh to better them. This movement, often unorganized and violent, takes place against the
backdrop of urban growth, rapid industrialization, and factory disaster. Riots and piecemeal wage negotiations often go
hand in hand in Bangladesh, as the pressures of the world economy exert themselves on Bangladesh’s fragile and unstable
garment industry. This paper examines the history and developments of these garment riots, with an added emphasis on
urban growth and economic crisis. While examining the riots as responses to Bangladeshi circumstances, it places these
riots in the wider context of neo-liberal globalization and the pauperization of industrial workers across the world. With
this at hand, the paper then analyzes various global responses to these working conditions and the infamous Rana Plaza
Disaster.

I
Globalization today is not a contentious prospect but a contentious reality. While humanity has
maintained a global reach for millennia, never before has it been unified under a dominant mode
of production. Since making its triumph in the 1850s, capitalism has established itself as a
penetrative and unavoidable force in the global economy.1 Unceasing in its growth, capitalism is
now the shared condition of the human community. The degree to which different sectors of the
human community experience capitalism varies, however, depending on their place in peripheral
markets to fully integrated wage-labor economies. Areas now entirely subsumed into the global
marketplace embodied an entirely different socioeconomic arrangement thirty years before. This
rapid industrialization of parts of the Global South has created a world parallel to the globalized
experience in the West, one in which workers frequently perform labor for low wages and produce
largely for western countries.
Paradigmatic of this dark side of globalization, Bangladesh frequently emerges at the center of
conversations concerning global labor malpractice and abuse. After the 2013 Rana Plaza collapse
resulted in 1,134 deaths, becoming one of the largest industrial disasters in history, the general
public began to question the ethics of the global fashion industry, a staple of globalization’s
triumph.2 Though astounding growth rates have catapulted Bangladesh’s place in the Ready-Made
Garment (RMG) sector to second in the world only to China, this rapid industrialization has come
with the cost of inhumane working conditions, repression, abuse, and periodic disaster, among
Adam Benjamin is pursuing a BA in History and Anthropology at WVU. His research interests are political economy,
East African history, urban studies, labor ethnography, and carceral geography. After graduation he intends on applying
to graduate school and pursuing a career in writing. In his free time he enjoys gardening, world cinema, and trips to the
forest.
1Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875, “Chapter 2: Capital” (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975).
2“The Rana Plaza Accident and Its Aftermath,” International Labor Organization, https://www.ilo.org/global
/topics/geip/WCMS_614394/lang–en/index.htm.
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other problems.3 The creation of a mass semi-proletarianized workforce, trapped in abhorrent
working conditions, has generated one of the fiercest and most violent workers’ movements in the
modern era.
While the Bangladeshi RMG workers’ movement lacks the explicit verbal anti-globalization
message found in Chiapas or Seattle in the late 1990s, it is, in practice, a direct response to the
structural issues of globalized production. Labor’s confrontation with global capital in Bangladesh
is mediated by an intricate and layered network of subcontractors and local industrialists. Thus,
the sociopolitical and economic message of the RMG workers’ movement is to be found in the
movement’s internal dynamics as a response to globalized production. The goal of this paper
is therefore to trace the history of Bangladesh’s industrialization and, more specifically, labor’s
response to it. This analysis includes both the circumstances the labor movement finds itself in
(the form) and the means by which labor responds to them (content).
In 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, and to the present day there have been repeated
labor revolts involving general strikes, blockades, factory burnings, and riots. In Bangladesh,
strikes, hartals, and riots respond specifically to poor safety standards, low wages, and poor living
conditions, but also more generally to the structural immiseration imposed by the needs of global
capital and generated by globalized production. The frequency of these revolts, coupled with
repeated industrial disasters, points to a situation that has not improved despite the interventions
of global labor and human rights organizations. The labor situation in Bangladesh has remained
one of a poorly employed, superfluous, disposable, and marginalized population responding to
its conditions through general strikes, riots, and factory burnings. These tactics are means of
circumventing structurally imposed limitations, including but not limited to legal measures taken
by the state to curtail the labor movement. Industrialists, pressured to keep wages low to stabilize
investment incentive and increase profit margins, are consistently forced to informalize production
and lengthen the working day. The workers’ response to these globalized conditions, including
their tactics and outreach, as well as their general living and working conditions, will be at the
forefront of this analysis.
Yet while the Bangladeshi labor movement clearly responds to its historically specific
circumstances, the riots and strikes seen within the country are also part of a wider and more
generalized trend of marginalized and pauperized populations responding to conditions of
economic downturn and/or immiseration, often exacerbated by specific situational tensions.
Similar conditions can be seen in the US in Ferguson and Baltimore, China, Greece, London, and
Vietnam, all of which contain populations essentially superfluous to the industrial economy. The
creation of these surplus populations is largely intertwined with the rise of neoliberal globalization,
and I will view Bangladesh within this context.
Also common to neoliberal globalization is the movement from the country to the city, which
has for a large part given rise to the semi-proletarianized population in Bangladesh. Dhaka and
its industrial suburbs have been the destination of this mass migration and the sole terrain of the
RMG movement. The connection between the ever-expanding slums and industry are a primary
factor in the Bangladeshi situation, as the slums continue to grow and industry pulls from their
inhabits as their primary labor source. State operations to police these slums are critical in their
attempts to discipline this expanding, pauperized, and thus obstreperous population. Analysis of
industrial transformation must take into account the geographical one.
The state’s response to labor unrest in this transformative process will be considered in
its attempts to appease workers through concessions and legal reforms, all the while setting
3“Bangladesh Remains 2nd Largest RMG Exporter Accounting 6.5 Percent Market Share,” Textile Today, August 7,
2018, https://www.textiletoday.com.bd/bd-remains-2nd-largest-rmg-exporter-accounting-6-5-percent/.
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preventative measures against wildcat strikes and labor revolt. This includes illegalizing certain
forms of strikes, institutionalizing labor unions, and creating an “industrial police force” to oversee
and curtail potential workers’ unrest. To the Bangladeshi state this is necessary to maintain stable
production and investment by ensuring a somewhat complacent working population. These legal
structures and developments in state power are subject to a historical genesis alongside forces
of production. When Bangladeshi industrialists are primarily working in terms of globalized
capitalism, however, they will be held accountable to international standards.
In this vein, the final point of analysis will examine how global labor and human rights
organizations have responded to the Bangladeshi situation. The most notable intervention on
behalf of these organizations came in the form of the Accord and Alliance, made with fashion
companies in the wake of the Rana Plaza collapse. Though they embody globalization’s selfregulatory response to its pitfalls, in the liberal view, they have often come up short in their
aspirations. Why, and more importantly, how they have come up short provides pertinent answers
to the historical situation in Bangladesh’s globalized RMG sector.
The complexities of the sequential labor revolts can be analyzed by taking into account the
nature of globalized production. The historical process of Bangladesh’s industrialization was
one under the auspices of global capital, more specifically during its neoliberal period. The
industrialization of Bangladesh contains a content unique to its historical situation. As will be
seen, the influx of this population to the city as the result of the emergence of the RMG sector can
be traced to a specific neoliberal policy, the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), which triggered the
seeds of production to germinate. Where European workers in the nineteenth century responded
to the changing, internal, dynamics of pre-industrial society, the labor movement in Bangladesh
responds to a mechanized and mature mode of production subsuming local production into a
global market.
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Surrounded entirely by the Bay of Bengal and bordering India and Myanmar, Bangladesh is a
young country, even relative to the post-colonial world. Born out of a devastating and repressive
war with Pakistan in 1971, what was formerly known as East Pakistan at first took on a socialist
planning model and nationalized all industry. In line with the decline of twentieth-century socialist
states, however, these policies proved to be unstable and were abandoned in favor of the “New
Industrial Policy.” This policy aimed to support private investment and denationalize all industry,
including the nucleus of the then-nationalized garment sector, which was returned to its former
private ownership.4 To bolster this move toward private ownership, the Bangladeshi state moved
again to privatize with the “Revised Industrial Policy” in 1986, eventually following it up with
more policy to phase out state-owned enterprise in 1991.5
Whether the privatization policy was the response to the failure of socialist nationalization
schemes or a direct capitulation to the neoliberal era, it nonetheless was integrated into the
neoliberal transformation of the global economy. Incentivized toward promoting free trade
standards and pursuing policy geared toward slashing bureaucracy, the Bangladeshi RMG sector
began to take root amongst its forming national bourgeois. By 1986 the Bangladeshi state had
fully embraced Margaret Thatcher’s infamous line, “There Is No Alternative,” or TINA. The
4Md. Nurul Momen, “Implementation of Privatization Policy: Lessons from Bangladesh,” Innovation Journal: The
Public Sector Innovation Journal 12, no. 2 (2007).
5Ibid.
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state believed financialization and liberalization to be key to achieving independent economic
growth contra import substitution. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
pressured Bangladesh to continue privatization, going as far as to enable and help create the
Export Processing Zone (EPZ).6 Now in the hands of domestic capital, the RMG sector grew to
become the backbone of the Bangladeshi industrial economy.
Between Fiscal Years (FY) 1986-1987 and 2006-2007, the number of textile factories grew
exponentially from 629 to 4,490, while the total number of exports in millions of US dollars
went from 298.7 million to 9.21 billion.7 Between FY 1989-1990 around 340,000 people were
employed in the RMG sector. By FY 1994-1995 employment grew by 1.2 million, and finally by
FY 2009-2010 it reached approximately 3 million people.8 By FY 2013-2014 the RMG sector
dominated the Bangladeshi economy, consisting of 84 percent of all exports and making up 14.17
percent of the country’s total GDP (though this later began to fall, see below).9
While privatization schemes led to the growth of private domestic ownership on a mass scale,
the RMG sector was aided by free trade agreements meant to integrate underdeveloped countries
into the world economy. The most notable of these was the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA),
which imposed import quotas on developed countries to purchase from their underdeveloped
counterparts while curtailing market domination from powerhouses such as China and India.10
The result of the MFA, which was in effect from 1974-1994, was highly beneficial to Bangladesh’s
RMG sector. Not only did it allow export by volume to grow in Bangladesh, it also gave impetus
to larger producers such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China to begin shifting apparel
investment toward these underdeveloped countries such as Vietnam, Honduras, and Bangladesh.11
The Bangladeshi RMG sector, almost entirely within the hands of domestic producers, began its
contracting system.
The termination of the MFA in 2005 brought about anxiety concerning Bangladesh’s future
in the RMG sector and as a major exporter. Bangladesh, while now enriched with noteworthy
productive capacity, could not be expected to compete with China and India on the global market,
let alone the ROK. This initially caused panic and confusion amongst investors and industrialists
alike, worrying that the end of the MFA would trigger a large capital flight from Bangladesh.
According to a 2003 Textiles Intelligence press release, “Ultimately, garment makers in Mexico
and Bangladesh will have to adopt strategies appropriate for a world in which winners will be
decided on the basis of their international competitiveness – not on the basis of their quota-free
access to the major markets.”12
Yet hopes for Bangladesh outweighed panic in comparison to other prominent garment
exporters such as Mexico for two reasons: one being the fact that 95 percent of Bangladeshi
factories were under domestic control, preventing the flight of constant capital, and the other
6Pragya Khanna, “Making Labour Voices Heard During an Industrial Crisis: Workers’ Struggles in the Bangladesh
Garment Industry,” Labour, Capital and Society / Travail, Capital Et Société 44, no. 2 (2011): 108-110.
7Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association, “Trade Information.”
8M. E. Khan et al., “Living Wage Report: Dhaka and Satellite Cities; Context: the Garment Industry,” Global
Living Wage Coalition, 2016, 11-12, https://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/resource/2017-12/Dhaka_Living_
Wage_Benchmark_Report.pdf.
9Ibrahim Hossain Ovi, “Apparel Sector’s Contribution to GDP Growth Going Down for Years,” Dhaka Tribune,
April 26, 2019, https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2019/04/26/apparel-sector-s-contribution-to-gdp-going-downfor-years.
10M. S. Alam et al., “The Apparel Industry in the Post-Multifiber Arrangement Environment: A Review,” Review of
Development Economics 23, no. 1 (2018): 454-474.
11Ibid.
12“Garment Industries in Bangladesh and Mexico Face an Uncertain Future,” Textiles Intelligence, October 15, 2003.
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being their consistently low wages, some of the lowest in the world.13 The latter became their
primary means of holding their precarious position in the marketplace, bringing in swaths of
investment and maintaining the rising export rate.
The recently proletarianized workers, torn from their agricultural life and subject to slum
dwellings, faced abusive and substandard conditions typical of low wage labor and infamous to
Bangladesh. With wages seemingly invariant and conditions unimproved, the workers sought
channels of power by which to respond. The typical organs of class power, namely organized
labor, had also changed alongside Bangladesh’s neoliberal transformation. While playing a
significant role in the independence movement, organized trade unions later became integrated
into political parties, creating distrust among the workers for their unions and what Pragya Khanna
identifies as a superstructural divide between workers and their unions.14 This created a situation
in which workers were “less likely to be belong to a labor union than to be involved in informal
resistance.”15 The working class was at a tipping point with no hand to guide its outpour.
This complete rearrangement of socioeconomic conditions created tensions unresolvable
outside the realm of political and economic struggle. Prior to the industrial transformation, 88
percent of the Bangladeshi population was in subsistence agriculture with an overall literacy
rate of only 24 percent.16 By 2010, Dhaka became the fastest growing city in the world with an
industrial landscape describable as “Dickensian.”17 Through neoliberal reforms and capitulation
to Structural Adjustment Programs, Bangladesh created a canker sore for neoliberalism’s public
appearance and an industrial nightmare for much of the population. Workers, now pressed
under brutal conditions and without strong and resolute institutional power, began to respond to
this strenuous position they found themselves in. Through a variety of circumventions toward
structural limitations and informal resistance tactics, Bangladeshi RMG workers would initiate
their discordant, violent, and abstruse bargaining game with the RMG sector. In other words, for
them TINA would not be an option.
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Unions, as mentioned before, had already played a politically important role in the independence
movement. After their politicization, however, the workers had little outlets for their growing
discontent. The breaking point of the Bangladeshi working class came in 2006, exhausting the
already fragile and tense social landscape and ripping its frail fabric at the seams. A year earlier,
in 2005, a deadly collapse of a Savar-based garment factory killed one hundred people.18 Before
that there had been eight factory collapses and fires from 1990-2005, resulting in a total of around
243 deaths. With stagnant, low wages, and poor living conditions, the labor pool of Bangladesh
was now a kettle waiting to boil over. This kettle continued to boil over from 2006-2019, each
time with rage pointing to a specific problem, yet indicative of a general immiseration.
13Ibid.
14Khanna, “Making Labor Voices Heard,” 111-113.
15Hasan Ashraf and Rebecca Prentice, “Beyond Factory Safety: Labor Unions, Militant Protest, and the Accelerated
Ambitions of Bangladesh’s Export Garment Industry,” Dialectical Anthropology 43, no. 1 (2019): 93-107.
16Samantha Smith, “The Multi-Fibre Arrangement: A Threat of Protectionism,” Trinity College Student Economic
Review (1998), https://www.tcd.ie/Economics/assets/pdf/SER/1998/Samantha_Smith.html.
17Erik German and Solana Pyne, “Dhaka: Fastest Growing Megacity in the World,” Public Radio International,
September 8, 2010, https://www.pri.org/stories/2010-09-08/dhaka-fastest-growing-megacity-world.
18Khanna, “Making Labor Voices Heard,” 119.
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In May of 2006, as Bangladeshi workers ravaged the city and stormed the factories, the Daily
Star asked one worker of his class’s antics to which he responded, succinctly saying, “They do
not pay us wages regularly. So we are on the street and damaging factories.”19 That very day a
garment worker of the Savar EPZ was killed after factory owners mobilized their sympathetic
workers against the insurrectionaries.20 One worker, while vandalizing a factory, complained
for lack of two-months’ pay.21 By the end of the day two RMG units were burned and two
hundred damaged. With this protest coming after a week-long shutdown of EPZs, this had been
the strongest show of force from Bangladeshi RMG workers yet.
By the end of strike, three hundred factories had been damaged and a number of workers had
been killed.22 The strike, spontaneous and without official union guidance, was also notable for its
seeming success. The Bangladeshi government attempted to meet pay raises and improvements
to general working conditions with the hallmark Bangladesh Labour Act of 2006. This legislation
guaranteed a minimum wage and compensation for injuries among other things, yet was eventually,
and presciently, met with workers’ skepticism following its enaction. Demonstrative of the
superstructural divide that Khanna gives name to, some workers accused unions, the state, and
industrialists of an “unholy alliance” with each other when creating the Labour Act.23 Syed
Sultan Uddin Ahmed, a member of the Bangladesh Institute of Labor Studies (a terminus point of
this revolt), subsequently denied this accusation of collaboration, adding that the responsibility of
the legislation failure was that of the industrialists for not implementing it.24
The legislation itself, however, did much to curtail the growth of these spontaneous labor
revolts, as it did improve general working conditions, imposing and contributing to the structural
limitations imposed against the labor movement. Article 13(1) of the Labour Act, for example,
gives explicit permission for factories to close down and fire their workers if a strike is declared
illegal by the state.25 As will be seen, this provided even greater precedent for mass firings
following labor upheaval.
But one of the most forthright draconian measures against the labor movement came the
following year in 2007. After a series of political upheavals, the Bangladeshi government under
the control of the president Iajuddin Ahmed would declare a state of emergency ahead of upcoming
elections. According to the New York Times, “such measures have not been taken in Bangladesh
since the restoration of democracy in 1991 after years of military rule.”26 During this state of
emergency, Ahmed also placed an explicit ban on strikes, hoping to keep striking power out of the
hands of political opponents. This declaration was seen by many, including businessman Syed
Manzur Elahi, to be a strong implication of military rule, with Elahi stating: “As it is we have an
image problem. . . . [T]his will multiply the problem.27
In spite of this authoritarian takeover, RMG workers continued their battle against management,
striking and rioting against the closure of a factory in Tejgaon and for a bonus for the Muslim
holiday of Eid and a wage of 5,000 taka (Tk) a month, a mainstay demand of the RMG workers’
19“EPZ Workers go Berserk,” Daily Star, May 23, 2006.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
22Khanna, “Making Labor Voices Heard,” 120.
23Md Hasan, “Accords with Workers Hardly Implemented,” Daily Star, May 31, 2006, https://www.thedailystar.net
/2006/05/31/d6053101085.htm.
24Ibid.
25Bangladesh Labour Act of 2006, “Chapter II, Article 13 (1): Closure of Establishment.”
26Somini Sengupta, “Bangladesh Leader Declares State of Emergency,” New York Times, January 11, 2007,
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/11/world/asia/11cnd-bengla.html.
27Ibid.
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movement.28 While 3,000 workers took to the streets, damaging twenty factories and injuring
two police officers, the Bangladeshi government subsequently utilized its legal power over labor,
closing four units of a garment factory “for an indefinite period of time” while citing the Labour
Act.29 When pressed by police officials to negotiate with workers, the bosses summarily responded
that they “were not bound to have talks with the workers.”30 Workers, however, claimed abuse: “A
number of affected workers said the owner used to force them to work under inhuman conditions.
They alleged that factory officials would forfeit a significant part of the salary and overtime bill if
anyone was found taking rest even for a minute during work hours.”31
In 2008 unions attempted to negotiate with industrialists and quell the ferocity of labor revolt
by bringing workers back into the fold of mainstream trade unionism. Representative again of the
superstructural divide, the trade unions nonetheless failed in their ambition. Amirul Haque Amin
(secretary of the National Garment Workers Federation (NGWF), said with dismay to the Daily
Star, “We know we have a lot of responsibilities in the wake of any unrest in the industrial sector.
But, sometimes we feel helpless as we have no control over the workers.”32 He would later go on
to cite lack of effective unionization at the point of production as one of two primary factors for
this problem.33
With the failure of the trade union negotiations at hand, workers’ wages remained stagnant.
The fight for Tk5,000 a month was becoming growingly unrealizable through dialogue, as
negotiations continued to conclude below this demand. But the strike wave of 2006-2007 was
also by no means the end of the labor struggle. In 2009 RMG workers again went up against
their bosses following the closure of the Ha-Meem Group factory, which employed one thousand
workers in Ashulia. Originally contained to workers of the Ha-Meem Group factory, this revolt
soon spread and fifty thousand workers in Ashulia joined the original group in damaging and
vandalizing over fifty factories.34 While the Daily Star cited the 2008 Financial Crisis and decline
in global demand for the “sick” Ashulia factory, the rapid spread of one factory’s upheaval to a
more general population of RMG workers signifies the more unanimous feeling of discontent
amongst workers.35
But while wage battles and riots continued to grip the RMG sector, other, more indirect
structural consequences of the RMG sector’s brutality would begin to emanate in textile factories.
In 2008, for example, there was an uptick in sightings of ghosts and witches, many of which were
said to haunt the floors of RMG factories. As a result of this, many workers actively refused to
work in these factories until their exorcism.36 Seemingly sociocultural and even irrational at first,
these sightings are more indicative of the immiserated daily life that workers lead. Low caloric
intake and grueling hours had led workers to extreme psychological problems, with one doctor
citing over one hundred cases of anxiety disorders among RMG workers per month, stating:
28“Tejgaon Garment Workers Vandalise 20 Factories,” Daily Star, September 23, 2007, https://www.thedailystar.
net/news-detail-5091.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31Ibid.
32Refayet Ullah Mridha, “Weak Trade Unions Fail to Tackle Labor Unrest,” Daily Star, September 14, 2008,
https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-54695.
33Ibid.
34Refayet Ullah Mridha, “It All Started with the Sacking in a Sick Unit,” Daily Star, June 29, 2009, https://www.
thedailystar.net/news-detail-94829?amp.
35Ibid.
36Kelsey Timmerman, “Bangladeshi Workers Attacked by Ghosts,” Where Am I Wearing? http://whereamiwearing
.com/2008/09/bangladeshi-workers-attacked-by-ghosts/.
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“Poor garment workers suffer mainly from malnutrition and anxiety, which make them weak and
vulnerable to nervous breakdown.”37
Wage battles, then, were simply the most direct and immediately recognizable point of
discontent for workers. Other problems, however, namely psychological and medical ones, were
the more indirect consequences of the structural reality of globalized production in Bangladesh.
With this perspective, “poor working conditions” are only a stand-in for a wider, underscoring
immiseration of RMG workers’ lives.
The correlation of the 2008 Financial Crisis and “sick factories” of the 2009 uprising are
still accentuations of a wider trend of the pauperization of RMG workers, with the uprising
triggered by a shift in demand and factory closure but underscored by the general discontent of
RMG workers. The psychological trauma of the workers is indicative of this immiseration that
generated the repeated violent response on behalf of workers. Nonetheless, struggle for higher
wages then defined the 2006-2010 strike wave on the ground in verbal demands, culminating in a
more extensive and persistent campaign for Tk5,000 in 2010.
The 2010 wage battle came after a global report from the International Trade Union
Confederation (ITUC) stated Bangladesh’s working conditions were some of the worst in the
world, with exploitation on the rise.38 During this strike, police fought with workers, allegedly
including children, in the streets, as workers pelted them with rocks and vandalized cars in
response to massive wage cuts.39 Feeling undermined and exploited, one rioting worker stated
“We were forced to take to the streets as the owners exploited us right under the government’s
nose. I have to spend Tk1,000 for food and Tk1,500 for house rent. How will I maintain other
things with this wage?”40 After workers blockaded roads and attacked commercial districts
throughout Dhaka, the government conceded to a fixed entry-level minimum wage at Tk3,000,
much below Tk5,000 RMG workers had been fighting for throughout the strike wave and much to
the discontent of the workers.41
Beneath the fight for Tk5,000, however, was the ever decreasing purchasing power of the
Bangladeshi worker. As studies have shown, while wages in larger industrializing countries such
as China rose in purchasing power, from 2001-2011 the purchasing power of Bangladehsi workers
fell by three dollars despite tenuous wage raises.42 To underline this decline in purchasing power,
while incidents reported by the media highlighted the largest ruptures in the Bangladeshi labor
movement, the Bangladesh Institute of Labor Studies counted 358 incidents of worker unrest
from 2008-2009 and 72 incidents in 2010.43
The labor movement itself continued into the 2010s. In 2012, worker unrest spilled over as
attacks on factories again, burning cars and ransacking around ten factories, blockading roads and
lighting barricades on fire.44 This action, starting in one Ashulia factory and spreading rapidly
amongst RMG workers, was again demonstrative of a generalized discontent with conditions.45
37Ibid.
38Jason Burke, “Children Beaten by Bangladeshi Police as They Join Garment Workers’ Strike,” Guardian, June 30,
2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/30/bangladesh-strikes-children-beaten-police.
39Ibid.
40“RMG Wage Sparks Violent Protests,” Daily Star, July 31, 2010, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-148818.
41Ibid.
42Jenni Avins and Marc Bain, “The Thing That Makes Bangladesh’s Garment Industry Such a Huge Success Also
Makes It Deadly,” Quartz, April 24, 2015, https://qz.com/389741/the-thing-that-makes-bangladeshs-garment-industrysuch-a-huge-success-also-makes-it-deadly/.
43Bjorn Claeson, “Enemies of the Nation or Human Rights Defenders?: Fighting Poverty Wages in Bangladesh,”
International Labor Rights Forum, 2010.
44“More Violence in Ashulia RMG Belt,” Daily Star, June 13, 2012.
45Ibid.
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Five months later, however, came the Tazreen fire, one of the worst industrial disasters in
Bangladeshi history, which claimed 112 lives.46 Only a year later, the Rana Plaza disaster became
the worst industrial disaster in modern human history (see above).
The direction of the labor movement’s focus, however, shifted away from wage battles alone
and added a direct response to structural disaster in factories, something that eventually garnered
worldwide attention. In 2013, after Rana Plaza, workers, assisted by residents, burned a Gap,
Wal-Mart, and Zara factory, which created $100 million in damages.47 At one point two hundred
thousand workers, while also pressing for higher wages (this time Tk8,000, perhaps after being
emboldened by a global spotlight) alongside safety standards, burned factories and even cars in
response.48
The state’s response to the factory revolts has mostly been that of repression and attempts to
circumvent this movement’s capabilities. One journalist, for example, was arrested in 2017 for
“false” reports that could incite garment workers, citing again the Labour Act as legal precedent.49
In the same incident, labor law was cited as allowing factories to close given an illegal strike.50
In 2012 Aminul Islam, a prominent labor activist, was found dead outside the city. For some
observers such as Scott Nova, executive director of the Workers’ Rights Consortium, this was a
sign of a deteriorating situation: “There have been unionists killed in clashes with the police in
the midst of protests, but no recent case of assassination. Thus, this represents a deterioration of
an already grim labor rights situation in the country.”51 A deterioration of the situation, according
to Nova, and an intensification of a state power built to stabilize and uphold the backbone of
its economy. In the wider view of the globalized developing world, these measures would be
what Mark Anner calls the despotic version of the “market control regime,” by which organized
labor is curtailed by weak labor markets and, in the case of Bangladesh (and also Indonesia),
the state attempts to exert parameters toward embryonic or underdeveloped labor movements.52
According to Anner, the establishment of the market control regime leads to workers seeking help
from international labor organizations as opposed to other forms of protest such as wildcat strikes
and riots. The peculiarity of this claim is most evident in the fact that while labor accords and
international organizations have been an undeniable part of the Bangladeshi labor movement, the
riot and factory burning has also been mobilized as a tactic in as much as the state has developed
its repressive apparatus around it.
The workers’ revolt in 2010 in response to massive wage cuts, for example, was followed
by the intensification of state power in the form of the Industrial Police, founded only months
later with the goal of preventing and monitoring labor unrest.53 The creation of the repressive
46Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Kathy Chu, and Tripti Lahiri, “Bangladesh Fire Raises Pressure to Improve Factory Safety,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2012, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732429
6604578176983283834310.
47Serajul Quadir, “Workers Burn Down Bangladesh Garment Factory That Supplied Gap, Wal-Mart, Zara,” Business
Insider, December 3, 2013, https://www.businessinsider.com/workers-burn-down-bangladesh-garment-factory-thatsupplied-gap-wal-mart-zara-2013-12.
48James Pogue, “Bangladeshi Workers are Rioting and Burning Down the Terrible Factories They Work In,” Vice,
September 24, 2013, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/znwex5/bangladeshi-workers-are-going-berserk.
49David Bergman and Muktadir Rashid, “How Repressive Law Enforcement Crushed Minimum Wage Protestors in
Bangladesh’s Garment Sector,” Wire, February 2, 2017, https://thewire.in/labour/bangladesh-garment-workers-minimumwage.
50Ibid.
51Julfikar Ali Manik and Vikas Bajaj, “Killing of Bangladeshi Labor Organizer Signals an Escalation in Violence,”
New York Times, April 9, 2012.
52Mark Anner, “Worker Resistance in Global Supply Chains: Wildcat Strikes, International Accords, and Transnational
Campaigns,” International Journal of Labour Research 7, no. 1-2 (2015): 17-18.
53“Industrial Police Launched,” Daily Star, October 4, 2010, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-157098.
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state is then the continuous unfolding of its regulatory power exerted upon the spontaneous labor
movement. Or, in the words of Home Minister Sahara Khatun: “The activities of this newly
formed branch of police is not the same as the general activities of police. It’s a specialized branch
engaged in resolving all sorts of unwanted situation in industries especially in garment sector.”54
This winding and often circular battle between the state and RMG workers that has taken place in
and around Dhaka is also more historically situated than an immediately globalized movement.
The mainstay tactic of the revolts, the riot, is also an indigenization of industrial struggle as much
as it is a response to global industrialization. The violence expressed at the hands of the workers
is a markedly South Asian tactic known as the hartal, mass rioting toward a certain political
or economic goal. These are often used by political parties, and in the case of Bangladesh the
workers’ revolts are often co-opted by them with the promise of improved conditions.
In 2013 alone, for example, hartal generated $7 billion in damage with over $200 million
for each day of strikes.55 One case points to a manager of a GAP supplier losing his truck to
a riot, resulting in 2,500 garments in flames.56 Or in other words, “it’s enough to bankrupt a
factory.”57 Thus while the hartal is a certainly indigenous tactic, it has transformed into one of
industrial labor. Given the ability of the workers to bring production not only to a standstill,
but to its demise, the hartal is the logical conclusion to the institutional restraints on labor. Its
effectivity in circumventing these limitations has made it a continuous asset of Bangladeshi labor
on the ground, with unions unable to hold workers accountable due to the superstructural divide
experienced between organized labor and workers
The strikes and hartals inflict massive financial losses – the workers’ means of disrupting this
local economic system. The function of the industrial police is therefore to stabilize the situation
against the threat of riots and strikes as well as dangers to the already low profit margins. Given
that the draw of foreign investment in Bangladesh is low wages, the primary object of the state is
the defense of its economic interests, and granting a living wage to Bangladeshi workers would
be severely detrimental. The state then has no option but to weaponize itself to suit the needs of
an ever-mobile capital. In 2012 factory owners in parliament actively worked to undermine and
block legislation after the Tazreen disaster that might have improved general working conditions.
When speaking of this move, Ifty Islam, a managing partner at a Dhaka-based asset management
company stated “it’s hard to continue to improve factory compliance when there’s ever-increasing
downward pressure on the prices that global retailers are willing to pay.”58 This structural conflict
between workers and industrialists is entirely within the theater of globalized production.
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As has been seen earlier, Bangladeshi RMG workers are up against large institutional limitations
under the pressure of market forces. These limitations include the “superstructural divide”
between workers and unions as well as the criminalization of strikes through legislation such as
the Bangladesh Labour Act of 2006. Other notable limitations include the corruption in political
parties and lack of coherent and direct international support for the workers’ movement. These
54“Resolve Anarchy in Industrial Sector with Sincerity: Sahara,” Daily Star, December 5, 2010,
https://www.thedailystar. net/news-detail-164826.
55Patrick Barta, “Culture of Mass Strikes Suffocates Bangaldesh’s Economy,” Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2013,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323971204578628043063823914.
56Ibid.
57Ibid.
58Al-Mahmood et al., “Bangladesh Fire Raises Pressure.”
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limitations have helped shape the workers’ response to their immiseration by forcing them to be
spontaneous rather than organized and destructive of industry as opposed to engaging in peaceful
negotiations with industrialists. These workers, however, are not simply responding to a lack of
institutional, parliamentary political power, but rather the riot is political in its nature as a tactic
when striking at a center point of global textile production.
Among the idiosyncrasies of the capitalist world economy is the unity of the political and
economic. That is, no longer does economic or political power rest only in town or country
respectively, but the dominant political class is also the dominant economic class. Economic
struggles become political struggles, and vice versa. As Engels notes of England’s great urban
transformation in The Condition of the Working Class in England:
They [the workers] were comfortable in their silent vegetation, and but for the
industrial revolution they would never have emerged from this existence, which,
cozily romantic as it was, was nevertheless not worthy of human beings. In truth,
they were not human beings; they were merely toiling machines in the service of the
few aristocrats who had guided history down to that time. The industrial revolution
has simply carried this out to its logical conclusion by making the workers machines
pure and simple, taking from them the last trace of independent activity and so
forcing them to think and demand a position worthy of men. As in France politics, so
in England manufacture, and the movement of civil society in general drew into the
whirl of history the last classes which had remained sunk in apathetic indifference to
the universal interests of mankind.59
Insofar as the Bangladeshi working class has been the product of an industrialization process
on a mass scale, its entrance into the city and the world of production is an entrance into the
political-economic realm. Its assault against the factories and struggle with industrialists and
the global economy are a means of testing their political power as much as they are improving
working conditions; in fact the two are essentially the same. The political immobility of corrupt
parliamentary politics is shaken off in the avenues of the general strike and riot.
But RMG workers are also marked by a distinctive precarity and thus marginalization in their
working and living conditions. That is, the workers are superfluous, unskilled, and ultimately
disposable to industry. The slum, in this case, embodies this facet of their existence, as it is a
living condition equal to the overall cost of their labor (see below). These spaces are cramped,
overpopulated, subject to eviction, and prone to massive life-threatening fires. In the words of
a female garment worker when speaking with a researcher: “You want to know about our life.
Housing is the biggest problem. Today ‘shorkar’ (government) is coming to evict us at 10:30am.
So we don’t have much time to talk. We don’t know what will happen after that.”60
The phenomenon of the slum, however, is not new to industrialization; to the contrary, in fact,
as Engels noted in his own time: “Every great city has one or more slums, where the working
class is crowded together. True, poverty often dwells in hidden alleys close to the palaces of the
rich; but, in general, a separate territory has been assigned to it, where, removed from the sight
of the happier classes, it may struggle along as it can.”61 The massive growth of slums is also
not confined to Bangladesh alone, but is to be discovered in many parts of the developing world
59Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (Reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),
17, emphasis added.
60Syeda Sharmin Absar, “Women Garment Workers in Bangladesh,” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 29
(2002): 3012-3016.
61Ibid., 39.
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as the transition from rural to urban accelerates beyond the planning capabilities of third-world
states. In the age of the globalization, the slum is the primary living condition of the growing
urban poor in the Global South. The slum is then the globalized form of the capitalist city. Mike
Davis, writing on the slum and the global city in the present day in Planet of Slums, states:
Thus, the cities of the future, rather than being made out of glass and steel as
envisioned by earlier generations of urbanists, are instead largely constructed out of
crude brick, straw, recycled plastic, cement blocks, and scrap wood. Instead of cities
of light soaring toward heaven, much of the twenty-first century urban world squats
in squalor, surrounded by pollution, excrement, and decay. Indeed, the one billion
city-dwellers who inhabit postmodern slums might well look back with envy at the
ruins of the sturdy mud homes of Çatal Hüyük in Anatolia, erected at the very dawn
of city life nine thousand years ago.62
As is discussed in the UN’s thorough and Engelsian 2003 report, The Challenge of Slums,
slums owe their existence in part due to the lack of political mobilization or even the ability to do
so among residents.63 Slums in Bangladesh are also conducive to riots, as the enclosed terrain
is within walking proximity to the factory, their starkest reminder of exploitation and general
suffering. As Hobsbawm noted, the emergence of riots in the late twentieth century was due in
large part to:
[T]he increase in the number of buildings worth rioting against or occupying, and
the development in their vicinity of accumulations of potential rioters. For while it
is true that the headquarters of central and municipal government are increasingly
remote from the riotous quarters, and the rich or noble rarely live in palaces in the
town centers (apartments are both less vulnerable and more anonymous), sensitive
institutions of other kinds have multiplied. There are the communications centers
(telegraph, telephone, radio, television). The least experienced organizer of a military
coup or insurrection knows all about their importance.64
For the Bangladeshi RMG workers, their sensitive institutions are the factories, transportation
trucks, and highways, symbols of their relationship with the supply chain. With the Industrial
Police mobilized to contain and repress this immiserated population from reprisal, the reality of
this socio-political battleground becomes clear. Slums allow industrialists to keep the working
class benign to their own political power, a means of disarming them in squalor. The hartal as a
tactic is then a strategic intervention to force the hand of the industrialists and the state. The riot is
the most formidable response to problems that the state and parliamentary democracy have failed
to ameliorate. Thus, the socio-political context of the slum becomes gradually more evident in
light of the reality of workers’ limited institutional political power.
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The slum, in the case of the globalized Bangladeshi industrial landscape, also carries an economic
function. As the global labor force grows at an exponential rate, those within these slums are
62Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (New York: Verso, 2017), 17.
63United Nations Human Settlements Program, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003
(London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications, 2003), 68.
64Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Cities and Insurrections,” Global Urban Development Magazine 1, no. 1 (May 2005).
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being accommodated for their labor with this housing. In this way, their housing is seen as equal
to their value as workers. At first this seems obtuse and anecdotal, but slums in themselves are
critical as a site of this production process. For industrialists, in fact, the stagnant conditions of the
slums make workers an easily accessible pool of cheap labor, often for informalized production.
Slums, therefore, are a tool of capital accumulation, a place where labor power, the catalyzing
commodity of production, can be maintained at a low cost.
Informalization, precarity, and globalized production then go hand in hand with the slum:
When a large portion of an urban population resides in slums and squatter settlements
(for example, in Mumbai, Mexico City or Dhaka), the hiring prospects for small
industrial and service firms are enhanced because labor costs are kept low by
severe job competition among a plentiful labor supply in the informal sector. The
tradeoff is that an expanding informal labor market increases wage instability, job
turnover, the exploitation of women and children in low-wage jobs, and the income
disparity between socio-economic groups. Currently, dominant globalization and the
associated “informalization” of the economy that is seen in many places is not only
widening the chasm between rich and poor, but also generates “a large growth in the
demand for low-wageworkers and for jobs that offer few advancement possibilities.”
Increasingly, the informalization of low-wage jobs becomes the burden of women
and new immigrants.65
In Bangladesh and Dhaka, this informal sector composes 65 percent of workers overall.66
The city’s poor, while making up 70 percent of the city’s population, inhabit only 20 percent of
the area.67 This massive urban population is then surplus to production; it shares only a tentative
and marginal relation to production, and is disposable, as mass dismissals during strikes have
demonstrated. Its fluidity in production then allows it to be immediately malleable and used in
shifts in production.
In the RMG sector specifically, informalization has been critical to cope with large and sudden
shifts in global demand while maintaining production levels. According to an NYU study, the
total number of export volumes fluctuated, but exporter numbers remained the same, meaning
that exporters use informalization to accommodate to a number of shifts.68 This strategy is
built to ensure the RMG sector’s security in the global marketplace, yet is hinged on lowering
wages, quickly building new factories with the same machinery, and dramatically extending the
working day. While direct exporters “assume responsibility of every aspect of production,” the
informal sector allows producers to circumvent minimum wage laws and safety standards that
would otherwise damage already fragile profit margins.69 In two sub-districts of Dhaka alone, 32
percent of the 479 factories were informal.70
On one hand, the necessity of low wages to stabilize profit margins and preserve the RMG
sector is a response to the global economy’s incentivization of them. On the other hand, workers
are condemned to stagnant mobility as a result. In the informal sector, this means harsher labor
practices and lower wages. In the formal sector, however, RMG workers are also marked by
65United Nations, The Challege of Slums, 68.
66Davis, Planet of Slums, 116-117.
67Ibid., 94-95.
68Dorthée Baumann-Pauly and Sarah Labowitz, “Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg: Bangladesh’s Forgotten Apparel Workers,” NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, 2015, http://people.stern.nyu.edu/twadhwa/
bangladesh/downloads/beyond_the_tip_of_the_iceberg_report.pdf.
69Ibid.
70Ibid.
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a distinctive precarity and thus marginalization to the production process. The most obvious
example of this general condition is the mass firings following labor disputes.
In 2016, RMG workers mobilized in a spontaneous strike in response to the torture of workers,
rising rent/market prices, and unsafe conditions without compensation. When the strike began,
factory owners immediately shut down around eighty-four factories, firing workers en masse.
Upon doing this, industrialists declared the strike illegal due to its spontaneity, and their actions
justified under article 13(1) of the Labour Act.71 In 2019 around five thousand workers would
be fired; three thousand would have cases filed against them, and one hundred arrested, with
Ben Venpeperstraete (garment labor activist) claiming the government was actively working to
suppress the labor movement.72
The disposable RMG workers are also some of the least productive in comparison to regional
competitors, such as those of Sri Lanka, South Korea, and Hong Kong, yet the industry has
managed its competitive advantage of low wages predicated on the labor of these unskilled female
workers.73 In order to compensate for low skills and flatlined technological improvements, the
Bangladeshi industrialist has also extended the working day. In one study, for example, it was
found that 72 percent of respondent RMG workers labored 10 to 12 hours a day, 12 percent
working more than that.74
This informalization and extension of the working day has been done in part to ensure
production quotas stay in place without having to make costly improvements to existing constant
capital in order to stay afloat in the market. The brutality that the RMG workers are up against
often comes not only in the form of the aforementioned production strategies, but from their
productive consequences. The most obvious and infamous example being the Rana Plaza disaster
and Tazreen industrial fire (see above). The former being the result of a low quality and expedited
three-floor addition to the factory and the latter due to the lack of adequate fire escapes and
alarms. While the Bangladeshi labor revolts themselves attracted limited international attention,
the disasters would elicit an unparalleled global response to the textile industry.
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With the unprecedented disaster at Rana Plaza shocking the world, the cyclical dynamics
of Bangladesh’s RMG sector became a focal point of international labor and human rights
organizations. While abusive and exploitative working conditions have been a focal point of
global concern for many years, the response to Rana Plaza directly challenged the ethics of
the global supply chain and the consumer habits of western citizens. Corporations that source
heavily from Bangladesh, such as H&M, Walmart, and Gap, immediately had to answer for their
participation in this dynamic. While numerous solutions were generated, they have yet to prove
their enforceability or capacity to undermine the weight of the global market in the Bangladeshi
dynamic.
71Ibrahim Hossain Ovi and Nadim Hossain Savar, “What Are the Ashulia Protests About?” Dhaka Tribune, December
22, 2016.
72“Almost 5,000 Bangladeshi Garment Workers Sacked Over Strikes,” Al-Jazeera, January 29, 2019.
73K. M. Faridul Hasan et al., “Role of Textile and Clothing Industries in the Growth and Development of Trade and
Business Strategies of Bangladesh in the Global Economy,” International Journal of Textile Science 5, no. 3 (2016):
39-48.
74Md Islam and Kamrul Dilara Zahid, “Socioeconomic Deprivation and Garment Worker Movement in Bangladesh:
A Sociological Analysis,” American Journal of Sociological Research 2, no. 4 (2012): 82-84.
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In the immediate aftermath of this disaster came the Accord on Fire and Building Safety,
drafted by the IndustriALL Global Union and the UNI Global Union to create a framework
by which the structural safety of factories could be ensured through cooperation between trade
unions and industrialists. The Accord was signed by H&M, American Eagle, Hugo Boss, and
several others.75 Following this, North American companies created their own Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety to achieve a similar task on their own terms. The Alliance was signed
by Gap, Fruit of the Loom, Kohl’s, Walmart, and others.76 Both of these frameworks hope to
make safety standards an enforceable and necessary facet of Bangladeshi industry in response to
the disaster. As direct connections were drawn between retail corporations and the Rana Plaza
factory in the supply chain, prevention of this disaster also became a growingly pertinent issue for
the stability of the brands’ reputations.77 With renewed and mounting pressure campaigns, the
Bangladeshi situation, while already globalized, was experiencing an intensified form of globality.
Globalization then became the object of critique in the ideal as well as material form. The Accord
and Alliance would address these concerns.
But as the material was being drafted, doubts concerning these policies were already fomenting.
In an interview with Huffington Post, Amirul Haque Amin, president of the National Garment
Workers Federation, said, “Improvement is not happening.” The news outlet reported:
[A] total of 600 workers have died in factory accidents in the last decade. “The
multinational companies claim a lot of things. They claim they have very good
policies, they have their own code of conduct, they have their auditing and monitoring
system,” Amin said. “But yet these things keep happening.”78
The same article also noted that the Tazreen and Rana Plaza buildings both passed inspection,
and checklist regulation standards in the hands of approved NGOs might not be sufficient to truly
ameliorate the situation.79 Indeed, the sheer number of factories in Dhaka alone presented a
challenge in terms of enforceability, where the application of both the Accord and Alliance may be
insufficient to truly tackle the issue. The Accord itself requires corporations to contribute money
directly toward the safety inspection efforts, holding them partially responsible by requiring a
$500,000 a year donation for these purposes.80 For this reason, Walmart and H&M believed
that the primary responsibility for factory safety lies in the hands of the Bangladeshi state and
industry, giving impetus to the creation of the Alliance.81 International labor organizers, such
as UNI Global Union general secretary Philip Jennings, claimed Walmart had “sunk to a new
low” by doing this.82 As widespread as the concern for Bangladesh’s place in the supply chain
was, it was unable to apply itself directly to the point of production and force the hand the global
economy’s largest interlocuters.
While concerns for the Accord and Alliance’s enforceability grew and the mainstays of the
supply chain attempted to shirk responsibility, the structural reality of the Bangladeshi situation
was soon to be realized by many adherents of international labor liberalism. The capacity for large
75Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, accessed December, 5, 2019, https://bangladeshaccord.org.
76Alliance for Bangladesh Workers Safety, accessed December 5, 2019, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/.
77Steven Greenhouse, “As Firms Line Up on Factories, Wal-Mart Plans Solo Effort,” New York Times, May 14, 2013,
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/business/six-retailers-join-bangladesh-factory-pact.html?pagewanted=all.
78Kay Johnson, “Major Retailers Rejected Bangladesh Factory Safety Plan,” Huffington Post, April 26, 2013.
79Ibid.
80Accord on Fire and Building Safety.
81Johnson, “Major Retailers Rejected.”
82IndustriALL Global Union, “We Made It! – Global Breakthrough as Retail Brands Sign Up to Bangladesh Factory
Safety Deal,” accessed December 5, 2019, http://www.industriall-union.org/we-made-it-global-breakthrough-as-retailbrands-sign-up-to-bangladesh-factory-safety-deal.
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international labor organizations to directly mediate and stabilize the situation was growingly dim.
As Doug Miller presciently pointed out, liberalization of trade had left enforcement of global
policy in an ambiguous place; thus agreements made even in collective bargaining (as opposed to
unilateral codes of conduct) can be circumvented through EPZs and informalization.83
As time continued, studies began to show the Alliance and Accord to have had little general
impact on Bangladeshi factory safety. As Miller noted, not only were producers able to circumvent
newly imposed standards and codes of conduct, but informal factories were virtually impossible
to track by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and could not be held accountable to
any standards. In one case, the ILO had mismeasured the sheer number of workers in the RMG
sector by one million, as discovered in an NYU Stern study.84 Thus, the Accord’s program of
remediation and training was only touching the “tip of the iceberg.”85
While other studies argued that informalization had not curtailed the observational capability
of the Accord, the Bangladeshi situation would continue to unravel and escape the public eye as
time went on.86 As recently as 2019, fifty thousand workers launched wildcat strikes over poor
pay.87 After mass vandalism and looting, twelve thousand workers were fired indiscriminately.
H&M responded, stating that they were “closely monitoring the situation.”88 Soon some began
to question the impact of the Accord, arguing that while it provided a level of safety standards,
it conveniently gleaned over the workers’ rights to organize and establish a minimum wage.
Chaumtoli Huq, a labor law professor at CUNY stated, “What’s odd is that you have these
two parallel movements—you have the Accord piece and you have the wages and unionization
piece.”89 Thus while providing an amount of stability and mediation between workers and bosses,
the international labor movement is seeing its capabilities challenged at the point of production.
At the point of production there then remains the dynamic between the workers, the state, and
global capital.
C
As has been uncovered, the dynamic of the Bangladeshi labor movement is a decidedly global one.
Workers have responded (and are actively responding) to globalized industrial conditions, being
led by economic forces into packed cities and slums; their industrial experience has been marked
by inflexible, substandard, low wages to meet market demands. The institutional limitations
placed upon the RMG workers generated a tenacious movement and, indeed, attack on the global
supply chain. But as mentioned earlier, globalized production in Bangladesh is also stagnating
rapidly, as the RMG sector plateaued and then declined in the nation’s overall GDP makeup. Thus
while attempts at maintaining quotas by extending the working day and the previously discussed
83Doug Miller, “Preparing for the Long Haul: Negotiating International Framework Agreements in the Global Textile,
Garment and Footwear Section,” Global Social Policy 4, no. 2 (2004): 215-239.
84Gillian B. White, “Are Factories in Bangladesh Any Safer Now?” Atlantic, December 17, 2015, https://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/bangladesh-factory-workers/421005/.
85Ibid.
86Jennifer Bair and Mark Anner, “The Bulk of the Iceberg: A Critique of the Stern Center’s Report on Worker
Safety in Bangladesh,” PennState Center for Global Workers Rights, 2016, https://ler.la.psu.edu/gwr/documents/
CGWRCritiqueofSternReport.pdf.
87Saurav Sarkar, “Bangladesh Accord Gets a Lifeline While Workers Organize Wildcat Strikes,” Labor Notes, August
6, 2019, https://www.labornotes.org/2019/08/bangladesh-accord-gets-lifeline-while-workers-organize-wildcat-strikes.
88“Bangladesh: Widespread Garment Worker Protests Over Minimum Wage Increase; Leads to Mass Dismissals,”
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre.
89Sarkar, “Bangladesh Accord.”
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informalization managed to stabilize the situation, a decline in the industry’s overall growth is
looming. A potential crisis of overproduction would bring about a significant and potentially
devastating change to Bangladeshi labor and economy.
As the situation continues to unravel and the internal dynamic is seemingly unending, the
future of Bangladesh remains in relation to the global market and its own internal conditions, as
was the genesis of its industrial system. The Bangladeshi labor movement has responded and
continues to respond to this by its own means, slowly gaining wages and continuing to apply real
terminal pressure on Bangladeshi industrialists without restraint. Whatever the result of this labor
movement may be, it will be indicative of industrialization in a globalized capitalist economy, as
have the lessons of the Bangladeshi labor movement.
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Japanese Economic Aggression, Organized Labor’s
Resistance, and the Path to World War II
T ho mas M il es
This paper examines economic aggression from the Japanese fishing fleet beginning in 1936 and the response from
organized labor in America prior to the famous attack on Pearl Harbor. The focus of this is research is primarily from the
perspective of American labor, drawing heavily on the Voice of the Federation newspaper, which was a publication owned
by the Maritime Federation of the Pacific. The US government was aware of encroachment of Japanese floating canneries
in 1936, but took little action against Japan in order to avoid worsening tensions between the two nations. However, in
1937 Harry Stuhr, the head of the Alaskan Fisherman’s Union, observed and photographed the Japanese vessel named the
Taiyo Maru and encouraged organized labor to petition Congress, institute a boycott on Japanese goods, and instigated
anti-Japanese sentiment across the US. The result would be the exacerbation of racial stereotypes against the Japanese,
increased public fears of war, and eventually the establishment of international conservation zones.

I
In explaining the origins of the war between the United States and Japan, historians emphasize
Japanese territorial aggression in Asia, pointing to such well-known examples such as Japan’s
attacks on Manchuria in 1931, China in 1937, and the East Indies and Indochina in 1941.1
Japanese expansionism was certainly the most important factor in the rise of tensions between the
United States and Japan, but historians have given much less attention to the economic dimension
of the struggle between these two nations. During the latter half of the 1930s, the United
States and Japan were already in conflict, however, this conflict was not over Japanese territorial
expansion, but over issues concerning natural resources. In 1936, Japan sent an exploratory
mission across the Bering Sea and into Bristol Bay, Alaska. The following year the appearance of
a large commercial fishing vessel, the Taiyo Maru, signaled the full expansion of the Japanese
salmon fishing industry into Bristol Bay, touching off a three-year struggle over fishing rights
between Japan and the United States.2 This expansion was part of Japan’s search throughout the
Pacific and Asia for food and other natural resources. Americans responded fiercely to what they
considered Japanese incursion into their waters. Fearful that the Japanese large-scale fishing
would decimate the salmon, the Alaskan Fisherman’s Union, with the critical support of the
Maritime Federation of the Pacific and other elements of the labor movement, joined forces
to contest Japanese commercial fishing off the coast Alaska. In defense of American fishing
interests, the unions launched a nationwide boycott, a traditional labor tactic, against Japanese
goods. This boycott was also aimed at protesting the dumping of cheap Japanese products on
Thomas Miles received a BA in History with a minor in Political Science in 2020. His research interests include
twentieth-century American labor history, twentieth-century American foreign policy, and decolonization in East Africa.
1See for example: Walter LeFeber, The Clash: US–Japanese Relations Throughout History (New York: Viking,
1989); Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York: Norton, 1997); Waldo
Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988); Dana Frank, Buy American: The Untold Story of Economic Nationalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005),
96-99.
2Ross Coen, “Owning the Ocean,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 104, no. 3 (2013): 133.
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the American market and at the Japanese invasion of China. Maritime unionists and West Coast
politicians also called for legislation to protect the fishing grounds and pressured a reluctant
State Department to intervene. This public pressure helped intensify the existing anti-Japanese
sentiment across the nation and led to action by the State Department to force the Japanese out of
the waters near Alaska and contributed to heightened tensions between the two nations.3
B
In the early twentieth century, Japan, which has a small land mass and few natural economic
resources, had a growing population and surging imperial ambitions. The depression of the
thirties and worldwide economic nationalism cut Japan off from its traditional markets and
“heightened the sense of vulnerability that came from its lack of raw materials and adequate
foodstuff.”4 In 1931 to help alleviate these problems, Japan used military force to gain control
of Manchuria, which was rich in agricultural production such as soybeans and wheat, as well
as minerals like copper and iron, all of which were in high demand in Japan and were imported
from other nations. The takeover of Manchuria and then its invasion of China in 1937 were the
opening moves of Japan’s larger strategy of gaining economic security through foreign conquest.
Americans were sympathetic to the plight of the Chinese, especially after viewing images of
Japanese violence against Chinese civilians. President Franklin Roosevelt called for a “quarantine”
against aggression, which heightened tension between the United States and Japan, which saw the
US as a barrier to its economic domination of Asia.5
The Japanese also looked to the sea to address its food shortages and to provide a product
for export. Fish was a critical part of the Japanese diet, and in 1935 fish products made up 20
percent of Japan’s exports. Fishing and canning provided employment to one and a half million
Japanese. Salmon was a particularly valuable commodity for export. In the thirties Japan was
even more aggressively expanding its fishing fleet and sought access to new fishing grounds,
including the rich salmon fisheries of the North Pacific. In the spring of 1936, the Japanese Diet
approved funding for a three-year survey of fishing resources in the Alaskan waters, seeking
particularly salmon and trout, and in the early summer sent several ships into Bristol Bay to begin
investigating the salmon run.
The movement of the Japanese boats into the waters off Alaska threatened the US fishing
industry as did Japan’s adoption of innovative fishing processing methods that were much more
efficient than American methods. The Japanese developed “floating canneries that made their
fishing fleets much more productive.”6 These were large Japanese fishing vessels that cast
extra-wide nets, with some being reported to being three miles wide in deep waters that enabled
3While there has been a study of the diplomatic negotiations between the US State Department and the Japanese
government over the Japanese incursion, the role of the labor movement in putting economic pressure on Japan through
its public relations activities and a boycott has been ignored. Jonathan G. Utley, “Japanese Exclusion From American
Fisheries, 1936-1939: The Department of State and the Public Interest,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 65, no.1 (January
1974): 8-16.
4David M. Kennedy, The American People at War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 76.
5F. R. Eldridge, “Manchuria-The Race for New Resources,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 168 (1933): 95-103; Kaoru Sugihara, “The Economic Motivations behind Japanese Aggression in the Late 1930s:
Perspectives of Freda Utley and Nawa Toichi,” Journal of Contemporary History 32 (1997): 259–280; Herbert Feis, The
Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of War Between the United States and Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1950).
6Kathleen Barnes, “The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific,” Far Eastern Survey 5, no. 23 (1936): 243-247.
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them to capture massive numbers of fish.7 One American fishing captain described the size of
these nets by comparing the lights on them to the outline of a small city at night.8 These vessels
could then process and can the salmon without having to return to shore and drop off their catch
at a cannery before returning to fishing unlike their American counterparts.9 This style of vessel
was originally used in 1930 as part of the Japanese crab fleet, but was adapted to salmon fishing
in 1936.10
Sightings of these ships in 1936 and 1937 alarmed American fishermen. The salmon fishing
industry was the largest and most productive industry in Alaska during the 1930s, with upper
estimates from tax receipts indicating that it accounted for 80 percent of total revenue in the
region.11 In 1937, the North Pacific Salmon Fisheries, which included British Columbia, employed
an estimated 64,000 people in Alaska, Washington, and Oregon, all of which hosted ports for the
North Pacific Salmon fleet, which employed 18.6 percent of all fisherman and 22.7 percent of all
secondary industries related to fishing, such as processing and transportation.12 By harming one
aspect of the economy, repercussions would be felt throughout the rest of the territory and also the
states of Washington and Oregon. This industry was so important that it was carefully regulated
by the federal government, with limitations on the length of the fishing season, the types of boats
that could be utilized and the fishing methods. The conservation goals of the Bureau of Fisheries
stated that half of all salmon were to escape netting in order to maintain the population.13
Since the industry was so significant in the region, it should come as no surprise that fishing
unions emerged in Alaska and in the Pacific Northwest to defend the rights of its workers. These
unions were far from homogeneous and included fierce competition between differing ideological
values, particularly whether or not these unions should represent the larger interests of West Coast
Fisheries or maintain a more local Alaskan focus. More locally oriented was the Alaskan Native
Brotherhood (ANB) that championed the interests of the Native Alaskan fishermen. Alaskan
Delegate Anthony Dimond was a strong advocate for the smaller local unions.14 The Alaskan
Fisherman’s Union (AFU), which was the first organization to call for a response to the Japanese
encroachment, belonged to the former group, with its headquarters actually based in Seattle. It
should be noted that the AFU also segregated its fishermen during the era and prioritized the
Caucasian fisherman through means such as directing minority (both Native Alaskan and Asian
American) vessels to less desirable regions. This provided precedent for later racial stereotyping
and attacks in the reports of Japanese fishing vessels. By 1936, all of Alaska’s fishing unions,
however, were under the larger union organization of the Maritime Federation of the Pacific
(MFP), which represented the entire West Coast fishing industry in collective bargaining. The
MFP was affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which was a large
conglomeration of industrial unions in the United States and had recently broken off from the
American Federation of Labor.15
7Marcus A. Rose, “Japanese Poaching in Alaskan Waters,” Reader’s Digest 31 (1937): 97-100.
8“Witnessed at Bristol Bay; Poachers Menace U.S. Unions,” Voice of the Federation, October 7, 1937, 8.
9Barnes, “The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific,” 245.
10Alaska Salmon Fishery. Hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives,
Seventy-Fifth Congress, Third Session, on H.R. 8344, 1938, 12; Cordell Hull, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in
Japan, June 5, 1937, 745.
11Frank Richardson Pierce, “Are Fish Citizens?” Saturday Evening Post, November 6, 1937.
12Otis W. Freeman, “Salmon Industry of the Pacific Coast,” Economic Geography 11, no. 2 (1935): 109-129.
13Rose, “Japanese Poaching in Alaskan Waters.”
14David F. Arnold, The Fishermen’s Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast Alaska (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2008), 146.
15Ibid., 150-155.
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In the 1930s, there was very little established international law that dealt with commercial
fishing and conservation. The only rule regulating international fishing was the “three-mile rule.”
While this rule is believed to be of Dutch origins, it was accepted into international law due to its
use by England and France in the nineteenth century when they were regarded as two of the most
prominent maritime powers.16 This was supposed to be roughly equivalent to the distance a canon
could fire during that time period, so it was not originally meant to be for commercial intent.17
This rule stated that each nation had territorial control, including commercial exploitation, up to
three miles away from its coast. This proved to be a contentious issue, as the Japanese were within
their legal right to fish in Bristol Bay. They did not encroach upon the three-mile limit, since the
Taiyo Maru was twenty-eight miles from the shore. The matter was complicated, however, as the
salmon were most definitely spawned in Alaskan streams, thus creating a case for the debate that
the salmon were in some way US property, a view adopted by many of the fishermen.18
Other natural resources throughout the Pacific had greatly suffered from Japanese exploitation.
One of these was the fur seal that had been hunted to near extinction by Japanese hunters
engaged in large hunting trips until the US, Russia, Canada, Great Britain, and Japan agreed to a
conservation act in 1911 to preserve the animals.19 It is important to note that it was Japanese
hunting techniques, which did not discriminate on the sex of the seal, that directly led to the
near extinction of the animal.20 Japan was also expanding into Antarctic whaling as well as tuna
fishing off of the coast of southeast China and the Philippines. Japan also had previously fished
salmon throughout Soviet waters following the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. This led
to the Japanese fishing industry to expand its operations into Kamtchka and the Okhotsk Sea.
However, due to immense domestic demand as well as growing demand from their primary export
market, Great Britain, the Japanese felt pressure to expand their canned fish production.21 This
was already previously seen with their cod fishing fleet. In Seattle, the American cod fishing fleet
was reduced down to two or three schooners after being unable to compete with the Japanese fleet
throughout the early 1930s.22 This helps explain the worries of the Alaskan Fisherman’s Union
as it had seen what could happen to an entire commercial fleet after over fishing occurs.
There were also strategic incentives for Japan to garner a secure hold on the Pacific salmon
industry if one assumes the nation was projecting the need to supply military forces spread out
through the Pacific. This would make sense as the Second Sino-Japanese War began July 7, 1937,
the very same week the Taiyo Maru was spotted near Alaska. Much as some historians interpret
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria to be a strategic move in order to secure iron for the Japanese
growing military, one can argue that Japan had similar motives for developing a new means of
efficiently catching and processing massive amounts of salmon without returning regularly to
port.23 This would have proved useful in providing food to feed a growing military in the Pacific.
The call to boycott Japanese goods by the Maritime Federation to protest Japan’s encroachment
on the schools of salmon spawned in Alaska was not the only reason to boycott Japanese goods.
16Edward Allen. “The North Pacific Fisheries,” Pacific Affairs 10, no. 2 (1937): 136-151.
17“Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries; Unions Hard Hit by Pressure of Cheap Coolie Competition,” Voice of the
Federation, September 2, 1937, 1, 8.
18Kathleen Barnes and Homer E. Gregory, “Alaska Salmon in World Politics,” Far Eastern Survey 7, no. 5 (1938):
47-53.
19“Making the Fur Seal Abundant,” National Geographic Magazine 22, no. 12 (December 1911): 1139.
20Barnes, “The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific,” 244-245.
21Nagaharu Yasuo, “The North Ocean Fishery in Japan’s Economic Life,” Far Eastern Survey 8, no. 9 (1939):
106-108.
22“Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries,” 1, 8; Gordon Ireland, “The North Pacific Fisheries,” American Journal of
International Law 36, no. 3 (1942): 400-424.
23Eldridge, “Manchuria-The Race for New Resources,” 136-151.
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There already was a boycott against Japanese goods initiated in 1931 on a small scale by ChineseAmericans to protest the Japanese takeover of Manchuria. This escalated almost in sync with the
call to boycott Japanese goods by the fishing unions, as the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War
in 1937 inspired individuals from across the nation to boycott Japanese products as a means of
condemning Japanese imperialism. This boycott also was endorsed by the American Federation
of Labor as well as the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as part of a larger “buy American”
sentiment.24 As such, when discussing the effects of the Japanese boycott it is important to
keep in mind that these two boycotts, while separately organized and inspired, had the same
goal of discouraging American consumption of Japanese-made goods and services, and thus
it is impossible to completely isolate which boycott resulted in what percentage profit loss for
Japanese companies.
C
The first official evidence of Japanese commercial fishing off of the coast of Alaska occurred on
June 8, 1936. The United States Coast Guard observed a vessel named the Chichibu Maru fishing
salmon with gill nets in the Bering Sea. The State Department pursued an inquiry with Foreign
Affairs in Tokyo, but the Japanese government simply replied that the fishing vessel was only
licensed to fish in Siberian waters and must have been off course.25
The appearance around the same time of the Japanese survey ships in Bristol Bay aroused yet
more concern in Alaska. There were fears that these non-commercial Japanese vessels threatened
Alaska’s security, both economically and militarily. There were charges that these Japanese
ships were spying on Alaska to assess it as a point of invasion, in particular the Aleutians. The
concerns about suspected Japanese espionage under the guise of surveying the fisheries off of
the Alaskan coast were brought to the US House Merchant Marine Committee by New York
Representative William Sirovich and Alaskan Territory Delegate and union ally, Anthony J.
Dimond. Representative Sirovich asserted that Japan was spying on the coast in order to “grab
Alaska and thus provide a food supply for the fish-eating Japanese people.”26
In February 1937 representatives of a worried Seattle Central Labor Council wrote to President
Roosevelt asking him to keep the Japanese away from the Alaskan fishing ground and helped
launch a letter writing campaign addressed to multiple government agencies including the
Commerce Department and the State Department, demanding government action to protect
Alaska. Delegate Dimond and other members of Congress from the Pacific Northwest also
pressured the State Department to defend the fishing and cannery industries. Washington Senator
Lewis B. Schwellenbach called on the State Department to negotiate an international agreement
excluding the Japanese from the Alaskan fisheries.27
As of June 5, 1937, the federal government had not yet responded to the concerns of
espionage that had been raised or concerns about the depletion of Alaskan salmon. The State
Department was opposed to any unilateral exclusion, fearing it would have a negative impact on
Japanese-American relations and that it would undermine Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s belief
in “free trade and reasonable access to the world’s resources” as a means of preventing war. As a
result, there was “no feeling of urgency” in the State Department about the Japanese incursion.
24Frank, Buy American, 96.
25Hull, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan, 745-746.
26“Japanese Spying in Alaska Charged,” New York Times, February 7, 1937, 12.
27Utley, “Japanese Exclusion from American Fisheries,” 9.
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Instead of confronting Japan, the State Department began working on a treaty for an international
salmon conservation organization. Aware that there were rumblings in the labor movement about
organizing a boycott of Japanese imports, the State Department sought to stifle the fishermen’s
protests rather than seeking a diplomatic solution favorable to the salmon industry.28
The following month on July 7, 1937, the Taiyo Maru, the huge Japanese cannery ship
accompanied by a number of smaller support vessels, was spotted twenty-eight miles from Alaska
again by the Coast Guard as well as by observers in a plane, including Harry Stuhr, who was
an AFU organizer and would became a major advocate for the union resistance to the economic
threat posed by the Japanese fishing fleet, writing regular articles about the struggle in the Voice of
the Federation, the MFP’s official newspaper.29 What made this event different from the Chichibu
Maru was both its greater proximity to Alaska and the fact that Agent Wingard of the United
States Bureau of Fisheries flew out of Alaska to the ship to verify Stuhr’s observation. Both
Stuhr and Wingard took several photographs from the air of the ships’ operations. These photos
included images of gill nets, the smaller Japanese fishing vessels that served the “mother ship,”
and most damning: massive amounts of salmon on the upper deck and a strange stack that ejected
water occasionally, suggesting that the salmon was being canned on board. They shared this
information with Delegate Dimond, which added fuel to Diamond’s campaign against Japanese
incursions into Alaskan fishing grounds.30 The Japanese government’s repeated claims that the
only Japanese fishing in the Bristol Bay area was for cod and crab now fell flat, as newspaper
articles about Japanese activity reached the American people.31
This incident provided the ammunition needed for union organizers to make their move. On
July 10, 1937, Stuhr’s charges were already published in the New York Times, along with those of
H. B. Friele of the Nakat Packing Corporation.32 Friele was the chairman of the board of the
Association of Pacific Fisheries and was with Stuhr when he observed the Taiyo Maru two days
prior. Together, they denounced the Japanese government and condemned it for its complacency
in unlicensed salmon fishing off the Alaskan Coast.33 Despite the immediate outcry of the AFU,
the government in Washington, both the Bureau of Fisheries and the US State Department, failed
to take any immediate action condemning the Japanese. Instead they favored a more cautious
approach, offering to send Leo D. Sturgeon, an officer of the Far Eastern Division, to investigate.34
This was a cautious decision made by the American government to attempt to avoid antagonizing
Japan, but would be viewed as betrayal by the American fishermen whose livelihoods depended
on the exclusion of the Japanese fishing fleet in Bristol Bay.
Friele assisted a joint investigation by the State Department and Bureau of Fisheries into the
extent of the Japanese impact in the region in 1937. At the time, however, the government had
little to no recourse, as there was no official policy being violated. As far as the investigation
could tell, the Japanese fishing vessels never violated the three-mile limit.35 In response, Delegate
Dimond proposed a bill that would push this limit to four leagues. (Four leagues is technically

28Ibid., 10, 13.
29“Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries,” 1, 8; “Japanese Fish Poaching in U.S. Waters Stirs Effective Attack by Organized
Pacific Coast Seamen,” Voice of the Federation, September 9, 1937, 1, 6.
30“Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries.”
31Eldridge, “Manchuria-The Race for New Resources,” 136-151.
32“Japanese Fishing Disturbs Alaska,” New York Times, August 29, 1937, 62.
33“Deny Japanese Claims,” New York Times, July 9, 1937, 4.
34“Japanese Fishing Alarms Alaskans,” New York Times, July 25, 1937, 29.
35“Japanese Fishing Disturbs Alaska,” 62; “America May Protest Japan’s Alaskan Acts,” Evening Star, November 8,
1937, A-5.
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13.81 miles rounded to the nearest hundredth.)36 Another source claimed twelve miles.37 Even if
this proposed limit change was accepted, however, it was unlikely to appease the AFU and other
unions, as this limit would not prevent the Japanese from intercepting massive salmon runs en
route to their spawning grounds in the Alaskan streams from Bristol Bay.38 This was coupled
with reports of sightings of other experimental Japanese fishing boats, these floating canneries,
throughout the Pacific including off the coasts of Panama and Australia.39
On September 2, 1937, the Voice of the Federation published an article written by Harry
Stuhr titled, “Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries; Unions Hard Hit by Pressure of Cheap Coolie
Competition,” that criticized the “treasonable alliance” of the Japanese government and American
fishing corporations. He denounced the inaction of Washington, charging that it was a result
of corporate influence on the government, since American companies would be glad to pay
lower costs for Japanese-caught Alaskan salmon. The reasons American fishermen had difficulty
competing with the Japanese fleet was due not only to its floating canneries, but the fact that the
Japanese fishing fleet was technically a part of the Japanese Navy and as such received significant
government subsidiaries. He also drew comparisons to the demise of the American cod fishing
fleet and the near extinction of the fur seal, illustrating the lack of conservation in Japanese
fishing techniques as the common denominator.40 One union fishing boat captain described the
government response as an “ostrich shoving its head in the sand.”41
Over the course of September and October 1937, the belief among union fishermen that the
United States government was ineffective at best and complicit at worst intensified. The Maritime
Federation published articles drawing attention to the “sneaking policy of Imperial ruthlessness”
that characterized the incursion of the Japanese. They advocated the establishment of a union
boycott of Japanese goods in the meantime and characterized their Japanese counterparts as
“poorly-paid robots of the Imperial Japanese government.” There were even claims that American
scrap iron that was exported to the Japanese would be used in weapons against American youth in
a “war to defend the country. . . from having its natural resources raided by a foreign country.”42
Other unions such as the Copper River and Prince William Sound Fishermen’s Union joined in
this call for the exclusion of Japanese products as a result of their encroachment into Alaskan
waters. They sent a resolution to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Commerce, Delegate Dimond, and all West Coast fishermen’s unions calling for such
action. They blamed Japanese “poachers” for the collapse of the Russian fishing industry and
warned that America would be next if no action was taken as well suggesting that these Japanese
vessels gave refuge to Japanese spies.43 There was also significant resentment noted as American
and Canadian fishermen adhered to specific seasons in the Bristol Bay region, while Japanese
vessels were thought to be fishing year round.44 Harry Stuhr summed up the fears of unions quite
succinctly, “Manchukuo yesterday, China today, and America tomorrow.”45
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Rising calls for labor action and boycotting were accompanied with imagery of violence
and warfare. At this point, as the Far Eastern Survey observed, the “resentment of West Coast
maritime labor against Japan and the desire for some form of economic action was no longer
solely predicated on the fishing issue, but had grown to include disapproval of Japanese action in
China.”46 Japan was increasingly described as militaristic and expansionist, with the incursion of
China being pointed to as evidence. Organized labor was both motivated by these fears and a
major contributor to them. The Voice of the Federation argued that if labor did not take action,
war would be inevitable and that a boycott would weaken the economic and, by extension, military
strength of Japan. The logic was that war was the ultimate goal of Japan and that the Japanese
goods being sold in America were a means of fueling its conquests. According to the Voice, “Such
is the cunning and desperation of the Japanese war-mongers to keep their bloody murder-mill
operating at all costs.” In equally evocative language, it contended that, “Everything ‘Made in
Japan’ is dipped in human blood before it reaches the store around the corner. Every dime spent
for Japanese products is turned into a bullet, every dollar into a bomb, in furthering the most
monstrous piece of international thievery in the annals of history.”47 Statements such as these
both criticized the militaristic actions previously taken by Japan in Manchuria and China, as well
as projected those imperial ambitions onto the Japanese incursions into Alaskan waters. In doing
that, organized labor gave reasons for the American people to distrust the Japanese and primed
them for what seemed like inevitable conflict.
On November 7, 1937, the Maritime Federation of the Pacific held a conference in conjunction
with the Alaska Fishermen’s Union in San Francisco to make plans for a labor-led national boycott
and picketing of Japanese ships. The conference called for less reliance on imported Japanese
canned goods, such as crab, opting instead for Alaskan and Russian-produced products.48 It
announced the initiation of a boycott of Japanese goods starting on November 15 unless the United
States government took “definite and strong action” against Japan.49 A key aspect of the unions’
argument for state-sanctioned protection of the West Coast salmon industry was the perception
that these salmon were property of the United States since they spawned within the Alaskan
border. Some fishermen even used the argument that, for people, being born in US territory made
them citizens of the United States. Therefore, by being born within the Alaskan territory, the
massive runs of salmon in the Bering Sea were the property of the American people.50
In addition to defending the fishing and canning industries, The Maritime Union and other
elements of organized labor sought to protect American workers from competition from low-wage
Japanese workers, who the unions dismissed as "coolie" labor. The "coolies" were the Japanese
employed on the smaller fishing ships and on the large “mother” cannery ships, who earned
much less than the union American fishermen and American employees of canneries in Alaska,
Washington, and Oregon. With lower wages, Japan was able to sell salmon for a lower price
than American-caught salmon. For American workers, their jobs, wages and livelihood were in
danger.51 At the same time unions were also angry at the Japanese for dumping low cost products
on the American market. These included textiles, novelties, and toys, as well as canned salmon.
Moreover, American unionists, like many other Americans, were appalled at the Japanese military
aggression and atrocities in China. Some unionists argued that Japanese military aggression
46Barnes and Gregory, “Alaskan Salmon in World Politics,” 52.
47“Jap Salmon Poachers Put U.S.A. on Spot,” 1, 8.
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1937, 1, 3, 6.
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might soon be turned toward the United States. Therefore, Japan was not only an economic but
also a direct military threat.52
The announcement of the boycott’s start date and pressure from the Alaska Fishermen’s Union
resulted in a statement being released by the US State Department that it was preparing to ask
Japan to remove all vessels from Bristol Bay.53 Worried by the fear that inaction would result in
a Japanese-US crisis, the department finally “pressed the Japanese” with greater energy. The
American ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, “saw ‘potential dynamite’ in the fishery trouble,
and, unless handled ‘very carefully’ there was likely to be some kind of blow-up which might have
just as serious a reaction on our relations with Japan as anything that has happened in China.”54
Encouraged by the signs coming from the State Department, the MFP delayed the start of
the boycott.55 Meanwhile, the Japanese government was still denying any commercial presence
in the region while simultaneously expanding into Australian waters near Melbourne in the
South Pacific.56 The delay was used by the MFP to provide infrastructure and solidify plans
and alliances, particularly in San Francisco. They requested the support of local merchants and
distributed cards that read “I don’t sell Japanese goods” to sympathetic businesses throughout the
city and urged them to hang them in store windows.57 Buttons and pins with this and similar
slogans were also distributed to promote awareness. They successfully enlisted the support of
other non-fishing unions such as the Contra Costa Central Labor Council, which was a reflection
of the growing anti-Japanese sentiment.
The Maritime Federation of the Pacific also joined forces with a nationwide humanitarian
campaign to boycott Japanese products that emerged on the heels of the Japanese July 1937
invasion of China. The campaign was backed by liberal and progressive organizations including
unions, veterans associations, churches, consumer groups, youth groups, and peace societies.58
In the late summer and fall of 1937, the liberal magazine the Nation issued the early calls for a
boycott, and in October 1937 labor federation rivals, the American Federation of Labor and the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, endorsed the boycott. The AFL’s call was the lead story
on the front page of the New York Times. It declared that militaristic Japanese “fanatics” were
waging an undeclared war and had killed and wounded thousands of innocent people and asserted
that “these atrocious activities will continue only so long as the Japanese are able to secure the
necessary finances through sale of the products of their exploited workers.”59
Local organizations formed to promote the boycott in the Pacific Northwest. In San Francisco
in November 1937 the United Committee for the Boycott of Japanese Goods (UCBJG) organized
task forces that regularly checked local stores to determine if they were carrying boycotted
Japanese goods, and other groups prepared to organize picket lines. The following month the
group conducted a picket line outside the San Francisco Emporium Department Store, protesting
its sale of Japanese silk and “Made in Japan” toys for children. The Maritime Federation joined
52Voice of the Federation, September 9, 1937, 1.
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the United Committee and its members marched alongside other community members on the
boycott picket lines.60
The political cartoons in the San Francisco labor paper Voice of the Federation were
exceptionally good at capturing the growing hostility aimed toward Japan. In a cartoon published
in October 1937, a Japanese soldier is depicted stomping on China while pointing his bayonet,
dripping with blood and cheap Japanese goods, directly toward the US An American worker is
standing on the shore, disgusted and waving away the Japanese. This cartoon depicts the threat
Japan posed toward US workers through cheap products and potentially toward US national
security. A similar November 1937 cartoon displays a Japanese and American worker preparing
to shake hands. The smiling Japanese worker is hiding a knife behind his back with the tag “coolie
wage competition” attached.61 The last political cartoon of the year depicts an Imperial Japanese
soldier dressed in a gas mask and Santa outfit, which is labeled “Japanese Imperialism.” His bag
of “toys” has “Made in Japan” written on it and inside are various toy weapons. The Japanese
soldier is handing a bomb-shaped toy to an American child and saying, “some day, little boy. I’ll
give you a REAL one!” Symbolism abounds in this cartoon, starting with the toys. Japanese toys
were one of the products on the boycott list. The Japanese soldier handing a toy bomb to the child
is in effect saying: If you buy these products, you will be funding real weapons of destruction,
and those will be used in America.62
These three cartoons depicted American feelings about Japanese militarism and the Japanese
economic threat to American workers. By showing Japan in such a negative light, they sought to
draw the attention and support of American workers. Tactics like these allowed the unions and
other groups backing the anti-Japanese boycotts to further their agendas more easily. Support
from the community was important in the effort to pressure the State Department to respond to
Japanese aggression.
December 1937 also marked an increase in national attention given to the plight of the
Alaskan fishermen. Articles by reporter Preston Grover gained significant prominence when
they were published on early December in newspapers across the nation. These articles briefly
summarized the events leading up to the proposed, but yet to be enacted, boycott of Japanese
goods beginning with the incident with the Taiyo Maru. The articles appeared in newspapers in
places such as Bluefield, West Virginia; Jefferson City, Missouri; and Las Vegas, Nevada.63 An
article published by the Buffalo Evening News and picked up by the Washington Evening Star
noted that the Alaskan salmon fishermen were “up in arms” over the poaching by Japanese fishing
boats in American waters. The fishermen warned the State Department that unless it ceased they
would picket Japanese ships and, in which case, “there may be bloodshed.”64
In February of 1938, the MFP upped the ante by publicly endorsing bill H.R. 8344, which
would have extended “American jurisdiction over the continental shelf,” and announced the
implementation of its boycott. It also threatened to order its members to refuse to handle Japanese
goods in shipping ports. At the same time, Alaskan fishermen threatened to cut Japanese nets if

60“S.F. Pickets Hit Japanese Goods Sale,” Voice of the Federation, December 9, 1937, 1, 5; Nathan M. Becker, “The
Anti-Japanese Boycott in the United States,” Far Eastern Survey 8, no. 5 (1939): 49-55.
61Voice of the Federation, October 14, 1937, 1; Voice of the Federation, November 4, 1937, 1.
62Voice of the Federation, December 23, 1937, 1.
63Preston Grover, “Washington Daybrook,” Bluefield Daily Telegraph, December 1, 1937; Grover, “Washington
Daybrook,” Jefferson City Post-Tribune; Preston Grover, “A Washington Bystander,” Las Vegas Daily Optic, December 3,
1937.
64“Fisheries Dispute,” Washington Evening Star, December 14, 1937, A-10.

Japanese Economic Aggression

31

the Japanese attempted to fish in Alaskan water during the 1938 salmon fishing season. There
were also rumors that the fishermen were prepared to attack Japanese boats.65
In March 1938, the State Department decided to intervene by sending a diplomatic notice
calling for Japanese vessels to leave the waters of Bristol Bay. Japan agreed, however, the Japanese
continued to maintain their right to fish on the high seas. This “gentlemen’s agreement” was
initially perceived as a victory for organized labor’s campaign to combat the Japanese threat.66
The MFP proudly declared that Japan pulled out of Alaskan waters due to the fears of the boycott
and the “threat of the Alaska Fishermen’s Union to cut Japanese nets.” For justification for their
confidence in the power of labor and the liberals’ boycotts, the Maritime Federation could point to
Phillip Jaffe’s contention in 1938 in the journal Amerasia that “Japan fully realizes the significance
of boycotts” and to a 1939 study published in the Far Eastern Survey that suggested that as a
result of the boycott Japan suffered significant economic damage, especially to its textile export
industry.67
The intervention of the State Department and the peaceful settlement of the dispute between
Japan and the United States were influenced by several factors outside of labor as well. On
December 12, 1938, an American gunboat, the US Panay, was sunk near the Yangtze River in
China where it was protecting oil tankers belonging to Standard Oil.68 This event combined with
the continuous pressure from labor motivated both nations’ governments to reach an agreement
in order to reduce the tensions between the United States and Japan. Moreover, suspicions of
Japanese espionage continued to circulate. In Santa Ana, California, members of the American
Legion called for removal of Japanese ships due to their potential for espionage and the capability
of these ships to leave mines.69 This fear was exacerbated by public uproar over the sinking of
the Panay as well as rising calls for violence against the Japanese fishing vessels. Representative
Sirovich of New York urged Congress in February to quit “pussyfooting around” and bomb the
Japanese vessels off of the Alaskan coast.70 What resulted from these political considerations
and pressure from organized labor was the official public announcement from the Japanese
government that it would suspend licensing for any ships in Bristol Bay and remove their presence
from the region on March 26, 1938.71
However, this did not mark an end to labor’s struggle against intrusion of Japanese fishing
vessels in Bristol Bay. Japanese ships would continue to be spotted by Alaskan fishermen
occasionally until the outbreak of war. Two large factory ships similar to the Taiyo Maru
were spotted in Bristol Bay in May of 1939.72 There was even evidence of the Japanese fleet
expanding into regions besides Bristol Bay, such as in Katalla on the southernmost portion of
Alaska, where four ships were seen in August of 1940.73 Nor did the calls for violence against
these Japanese vessels end, as evidenced by a shipment of twenty-four rifles and ammunition
to Alaskan fishermen by the Secretary-Treasurer of the Pacific Coast Codfish Company for use
against any Japanese fishing vessels.74 As tensions continued to rise in 1940, the Coast Guard
began requesting planes to spot Japanese fishing vessels, only a year before the bombing of Pearl
65“War Lords of Japan Cut Country’s Export in Mad Scramble to Seize China,” Voice of the Federation, March 17,
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Harbor.75 There would also be continued interest expressed by congressional investigations as
of 1939 into Japanese fishing encroachment in both the salmon and herring industries.76 The
economic conflict continued up until the outbreak of WWII, as anti-Japanese sentiment within
organized labor and around the nation continued to grow.
After WWII, there was a distinct evolution of international fishing laws aimed at the protection
of commercial rights that was in part a result of the American labor union campaign to protect
American fisheries. On September 28, 1945, President Harry Truman released Proclamation
2668, which declared that the United States had the right to establish conservation zones and
regulate international fishing within those zones.77 There was public desire to further expand the
oceanic border beyond the end of the continental shelf while the American government had the
advantage of new military and economic power.78 The United States used its victory over Japan at
the end of World War II to finally create a lasting policy to prevent the over fishing of salmon by
the Japanese fleet.79 Furthermore, the Japanese fishing fleet, as a subset of its navy, was subject to
strict regulations imposed by the American government after the war. The two most important of
these dictated that the Japanese fishing industry adhere to US conservation guidelines and refrain
from deep sea fishing near any United States territories.80 As a result, the Japanese people faced
significant food insecurity until fears began to subside over the course of the next seven years, and
the US loosened its restrictions in an attempt to revive the Japanese fishing industry in 1952.81
C
During the 1930s, the United States faced significant economic aggression from the Japanese
fishing fleet off of the coast of Alaska. It represented the economic side of 1930s Japanese
expansionism. At first, the United States did not wish to antagonize the Japanese government
and opted for a reserved strategy that equated success with inaction. Aware of the threat that
the Japanese fleet posed to the conservation of salmon in Alaska and the preservation of their
livelihoods, and aware of the Japanese involvement in the near extinction of the fur seal and
diminishment of the American cod industry, organized labor united under the MFP and took
significant action.
These actions included: securing concrete evidence of the Japanese presence, educating the
American public about the threat, pressuring Congress and the State Department, inciting antiJapanese rhetoric that relied on racist stereotypes and fears of imperialism, organizing and enacting
a boycott, and distributing anti-Japanese propaganda. The totality of these activities resulted in
increased fear of war with Japan, political action against the Japanese government, financial loss
in Japan’s export industry, and ultimately the establishment of international conservation zones.
As such, many working class Americans, especially those on the West Coast, were primed to go
to war with Japan, convinced that Japan’s imperial expansion would not cease until it was actively
stopped. The intense competition over natural resources between Japan and the United States,
75“Coast Guard Wants Planes to Spot Japs,” Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, February 15, 1940, 1.
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combined with the refusal of the Japanese Navy to remove its fleet or support conservation for
the long term benefit of both fishing industries and the refusal of organized labor to let America
become a victim of Japanese economic imperialism, contributed to the growing tensions between
these two nations that culminated in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
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Determining the Impact of the Anabaptists Using Bullinger’s
Propaganda Strategies in Von dem unverschampten fräfel
JOVANNA SH I R K Y
Many scholars of the Reformation contend that the Anabaptist movement did not significantly impact the society of its day.
However, my analysis of Heinrich Bullinger’s anti-Anabaptist work Von dem unverschampten fräfel, ergerlichem verwyrren
unnd unwarhafftem leeren der selbsgesandten Widertöuffern indicates that the Anabaptists did pose a significant threat to
the socioreligious structures that both the mainstream Reformation and Catholicism endorsed. By analyzing Bullinger’s
propaganda strategies within the work, I find that the beliefs and practices of the Anabaptists challenged the most basic
structures of society, thus alarming Bullinger and others who opposed the movement. Bullinger’s language within the
work and the nature of his anti-Anabaptist arguments reveal that his concern reached beyond theological matters to more
basic social matters. When considered in the context of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social capital, it is clear that the
influence of the Anabaptists extended beyond obscure theological debate into the social foundations of fifteenth-century
European society.

In 1531 Huldrych Zwingli, the fiery leader of the Swiss Reformation, died in the Battle of Kappel,
leaving his protégé Heinrich Bullinger to take his place. One of Bullinger’s first priorities was
to act against the growing threat of a small group of reformers who challenged the most basic
structures of society by rejecting long-respected institutions including magisterial authority and
infant baptism. The same year Zwingli died, Bullinger published an extensive work refuting
the dangerous views of these dissidents, the Anabaptists. Bullinger’s work, entitled Von dem
unverschampten fräfel, ergerlichem verwyrren unnd unwarhafftem leeren der selbsgesandten
Widertöuffern (On the Outrageous Crimes, Offensive Perversion, and False Teachings of the Selfproclaimed Anabaptists),1 was his first and defining published work in his lifelong fight against
the Anabaptists and provides important clues about the role of the Anabaptists in the Reformation.
While some scholars of the Reformation argue that the Anabaptists never posed a significant threat
to the mainstream Reformation and the social structures it upheld, Bullinger’s strongly worded and
extensive propaganda against the Anabaptists indicates that the early Anabaptists’ influence on the
society of their day went farther and deeper than previously thought. Bullinger’s criticisms, which
are largely based on social matters rather than theological quibbles, align with the social theories
devised by Pierre Bourdieu that recognize the importance of social capital in directing social
dynamics. When considered in the context of Bourdieu’s social theory, Bullinger’s propaganda
strategies in Von dem unverschampten fräfel reveal that the Anabaptists did indeed significantly
impact the world of the Reformation era, contrary to the assessment of some scholars.
An analysis of Bullinger’s propaganda strategies in Von dem unverschampten fräfel requires
consideration of a variety of factors, including the background of the author himself; the evolution
of Anabaptism within the Swiss Reformation; and an analysis of the historiography surrounding
Bullinger, his work, and the Radical Reformation. In my analysis of Von dem unverschampten
fräfel I have divided Bullinger’s propaganda strategies into four categories—criticism of the
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Anabaptists’ lack of education, improper conduct, violent actions, and dishonorable religious
behavior—and have prefaced my primary source analysis with a discussion of Bourdieu’s theory
of social capital, the methodological context in which my analysis is located.
Bullinger came from a highly intellectual background that informed his leadership of the Swiss
Reformation and shaped his fight against the Anabaptists. He was born into a family of clerics in
1504 and underwent a lengthy and thorough education under humanist teachers. At nineteen,
Bullinger began work as a teacher at a Cistercian monastery in Kappel, Switzerland, where he
developed his humanist views and became good friends with Zwingli. After six years, Bullinger
became a Reformed preacher in his hometown of Bremgarten and was only twenty-seven when he
succeeded Zwingli in Zurich and published Von dem unverschampten fräfel.2 Bullinger’s humanist
education heavily influenced his writing style; he depended on the writings of the early church
fathers and a respect for the Old Testament to bolster his interpretation of Scripture, selectively
using evidence from both sources that would support his arguments. Using this method, Bullinger
and other Swiss reformers attempted to frame the Bible in a way that guided their readers toward
a certain meaning of passages.3 Bullinger’s method is clearly evident in Von dem unverschampten
fräfel, which is rife with references to the early church fathers and authoritative interpretations of
the Old Testament. The value placed on education by Bullinger and his peers was reflected in the
Zurich practice of sending promising future ministers to well-known schools in Germany where
they could receive a quality humanist education and continue Zurich’s intellectual tradition.4
Bullinger’s esteem for education stood in stark contrast to the nature of the Anabaptist
movement. The originators of Anabaptism, who originally belonged to the circle of reformers
in Zurich, broke away from Zwingli and his followers when their wish to amend the sacrament
of baptism to be available only to adult believers was rejected by the Zwinglians. The historian
George C. Williams dates the birth of Anabaptism to January 21, 1525, when George Blaurock,
a former priest, was rebaptized by Conrad Grebel, a humanist scholar and former student of
Zwingli.5 Although the first leaders of the Anabaptist movement were highly educated, the
movement was eventually forced out of Zurich into surrounding rural areas by persecution,
where it increasingly became embraced by the poor and uneducated. The intellectual disparity
between Bullinger and the Anabaptists would already have been apparent in 1531, when Von dem
unverschampten fräfel was published.6
Scholarly attention to Von dem unverschampten fräfel has been relatively scant. In 1959,
Heinold Fast gave a fairly thorough account of Bullinger’s creation of the book, saying that it was
a compilation of several earlier works and was already finished as early as October 1530, a year
before Zwingli died.7 George Huntston Williams provided more analysis of the motives behind
Von dem unverschampten fräfel, writing that Bullinger intended his book as a counterattack against
the teachings of the Anabaptist preacher Pfistermeyer, who had been active in the neighborhood of
Bullinger’s first pastorate at Bremgarten. In a wider context, Williams wrote, Bullinger meant his
anti-Anabaptist writings to “vindicate the Swiss Reformation” and distance himself from Lutheran
charges that the Zurich church had given rise to Anabaptism.8 Bruce Gordon echoed this view in
2Bruce Gordon, “Introduction,” in Architect of Reformation: An Introduction to Heinrich Bullinger, 1504–1575, eds.
Bruce Gordon and Emidio Campi (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Publishing Group, 2004), 18-19.
3Ibid., 25-27.
4Ole Peter Grell and Bob Scribner, eds., Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 115.
5George Huntston Williams, The Radical Reformation (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), 120.
6Claus-Peter Clasen, Anabaptism: A Social History, 1525–1618 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 311.
7Heinold Fast, Heinrich Bullinger und die Täufer: Ein Beitrag zur Historiographie und Theologie im 16. Jahrhundert
(Weierhof, 1959), 30.
8Williams, The Radical Reformation, 851-852.
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his 2004 biography of Bullinger, adding that Bullinger wished to retain good relations with the
Lutherans.9 However, almost no scholars have analyzed Bullinger’s propaganda strategies within
the book.
Disagreement has arisen over the origins of the arguments Bullinger presented in Von dem
unverschampten fräfel. John Howard Yoder, in his 2004 book on the Swiss Anabaptists, considered
the book an adoption of Zwingli’s thoughts regarding the Anabaptists, carefully collected by
Bullinger over a long period of time.10 Other scholars have argued that the book was a product of
Bullinger’s original thought.11 However, Yoder and most other scholars recognized that Von dem
unverschampten fräfel was possibly the first attempt to understand the Anabaptist movement as a
whole.12 It certainly was important at the time; Bullinger is said to have distributed copies to
every minister involved in debates with Anabaptists, and it became the go-to resource for that
purpose.13
The most extensive and enlightening treatment of Von dem unverschampten fräfel I could find
comes from Carrie Euler’s 2006 dissertation on links between the Reformation in Switzerland
and England. Euler’s analysis of Bullinger’s dialogues is useful since it is the only treatment of
them I could find based on their English translation by John Veron, the version I used for my
analysis. Veron, a Protestant French preacher who relocated to England in 1536 and soon after
started publishing anti-Catholic and anti-Anabaptist works, published a partial English translation
of three of the four volumes of Von dem unverschampten fräfel.14 Veron completed the translation
in three parts—the first, An Holsome Antidotus Or Counter-Poysen, Agaynst the Pestylent Heresye
and Secte of the Anabaptistes,15 in 1548 and the next two, A Moste Sure and Strong Defence
of the Baptisme of Children, Against [the] Pestiferous Secte of the Anabaptystes16 and A most
Necessary & Frutefull Dialogue, Betwene [the] Seditious Libertin Or Rebel Anabaptist, & the
True Obedient Christia[n],17 in 1551. Euler underlined Bullinger’s emphasis on the importance
of education to interpret Scripture correctly, something that Anabaptists lacked, according to
Bullinger.18 Bullinger’s work was a dialogue, a form considered “humble and comprehensible,”19
making it accessible to the average person on the street. In this way, Bullinger’s ideas spread all
over Europe, giving emphasis to practical and political concerns that echoed with other reformers
9Gordon, “Introduction,” 24.
10John Howard Yoder, Anabaptism and Reformation in Switzerland: An Historical and Theological Analysis of the
Dialogues between Anabaptists and Reformers, ed. C. Arnold Snyder, trans. C. Arnold Snyder and David Carl Stassen
(Kitchener, ON: Pandora Press, 2004), 94.
11William Peter Stephens, “Bullinger and the Anabaptists with Reference to His Von der unverschampten Frevel
(1531) and to Zwingli’s Writings on the Anabaptists,” Reformation and Renaissance Review 3, no. 1 (2001): 96-107.
12Yoder, Anabaptism and Reformation in Switzerland, 97.
13Bruce Gordon, The Swiss Reformation (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2002), 211.
14Dictionary of National Biography Online, s. v. “Veron, John” by John Goldworth Alger, accessed May 7, 2020,
https://en.wikisource.org/.
15Heinrich Bullinger, An Holsome Antidotus Or Counter-Poysen, Agaynst the Pestylent Heresye and Secte of the
Anabaptistes Newly Translated Out of Lati[n] into Englysh by Iohn Veron, Senonoys (London: Humfrey Powell, dwellyng
aboue Holburne Conduit, 1548).
16Heinrich Bullinger, A Moste Sure and Strong Defence of the Baptisme of Children, Against [the] Pestiferous Secte of
the Anabaptystes. Set Furthe by that Famouse Clerke, Henry Bullynger: & Nowe Translated Out of Laten into Englysh by
Ihon Veron Senonoys (Worcester: Ihon Oswen, 1551).
17Heinrich Bullinger, A most Necessary & Frutefull Dialogue, Betwene [the] Seditious Libertin Or Rebel Anabaptist,
& the True Obedient Christia[n] Wherin, as in a Mirrour Or Glasse Ye Shal Se [the] Excellencte and Worthynesse of a
Christia[n] Magistrate: & again what Obedience is due Vnto Publique Rulers of all Th[Os]e [that] Professe Christ Yea,
Though [the] Rulers, in Externe & Outward Thinges, to their Vtter Dampnatyon, do Otherwyse then Well: Translated Out
of Latyn into Englishe, by Iho[n] Veron Senonoys (Worcester: Ihon Oswen, 1551).
18Yoder, Anabaptism and Reformation in Switzerland, 215.
19Euler, Couriers of the Gospel, 43.
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who wanted to quell the Anabaptist movement.20 Euler pointed out that during a period of
upheaval and reform in England, Bullinger’s writings were used to mitigate the “liberty. . . which
would threaten England’s stability.”21 Did Bullinger intend his work for the same purpose in
Switzerland? Perhaps. Analyzing Bullinger’s propaganda strategies in Von der unverschampten
fräfel, and more specifically, Veron’s translated portions, may reveal much about what Bullinger
and other reformers feared about the rise of the Anabaptists.
Veron’s translations provide a useful lens for analyzing Bullinger’s work. Bullinger’s antiAnabaptist literature fed into a continent-wide effort on the part of states to suppress the Anabaptist
heresy. In Switzerland the year after it was published, Von dem unverschampten fräfel served
as the go-to reference for preachers engaged in the debates with the Anabaptists that took place
in Bern. In addition, Bullinger distributed the book to any minister who faced the Anabaptist
threat in his parish.22 In England, Veron’s translations became a widely recognized contribution
to anti-Anabaptist literature used in drafting the country’s ecclesiastical laws.23 Veron prioritized
translating the dialogues that addressed issues including the importance of obeying the magistrates
and baptism over the dialogues on issues including oaths, arms, and private property (although
these issues are also briefly addressed in the translated portions). Veron’s choices show that
the heart of anti-Anabaptist efforts lay in protecting the power of the state, and thus the existing
social structure. Carrie Euler wrote that Veron’s translations indicate the importance that foreign
reformers placed on Bullinger’s theology. Veron’s work highlights the issues most important to
leaders across Europe who were engaged in the same fight against the Anabaptist social threat
that is so evident in Bullinger’s propaganda strategies.24 Although Veron did not translate the
entire work, his translated portions represent the majority of Bullinger’s ideas—enough to gain a
complete picture of Bullinger’s propaganda methods.
It is also important to understand who the Anabaptists were that Bullinger was addressing.
Since Bullinger wrote Von dem unverschampten fräfel fairly early on, his opponents would
have been the early leaders of the movement. Yoder wrote that the Anabaptists were few in
Zurich itself, numbering only about one hundred. However, in these early years the Anabaptists
could boast well-educated and articulate leaders in Conrad Grebel, Felix Mantz, and George
Blaurock, all of whom had attended university. Yoder emphasized that Grebel and Mantz in
particular were “recognized linguistic experts who did not despise scholarship at all.”25 Yoder’s
observation raises questions about Bullinger’s claim that the Anabaptists were uneducated and
unable to interpret Scripture. Still, of these men only Blaurock was gifted in oratory and had
a “fighting disposition.”26 They fared badly in the early disputations with Zwingli.27 Later, the
Anabaptists were “led to a large extent by poorly educated and spiritually average people,”28
but, Yoder argued, this was on account of persecution, not because the Anabaptists ceased to
value a scholarly approach to Scripture.29 Yoder’s description of the Anabaptist leadership was
echoed by Claus-Peter Clasen, who recognized that many of the early leaders were indeed of
intellectual backgrounds. However, Clasen added that alongside these early prominent leaders,
20Ibid., 205, 236.
21Ibid., 236.
22Gordon, The Swiss Reformation, 211.
23Euler, Couriers of the Gospel, 221.
24Ibid., 218.
25Yoder, Anabaptism and Reformation in Switzerland, 213.
26Ibid., 117.
27Ibid., 116.
28Ibid., 115.
29Ibid., 213.
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many craftsmen and peasants played crucial roles in leadership of the infant movement.30 Since
the Anabaptists’ message mainly appealed to the poor, the movement slowly moved out of urban
centers and ceased to attract more intellectuals.31 Gradually, Anabaptists grew to view higher
education with contempt.32
Understanding how historians have viewed the Anabaptists and the wider Radical Reformation
provides important context for analyzing Bullinger’s writings. Over time, historians’ views
of the Anabaptists have varied widely, beginning with Bullinger’s own history of the group,
which was enormously influential in how the Anabaptists were viewed by historians for the next
few centuries.33 In a 2002 historiographic essay, John D. Roth wrote that to Bullinger and his
contemporaries, Anabaptists were simply “seditious revolutionaries” who were threats to society.34
This view of the Anabaptists persisted until the mid-twentieth century, when historians (mainly
those with Anabaptist ancestry) began presenting the Radical Reformation in a more positive
light. These included Williams and Roland Bainton, who described the Radical Reformation as a
“legitimate and coherent expression of religious reform.”35 Williams’s 1962 extensive survey of
the Radical Reformation and Bainton’s 1963 collection of studies on the Radical Reformation
both presented it as an important aspect of the wider Reformation that, although abortive, had
lasting implications.36
The 1970s brought a new debate centered around the origins and the impact of the Anabaptists.
Claus-Peter Clasen’s 1972 book on the subject found that although early Anabaptists were well
educated, the movement soon moved to rural areas where it survived only among a handful
of peasants. Clasen conceded that the Anabaptists’ beliefs did pose “a potential threat to
civilization,”37 but observed that the movement never gained enough adherents to wield a
significant impact on society. Thus, according to Clasen, the Anabaptists do not deserve much
attention as a legitimate subset in Reformation studies.38 However, in 1980 Steven Ozment argued
that “sheer numbers do not. . . automatically measure social impact or importance.”39 The sense
of urgency and strong language in Von dem unverschampten fräfel suggest that Ozment is right;
factors other than numbers must have contributed to the social impact of the Anabaptists. Social
historians also looked for evidence in the social makeup of radical groups to show that the Radical
Reformation stemmed from social unrest rather than theological disagreements or religious
desires.40 In a 1985 article, Werner O. Packull echoed Clasen, writing that Anabaptism was never
a “powerful mass movement,” but stemmed from a wider social movement, the “Reformation of
the Common Man.”41 Packull’s idea that the Anabaptist movement was socially driven opens an
interesting discussion to which my analysis of Von dem unverschampten fräfel contributes—that
the extent to which the early Anabaptists impacted society lay in sociological considerations, and
could not be determined solely through consideration of their numbers or intellectual abilities.
30Clasen, Anabaptism, 309.
31Ibid., 317.
32Ibid., 316.
33Williams, The Radical Reformation, 848-849.
34John D. Roth, “Recent Currents in the Historiography of the Radical Reformation,” Church History 71, no. 3 (2002):
524.
35Ibid., 525.
36Williams, The Radical Reformation.
37Clasen, Anabaptism, 425.
38Ibid., 428.
39Steven Ozment, The Age of Reform, 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and
Reformation Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), 348.
40Roth, “Recent Currents in the Historiography,” 526.
41Werner O. Packull, “The Origins of Swiss Anabaptism in the Context of the Reformation of the Common Man,”
Journal of Mennonite Studies 3 (1985): 54, 38.
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Alejandro Zorzin offered a unique perspective on the Anabaptists that further defined their
attitude toward the intellectual culture that Bullinger embraced. In a 2008 article, Zorzin wrote
that there is a notable dearth of early Anabaptist publications, an absence that indicates that
they sought to distance themselves from their highly educated opponents. While Bullinger and
other mainstream reformers published complicated polemical tracts, the Anabaptists preferred
to transmit their ideas by word of mouth and in hand-copied documents.42 It is possible that
this method of spreading ideas acted as salt in Bullinger’s wound and helped further divide the
Anabaptists from the leadership of the Swiss Reformed Church.
Because it was a well-recognized and influential work, Von dem unverschampten fräfel
provides a solid representation of widespread attitudes beyond Bullinger’s own and stands as a
valuable resource for understanding the part the Anabaptists played in the wider context of the
Reformation. Historiography addressing Bullinger, his writings, and the Anabaptist movement
provides important context and outlines debates that would benefit from a close analysis of Von
dem unverschampten fräfel. My analysis contributes to the continuing discussion over how much
the Anabaptists and other movements of the Radical Reformation impacted the society of their
day.
My analysis of Bullinger’s work is supported by the idea of cultural capital, a term that
appeared in the sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu. In the 1980s, Bourdieu introduced the
notion that a power struggle exists between social groups, centered on the possession of “cultural
capital,” or skills, tastes, and experiences that inform one’s place in the social universe.43 In his
1984 book Distinction, Bourdieu explained that people operate on subconscious impulses that are
oriented toward their “most vital interests.”44 These impulses include a desire for power based on
having the ability to classify and name a certain set of people, thus assigning them their place in
society.45 Bourdieu mentioned specific strategies used to classify groups of people, including
“labelling judgments” that emphasize one particular trait of a group in order to color them in a
certain way.46 Bullinger certainly did this in his characterizations of the Anabaptists. Bourdieu’s
theory indicates that a consideration of Bullinger’s classifications of the Anabaptists can help to
reveal the motives behind Bullinger’s anti-Anabaptist propaganda, which targeted what Bullinger
perceived to be a significant Anabaptist threat to the current social order.47
Sociologists have elaborated upon Bourdieu’s original theory to include more specific types
of capital that are subsets of cultural capital. In my analysis, I address three types of capital:
intellectual capital (“the value of all the knowledge and ideas of the people in a society”),48
embodied cultural capital (by this, I mean adherence to proper conduct and behavior within
society), and religious capital (“the degree of mastery of and attachment to a particular religious
culture”).49
42Alejandro Zorzin, “Reformation Publishing and Anabaptist Propaganda: Two Contrasting Communication Strategies
for the Spread of the Anabaptist Message in the Early Days of the Swiss Brethren,” Mennonite Quarterly Review 82
(2008): 503-516.
43Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” Sociological Theory 7, no. 1 (1989): 17.
44Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1984), 474.
45Ibid., 479.
46Ibid., 475.
47Ibid., 482.
48Cambridge Dictionary, s.v. “intellectual capital,” accessed April 22, 2020, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us
/dictionary/english/intellectual-capital.
49Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000), 120.
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The final sections of Von dem unverschampten fräfel were printed in Zurich in February
1531, but Bullinger may have completed the work as early as October 1530.50 The work was
his first major anti-Anabaptist book, and acted through “popular art” as a “spiritual weapon” to
root out Anabaptist influence that preachers and the state believed was “smoldering” in many
congregations.51 Bullinger employed the popular dialogue format for his book and wrote in
the vernacular in order to render his arguments “humble and comprehensible.”52 He arranged
it as a conversation between two characters: Simon, “that taketh the Anabaptistes parte,” and
Jojada, “who representeth the true christen man.”53 Bullinger’s choice of these two names in itself
supports my argument that Bullinger attempted to characterize the Anabaptists negatively; both
names carry heavy connotations. The name “Simon” probably refers to Simon Magus, a man
recorded in the New Testament who offered to buy the spiritual power of the apostles; his name
therefore stood for arrogance and worldliness.54 Bullinger himself referred to Simon Magus in
the text of Von dem unverschampten fräfel, saying that they “that in the gospell, do seke carnall
thyngs, and fleshly [i.e., the Anabaptists] are the fellowes of Symon Magus.”55 On the other
hand, the name Jojada is a sixteenth-century version of “Jehoiada,” a Biblical name that means
“Yahweh knows.”56 Bullinger’s insinuation is abundantly clear.
A major theme of Bullinger’s anti-Anabaptist propaganda is his characterization of the
Anabaptists as possessing little intellectual capital. Desultory adjectives dot the entire work,
suggesting both a lack of education and intellectual immaturity, but Bullinger’s major objections
to the Anabaptists’ intellectual level fall into three clear categories: lack of historical knowledge,
lack of grammatical knowledge, and poor biblical analysis skills.
Instances of Bullinger’s descriptions of the Anabaptists as uninformed are too numerous to
analyze exhaustively. A passage in the dialogue on the office of the preacher is representatively
sharp in its criticisms: “What learnynge should we loke for, where rudenes, and (as thei do speake
themselves) simplicitee, is taken for hyghe rudicion? I dooe passe over here, many of them,
which can scarcely reade, yea and what wyll saie of them, ye can reade no maner of thyng.”57 In
another dialogue, Bullinger wondered why the Anabaptists attempt to put their minds to matters
that “passeth their strengthe.”58 The frequency with which Bullinger referred to the intellectual
inferiority of the Anabaptists suggests that the issue may have been a real point of concern for
him. Because he came from a strong intellectual background, having to face the arguments of
those who he saw as uneducated must have been insulting. Still, Bullinger used the Anabaptists’
lack of intellectual capital as a strong weapon against their influence in society.
Bullinger also criticized the Anabaptists’ tendency to characterize themselves as “simple” or
“little children,” saying that these characterizations actually do not reflect well on the Anabaptists’
legitimacy, even though they are meant to. In one of his few long speeches, Simon, who initially
represents a sympathizer with the Anabaptists (although later he seems to become an Anabaptist
himself), was framed by Bullinger as lacking intellect: “We, which are symple persons, are so
tossed and carried to and fro, in so muche, that we can not tel, what is beste to bee doone.”59
In several places, Bullinger put words in Simon’s mouth in a similar way, indicating that those
50Fast, Heinrich Bullinger und die Täufer, 30.
51Ibid., 23.
52Euler, Couriers of the Gospel, 43.
53Bullinger, An Holsome Antidotus, 19.
54Euler, Couriers of the Gospel, 214.
55Bullinger, An Holsome Antidotus, 53.
56Euler, Couriers of the Gospel, 214.
57Bullinger, An Holsome Antidotus, 106.
58Ibid., 225.
59Ibid., 39.
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who are susceptible to the wiles of the Anabaptists are intellectually inferior, and thus that the
Anabaptists’ arguments are not worthy of serious consideration and lack legitimacy. To introduce
a dialogue devoted to clarifying the difference between simplicity and lack of education, Bullinger
criticized the Anabaptists’ biblically-based argument that “God did manifest himself to the littell
ones and not to the wise.”60 Bullinger responded that this saying does not refer to degree of
education, but rather to quality of motive, which allowed him still to discriminate against the
Anabaptists based on their low level of education.
In the following dialogue, Bullinger expanded these thoughts more, offering an explanation of
diction in a way that belittled the Anabaptists’ intellectual understanding of nuances of meaning.
While Simon contends that the less learned a man is, the better fit he is for religious office, Jojada
replies that “the symple” are not those who “lacke wisdome and learnynge,” but rather refers to
“he whiche is playne and sincere.”61 In addition, Bullinger wrote, the apostles were not unlearned
men but were taught by Christ for three years; thus, they possessed true wisdom as well as true
simplicity.62 Bullinger further defined the truly learned as having been “taught by God, & to
the glory of God.”63 This statement is an example of Bullinger’s subjective definition of what
constitutes teachings that are to the glory of God, which excluded any kind of wisdom or learning
that he did not agree with. This dialogue, although short, is packed with indications that Bullinger
was engaged in an attempt to separate and define the Anabaptists as lacking legitimate intellectual
skills.
In addition to criticizing the Anabaptists’ understanding of true wisdom, Bullinger also
disparaged them by suggesting that they do not know history. To begin the dialogue on original
sin, Bullinger remarked that the Anabaptists must know nothing of Peter Abelard, a past heretic,
because they made the same theological mistakes as he did. “In this thyng,” writes Bullinger,
“are ye blameworthy, that ye Anabaptistes do know neither new nor olde histories, yet ye wyll
be teachers. What audacitie is this?”64 Bullinger evidently could not accept the fact that the
Anabaptists dared to presume to preach without being educated in church history. In a following
dialogue, when Simon protests that the Anabaptists base their teachings on Scripture rather than
the theology of other groups, Jojada rebukes him, saying, “If they had read and tasted the old
histories, they wolde be more modest and sobre and not so presumptuous.”65 Bullinger followed
this statement with another expression of outrage that those so ignorant would call themselves
teachers. In these examples, it is clear that Bullinger was genuinely concerned with the lack of
education of his adversaries and made full use of the obvious disparity in intellectual capital to
underline, in as strong a way as possible, that the Anabaptists do not deserve to be heeded.
Grammatical discussions figure surprisingly largely in Bullinger’s work. In the same way that
he criticized the Anabaptists’ lack of historical knowledge, Bullinger made a point of emphasizing
their lack of grammatical knowledge. In one instance, Bullinger took the time to give a short
lesson about the Latin word “tollit,” meaning (according to Bullinger) “taketh away,”66 as it
pertains to Christ’s removal of all sin. Simon serves as a crutch to illustrate the confusion of
the Anabaptists over the difference between collective sin and individual sin. Although here
Bullinger did not outright accuse the Anabaptists of grammatical ignorance, he constructed the
conversation in a way that put Simon on the lower intellectual level.
60Ibid., 81.
61Ibid., 83.
62Ibid., 85.
63Ibid., 87.
64Ibid., 145.
65Ibid., 153.
66Ibid., 146.
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In a more extensive discussion, Bullinger presented synecdoche as a legitimate and enlightening
way to interpret the Bible. In his dialogue on eternal sleep, he bemoaned the fact that the
Anabaptists “doo not, nor wyl not, understand this figure sinecdoche, nor the other figures, and
tropes. Which thyng causeth them to erre, in many thynges.”67 Bullinger used synecdoche heavily
in his dialogues on baptism, justifying his use of the trope by saying that “the custome and maner
of the Scripture (which custome and maner is used almost among all nations)”68 is not to itemize
every category of person which is being referred to, but to use synecdoche. Bullinger followed
his own advice, relying on synecdoche to support a wide interpretation of the Bible, specifically
regarding whether the first apostles baptized children or not. Over the course of several pages,
Bullinger took great pains to explain how synecdoche supports the legitimacy of infant baptism,
insisting on the importance of a solid intellectual interpretation of the Bible: “Who doth not see,
that ye expounde all thynges after the letter, & yet ye doo not weyghe & ponder it?”69 Throughout
his discussion of synecdoche, Bullinger framed Simon as being confused about the use of the
trope, thus helping to establish a dichotomy between the educated reformers and the uneducated
Anabaptists.
Bullinger also dismissed the Anabaptists’ ability to analyze the Bible correctly based on their
lack of education. To close his dialogue defending the authority of the magistrates, Bullinger
outright denied the Anabaptists’ ability to correctly interpret Biblical passages. “They do pycke
and gather certain bytter and grevous sayinges oute of the psalmes and prophetes,” he writes,
“which afterwardes being learned without boke, they do vomite againste the magystrates.”70 This
representative excerpt illustrates that lack of education was framed by Bullinger as a serious
impediment to biblical analysis skills, and therefore spiritual legitimacy as a religious group
within society.
Extremely notable is the frequency with which Bullinger employed propaganda tactics against
the Anabaptists that have nothing to do with their teachings or theology but target their conduct and
characteristics. These propaganda strategies were aimed directly at undermining the Anabaptists’
embodied cultural capital in the eyes of the world, and often came clothed in spicy language that
illustrates the fiery character of debates between the Zurich reformers and the Anabaptists.
Bullinger found fault with the Anabaptists’ lifestyle, including their family life and means
of supporting themselves. Early in his book, Bullinger summarized all the Anabaptist heresies
that he planned to refute in the work. In the middle of this summary, he inserted this paragraph:
“Suche are therfore spoters & macules of christes flocke whiche do forsake their familye and
houshold, and beying adduced or geven to sedicious fables, do fede them selfes, with other mens
laboures.”71 Bullinger’s assertions here are not logically connected to the Anabaptists’ religious
teachings, so other motives must have driven him to include them. He repeated this argument
in another dialogue, saying that many Anabaptists “do leave and forsake their owne wyves and
children, yea all offyce and honesty beying casted a syde, dooe lyve, feade, and fatte them selves,
with other mens labours, snortyng bothe daie and nyght, most slougardely.”72 These criticisms
served a useful purpose for Bullinger—they painted the Anabaptists as antisocial in the deepest
sense, thus allowing his refutation of their theological heresy to be readily acceptable to his
audience. Whether or not Bullinger’s claims are justified, his inclusion of these criticisms in his
comprehensive refutation of Anabaptist heresy indicates that criticizing the cultural capital of
67Ibid., 211.
68Bullinger, A Moste Sure and Strong Defence, 35.
69Ibid., 45.
70Bullinger, A most Necessary & Frutefull Dialogue, 43.
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the Anabaptists was of great concern to him and was important in his efforts to mitigate their
influence.
Bullinger elaborated on the laziness of the Anabaptists in later dialogues. In his dialogue
justifying private property, Bullinger pointed out that “if [the Anabaptists] had as much as they
do lacke, thorough their owne negligence and slugherdnesse, they woulde fynde by and by a way,
to justify their unjust and evyll gotten goodes.”73 Bullinger not only implied that the Anabaptists
were lazy, but that they manipulated their theology to support their corrupt motives. Later in the
same dialogue, Bullinger mentioned again that the Anabaptists “boasteth. . . in forsakyng of their
houshold, and in their slouthfulnes wherin thei do wander about, as ydle vacaboundes.”74 This
comment refers to the Anabaptist practice of itinerant preaching based on early apostolic mission,
where preachers would travel alone, conveying their ideas by word of mouth and depending
on others’ hospitality.75 Bullinger used this reference to the Anabaptists’ itinerant preaching to
characterize them as socially anomalous. By supporting itinerant preaching, Bullinger argued,
the Anabaptists disregarded the social norms of the day that required men to stay at home to work
and provide for their families.
Bullinger went beyond pointing out the Anabaptists’ rejection of social norms by accusing
them of more serious misdemeanors, including theft and prostitution. In one instance, Bullinger
claimed that the only miracles the Anabaptists have ever performed “are, that they. . . make
the gammons, and legges of bakon, hangynge in the larders, of the symple and poore people,
invisible.” Similarly, Bullinger accused the Anabaptists of encouraging prostitution, saying that
Anabaptist women “doe abhominabli prostitute, and make common theire owne bodies to all
men. . . besyde that, that ye publicans, and harlottes shall be preferred, to the ryghtwes, in the
kyngdome of heaven.”76 These accusations were among Bullinger’s most forceful in his attempt
to deprive the Anabaptists of cultural capital, since these offenses against society were universally
condemned and greatly shocking.
One interesting thing to note about Bullinger’s argument style is his frequent concern that the
Anabaptists, through their false teaching, “boast and advance their spirit. . . deceivyng the simple
and rude people.”77 Here, it is important to consider Bullinger’s intended audience; his book’s
comparatively simple language and popular dialogue style clearly indicate that it was meant for
the ears of “simple and rude people,” as well as for the Anabaptists themselves. Bullinger seems
genuinely concerned that they not be taken in by the heresies of the Anabaptists. To his audience,
Bullinger described the Anabaptists as dangerous and false, thus utterly different from himself
and the true church he represents. Bullinger’s comments both helped to create a divide between
himself and the Anabaptists and illustrated the implicit social structures of early modern European
society that the Anabaptists were challenging and that Bullinger wanted to defend.
In a myriad of choice wordings, Bullinger characterized the Anabaptists in the least complimentary terms possible. In one instance, he expressed frustration over those who refused to recant,
and even those who recanted in the past but then reconverted and “obstinatly defende. . . their
heresee.”78 Such men, wrote Bullinger, are beyond help. He also characterized the Anabaptists
as fickle, lightheaded people who lack mental discipline: “It is the poynte of an unwise man
to say, I thought not, and havyng hearde, but one parte, to geve sentence.”79 In an interesting
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instance, Bullinger slipped in a subtle comment insinuating that Simon is using cunning, instead
of honest theology, to trip him up in his arguments: “Also this dothe folowe, that thou being
overcomen with the truth, dost seke how to bring me into an other purpose, least I should bind the
more straightly.”80 While arguing that the Anabaptists do not possess constructive or legitimate
wisdom, Bullinger went so far as to describe the wisdom of the Anabaptists as “not comying from
above, but yerthly beastelyke and deavelyshe.”81 This type of comment, of which I have provided
only a selection, seems to be unwarranted by and unconnected with whatever theological dispute
Bullinger was engaged in at the moment. This suggests that there were other factors at work in
the divide between Bullinger and the Anabaptists.
Another interesting propaganda strategy that Bullinger adopted was to compare the Anabaptists
to heretics of the past who were widely known to have possessed bad characters and committed
evil deeds. At the beginning of his dialogue on grace, Bullinger described the faults of the
Catharians,82 who “the Anabaptistes. . . are in all things lyke unto.”83 Bullinger did not mince
his words in his description of the Carthians: “They dyd congregate & assemble a particuler
Churche, avoidyng and shunyng al comunion or felowship of synners. In the meane season, they
dyd passe al mortal men, in presumptuosnesse and arrogancy, in envy, hatered & contencion, in
covetousnesse, & intemperancy of lyfe.”84 Using this strategy allowed Bullinger to use strong
language about the Anabaptists while not aiming it directly at them, and operated as another
subtle method that contributed to Bullinger’s systematic categorization of the Anabaptists.
Another theme of Bullinger’s propaganda strategies is that of violence—what violence is
acceptable, and what is not—and the unsoundness of the Anabaptists’ disturbance of society.
Early in the first dialogue, Bullinger condemned several instances of alleged Anabaptist violence.
Bullinger focused on the Anabaptist takeover of the town of Waldshut (rendered by Veron
as “Waltzhountum”).85 In his words, the Anabaptists “did utterly subverte the entire citie of
Waltzhountum, and did cause many of the cytezens. . . to be exyled, and to be put from their
possessions.”86 The town of Vormantia,87 according to Bullinger, almost suffered the same fate. In
a town named Sanctogalius,88 an Anabaptist supposedly “did smite of his own brother’s head,”89
claiming the act was divinely sanctioned. Bullinger took issue not only with the Anabaptists’
violent acts, but also with their apparent disregard for valued social capital: citizenship and
material possessions. In fact, he seems to have equated violence with a lack of cultural capital on
the part of the Anabaptists.
The incident at Waldshut to which Bullinger refers deserves closer attention, as it is more
complicated than Bullinger makes it seem. In 1524, an army of peasants did in fact clash with
their Austrian overlords, but they were neither Anabaptists nor motivated religiously at all.90 In
1523, the pastor of Waldshut, Balthasar Hubmaier, had come under the influence of the Swiss
reformers and began to institute radical reforms in Waldshut. However, his reforms were a little
too radical for the reformers in Zurich; he began to develop ideas about delaying infant baptism
80Bullinger, A Moste Sure and Strong Defence, 27.
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and allegedly had contact with Thomas Müntzer, which is probably why Bullinger connected the
uprising in Waldshut with the Anabaptists.91 Although Hubmaier may have capitalized on social
unrest to win over the people of Waldshut to Anabaptism, the uprising was not motivated or led
by Anabaptists. This indicates that either Bullinger’s bias against the Anabaptists blinded his
judgment, or that others with bias misinformed him.
In the dialogues included by Veron in A most Necessary & Frutefull Dialogue, which were
largely concerned with magisterial authority, Bullinger addressed the issue of violence widely,
consistently painting the Anabaptists as people who endorsed violence by rejecting the authority
of the magistrates. Simon calls for magistrates who “amend not” to be “rooted out of the earth,”
and later wishes that the “ungodly may be utterly destroyed, and roted out of the earth.”92 Jojada
replies that “violence, bloude, and warres” must not be used to this end, as they are “tumults
and evyl waies,”93 and then promotes prayer as a more virtuous way to combat tyrants. In a
telling omission, Bullinger did not mention a string of violent acts the Zurich authorities had
already committed against the Anabaptists, including the execution by drowning of Felix Mantz
and the public whipping of George Blaurock in 1527.94 Bullinger’s theology is impeccable and
impressive, but the language he used to characterize the Anabaptists through Simon is telling;
they come across as lawless, violent troublemakers, further depleting their cultural capital.
In addition to physical violence, Bullinger accused the Anabaptists of causing upheaval and
disrupting the peace of society, both within the church and in public. Bullinger used this argument
in countless instances; for example, he argued that the Anabaptists did not deserve to preach
because they “move sedicion” and “separat and make division in the church.”95 While discussing
the role of prophets in the church, Bullinger insinuated, none too subtly, that the Anabaptists were
inherently violent by describing them as “mad and phantasticall men” who “all cry out at once,
with an unsemely clamor.”96 Here, Bullinger used the Anabaptist way of worship to paint them
as disruptors with distasteful, inappropriate customs that turned the peaceful orderliness of the
church upside down.
Bullinger’s treatment of violence is often contradictory. At the beginning of his dialogue
on the unity of the church, he seems to justify violence where it is used against the “ungodly.”
In response to Simon’s remark that Christ came “not to bring peace but the swoorde,”97 Jojada
clarifies that the sword, while it should not be used against the godly, is certainly meant for the
“infidels” and “ungodly.”98 He then accuses the Anabaptists of using dissension within the church
as a sword, “which sworde is not among the godly in the Churche.”99 By this, Bullinger implied
that the Anabaptists were separate from the church, and thus deserved the sword to be used against
them. Bullinger further justified his harsh treatment of the Anabaptists, saying that “we dooe
not lye, when we accuse them of tumulte”100 and thus are not persecuting them. Bullinger set
this statement as a response to the closing of the Beatitudes: “Blessed are ye, when men dooe
curse you, and speake all evil against you,”101 which is the defining Biblical passage establishing
persecutors against persecuted. Bullinger’s statement was therefore meant as a clear justification
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of his persecution of the Anabaptists. This disparity suggests that rather than (or in spite of) the
violence of the Anabaptists being a major, serious theological concern for Bullinger, he uses it as
a tool for coloring them in a negative light.
Some of Bullinger’s arguments that on first glance seem to be focused on theology take on
the flavor of deprivation of religious capital. A major theme within Bullinger’s work is that
of the relation between the temporal and the spiritual. Bullinger used this theme to inform his
discussions over who deserves to preach, who can have the Spirit, and appropriate attitudes
toward Scripture. These discussions feed into Bullinger’s larger objection about the dissension
the Anabaptists were causing in the church.
Bullinger devoted an entire dialogue to arguing against the Anabaptist practice of allowing
unqualified men to preach in public. He allowed that anybody should be able to “talke of God,
yea, & synge of him,” but frowned on men taking upon themselves the role of “common preacher,
not being called.”102 This, he argued, destroys the authority of the church, causing upheaval
and chaos. To make it even worse, he wrote, the Anabaptist preachers “separate. . . from the
church, to seke woods and corners, there to assemble a company, to institute and ordein sectes.”103
The Anabaptists’ apparent rejection of the order of the church in place of worship and spiritual
leadership signaled to Bullinger that they were challenging the authority of the church, and he
used this example to focus not on the content of the Anabaptists’ preaching but its manner, thereby
painting them as irreligious rebels.
Bullinger also addressed the Anabaptists’ approach to Scripture and the Spirit. Throughout
his work, he used Biblical references heavily to underline his points, and through this made two
different jabs at the Anabaptists: not only are they not intellectually equipped to understand
the Scriptures properly, but by refusing to understand them correctly they deprive themselves
of possession of the Spirit. Because an Anabaptist “striveth againste the holy Scripture. . . [he]
cannot bee that spirituall man, whome Paule doth speke of.”104 Therefore, wrote Bullinger, the
Anabaptists “can judge nothing” but “ought to be judged and tryde, by the worde of God.”105
Here, Bullinger attempted to deprive his adversaries of the religious capital that existed within
the established church at the time. Since they either could not or would not access the Scriptures
appropriately, Bullinger consigned the Anabaptists to the other side of the judgement seat, and
thus on a lower level than those in the right.
Elsewhere in the same dialogue, Bullinger further defined the spiritual state of the Anabaptists
by claiming that they don’t possess the godly Spirit at all, but the spirit of man. In a comparison
between Anabaptist preachers and a Catholic priest who could only believe what the “bishop
of Rome” allowed, Bullinger was indignant: “Beholde my Symon, what abhominacion is this,
that a mortall man shulde take upon hym, to adprobate & alowe the divine and heavenly veritee,
and let hym selfe judge over God?” The Anabaptists, he wrote, in doing the same “boast and
advance their spirite” and thus deceive the “simple and rude people.”106 In making this argument,
Bullinger took all legitimacy away from the Anabaptists’ spiritually, thus depleting their spiritual
capital. Bullinger did not base his argument here in theology, but merely on a subjective definition
of what constitutes true understanding of the Scriptures. This suggests ulterior motives.
In the dialogue on the unity of the Church, Bullinger introduced a new argument over the
difference between temporal and spiritual matters that seems to contradict his fierce protectiveness
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of the office of the magistrate and other institutions of power that are intertwined with the
Church. He took issue with the fact that the Anabaptists caused dissension within the church over
“outward” things including baptism, rents and tithes, Christian men holding political office, the
taking of oaths, and wealth.107 Even though in earlier dialogues Bullinger argued at length about
the spiritual value and importance of these issues and how they are carried out in society, here
he condemned the Anabaptists for raising them as issues for disagreement. Again, he used his
argument to separate the Anabaptists from the established church on a spiritual level, helping to
define them as “other,” and thus less.
In another departure from theological argument, in his dialogues on baptism Bullinger again
attacked the practical manifestations of the Anabaptists’ heresies, although briefly and not directly.
To close his argument, he remarked, “Besydes that, your consequences are false, and wythoute
foundatyon. If ye be nothynge ashamed of your false consequences, we wyll be nothinge ashamed
of our true.”108 Here, it is clear that Bullinger didn’t only have a problem with the Anabaptists’
faulty theology but with how their theology was playing out in society. Bullinger’s language also
betrays an exasperation that points to the seriousness and urgency of his refutation of Anabaptist
heresy.
Bullinger’s propaganda strategies aimed at minimizing the social capital of the Anabaptists are
too numerous and obvious to ignore. While they are mostly socially driven and unconnected to
the theological thrust of the work, they are also hidden within Bullinger’s theological arguments.
The consistency and purposefulness with which Bullinger used these strategies indicate that the
social clout of the Anabaptists concerned him just as much as their perceived misinterpretations
of the Bible. Bullinger certainly had cause for concern; Anabaptist leaders, most notably Thomas
Müntzer, had been involved in the Peasant Revolt of 1524–1525 and, to the Zurich reformers,
embodied the social disturbance and upheaval of the revolt.109 The Peasant Revolt would
have loomed large in Bullinger’s memory, lending urgency to his concerns. When considering
Bullinger’s forceful propaganda set against the backdrop of the very real threat of major social
upheaval led by the Anabaptists, it is doubtful that the Anabaptists “had no discernible impact on
the political, economic, or social institutions of their age,”110 as Clasen contended, or deserve
to be “condemned to ephemeral minority status,”111 as other scholars have done. Instead, it is
clearly evident that the Anabaptists represented a strong challenge to the social structures of their
day. While my analysis demonstrates that the Anabaptists exercised a considerable impact on
society, it does not attempt to define the nature or extent of the Anabaptists’ impact on society.
This would be a matter for a more extensive study.
Using sociology to analyze primary sources and make historical arguments, as I have done,
proved to be extremely productive. Sociological theories allow historians to dive deeper into
their subjects and, rather than just horizontally assess the surface effects of documents, vertically
explore the depth and complexity of the people who produced the documents, who all existed and
operated within the vast realm of social dynamics. Looking at documents from the perspective of
social dynamics also equalizes the outwardly differing fields of economics, politics, and religion,
for example, thus creating an environment where all these fields inform each other on a deep
level. My analysis, which uses a theological document to shed light on social issues, helps dispel
the erroneous thought that “the works of theologians who discussed and refuted the Anabaptist
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doctrines are likewise of limited value to the social historian,”112 thus expanding the scope and
power of historical research.
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China’s Illegal Organ Trade: From Executed Prisoners to
Organ Tourism to Falun Gong
ADRIENNE THO M P S O N
As worldwide populations continue to rise, the constant necessity for life-saving organs for terminally and chronically ill
patients has become extremely vital and profitable to medical centers across the globe. Since China’s preliminary debut in
the international organ donation and transplantation system in the late 1960s, various scholars, journalists, and health
professionals across the globe have demonstrated outright shock at the massive influx and seemingly endless supply of
transferable organs emanating from Chinese transplant centers and hospitals. Investigations have shown that China has
been actively harvesting organs from recently executed prisoners and incarcerated Falun Gong practitioners. Regardless
of numerous outside efforts to cease the practice of harvesting organs from nonconsenting human subjects, China has
continued to defy foreign health regulations and codes outlining ethical transplantation methods and has prevailed as one
of the leading organ supply centers of the twenty-first century.

Since China’s preliminary debut in the international organ donation and transplantation system
in the late 1960s, various scholars, journalists, and health professionals across the globe have
demonstrated outright shock at the massive influx and seemingly endless supply of transferrable
organs emanating from Chinese transplant centers and hospitals. According to Damon Noto,
spokesman of the Doctors Against Forced Organ Harvesting (DAFOH), “Chinese transplant
centers went from 150 in 1999 to over 600 by early 2000 and. . . the number of transplants
performed each year went from several hundred in 1999 to well over 10,000 a year by 2008.”1 In
2011, however, the Beijing Red Cross stated that, over the past 20 years, only about 40 people
across China had registered to become organ donors.2 How, then, were thousands of patients
traveling to China for life-saving organs over the past several decades – and into the present – able
to practically step into surgery the minute they reached China as opposed to patients in Europe
waiting anywhere between 300 days to nearly 7 years when there are 18 million registered organ
donors in the United Kingdom alone?3
Tasked with finding the source of China’s limitless organ bank, global investigators, such as
David Matas, the senior legal counsel of B’nai Brith Canada, and David Kilgour, a human rights
activist and a senior fellow to the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, discovered that
China was actively harvesting organs from recently executed prisoners. Furthermore, speculations
arose regarding China’s Communist Party persecuting, murdering, and forcefully extracting
organs from Falun Gong practitioners who once outnumbered the entire membership of the
Chinese Communist Party and, despite their peaceful and philosophical platform, proved to be
a potential threat to China’s former General Secretary of the Communist Party, Jiang Zemin,
who coincidentally declared war on the organization in 1999 around the same time that Chinese
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transplant centers and transplantations themselves began to rise. Regardless of numerous outside
efforts to cease the practice of harvesting organs from both executed prisoners and Falun Gong
members, China has continued to defy foreign health regulations and codes outlining ethical
transplantation methods and has prevailed as one of the leading organ supply centers of the
twenty-first century.4
Autografted skin transplantations used to reconstruct superficial injuries and disfigurements
were the first credible examples of organ transplantation and were reported to have been performed
first by Indian physician Sushruta, the proclaimed “Father of Surgery,” around the turn of
the millennia.5 Although many pre-twentieth century doctors and surgeons had experimented
by transferring organs between animals, the most concrete advancements in human organ
transplantation were launched by French surgeon and biologist Alexis Carrel who, throughout the
early 1900s, explored and perfected various techniques in transferring solid organs and preserving
ex-vivo, or external, organs for prospective usage.6 His extensive medical research in organ
transplantation as well as vascular anastomoses, or the surgical cross-connection of blood vessels,
earned him the Nobel Price in Medicine in 1912.7 Official surgical transplantation of human
organs from both deceased and living donors to sick and dying patients began in earnest after
World War II.8 The first successful solid organ transplantation was achieved in December of
1954 by Dr. Joseph E. Murray and his colleagues at the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston,
Massachusetts.9 Potential organ rejection, in which the organ recipient’s immune system attempts
to eliminate the donor organ, continued to limit the capacity of large-scale transplants until the
1980s.10 For the past several decades and until the present, thousands of patients across the globe
have awaited available organs from either living or deceased donors; because organs are currently
in such high demand, it is estimated that nearly 114,000 people in the United States alone are
presently on the waiting list for an organ transplantation and, because of this monumental number
and the ever-growing wait times for each individual patient, an average of 20 people die each day
from the lack of available organs.11
On par with the medical trends of the mid-twentieth century, China began conducting its
own research and clinical experiments in human organ transplantation in the 1960s, which have
since been “extraordinarily developed and expanded during the past decades due to the unmet
demand from hundreds of thousands of patients with end-stage organ diseases.”12 Because of this
boundless demand and the potential monetary benefits, China decidedly passed the “Provisions on
the Use of Dead Bodies or Organs from Condemned Criminals” in October of 1984, which allowed
for Chinese officials to harvest organs belonging to executed prisoners and more specifically from:
1). The uncollected dead bodies or the ones that the family members refuse to collect;
4Ibid., 1-2.
5Vibha Singh, “Sushruta: The Father of Surgery,” National Journal of Maxillofacial Surgery 8, no. 1 (Jan. – Jun.
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2). Those condemned criminals who volunteer to give their dead bodies or organs to
medical institutions;
3). Upon [sic] approval of the family members.13
Additionally, all operations concerning the removal of organs from executed prisoners were
to be kept “strictly confidential,” and “[t]he execution ground should be guarded. . . before the
operation is completed.”14 While extreme precautions were undertaken to camouflage China’s
highly unethical response to the capital punishment of its prisoners, this system allowed for China
to gradually become more involved in the global network known as organ tourism, or the overseas
transit of patients seeking organs in countries where they may be more readily available than in
their own home countries.
By utilizing organs from executed prisoners, organ tourism became an extremely profitable
business for Chinese hospitals; a vast majority of medical centers in China reported that their
main sources of revenue came solely from their adjourning transplant units.15 According to the
China International Transplantation Network Assistance Centre website, organs were advertised
to patients by their monetary value: $30,000 for a single cornea, $30,000 to $62,000 for a kidney,
$98,000 to $130,000 for a liver, $130,000 to $160,000 for a heart, $150,000 for a pancreas, and
$150,000 to $170,000 for a lung.16 Their original prices have been maintained and upheld far into
the twenty-first century. In 2001, a group of seven foreign patients who traveled to China together
for unspecified transplants were each asked to bring around $26,000 for their surgeries.17 Another
patient disclosed that they paid $27,000 for their kidney transplant at the Economic and Technical
Development Hospital in Guangzhou in 2004; the following year, a patient from Taiwan paid an
increased amount of $29,000 at the Guangdong Province Border Patrol Armed Police Central
Hospital in Shenzhen for the same procedure.18 China’s Deputy Minister of Health, Huang Jiefu,
even admitted that “[o]rgan transplantation has the tendency to become a tool for hospitals to
make money,” meaning that profit was and still is more critical to Chinese medical centers than
ethical medical care.19
Despite China’s growing position as an organ epicenter for foreign patients, Chinese health
officials continued to harvest organs from prisoners in extreme secrecy, which eventually piqued
the attention of global ethical and medical organizations. In response to China’s “Provisions on
the Use of Dead Bodies or Organs from Condemned Criminals,” the World Medical Association
(WMA) publicly condemned the practice at Brussels in 1985, at Madrid in 1987, and later
at Stockholm in 1994.20 The WMA voiced its concerns particularly toward the commercial
exploitation of human organs and the participation of doctors in a practice where consent may not
be absolutely discernible.21 Not only is consent a major issue concerning prisoners, or potential
13“On the Use of Dead Bodies or Organs from Condemned Criminals,” Provisional Regulations of the Supreme
People’s Court, The Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public
Health and Ministry of Civil Affairs, October 9, 1984, in Organs for Sale: China’s Growing Trade and Ultimate Violation
of Prisoner’s Rights: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee
on International Relations House of Representatives; 107th Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
2001), 51.
14Ibid., 52.
15Organ Harvesting, 27.
16Ibid., 31.
17“The Killing of Prisoners of Conscience for Organs in China,” China Organ Harvest Research Center, 38.
18Ibid.
19“Difficulties in Organ Transplant Legislation,” Sanlian Life Week, April 17, 2006.
20Harold Hillman, “Harvesting Organs from Recently Executed Prisoners: Practice Must be Stopped,” British Medical
Journal 323, no. 7323 (Nov. 2001): 1254.
21Ibid.
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organ donors, on death row in China, who may or may not be mentally suitable to authorize
formal compliance before their executions, but some capital offenses in China are extremely strict
and therefore tend to allocate more prisoners to potential execution than most other countries.
According to research compiled by the Cornell Law School, China has executed anywhere from
2,400 to approximately 6,500 prisoners per year over the past twelve years alone; moreover, even
recorded executions are probably only “a fraction of those that are carried out.”22
From May 4th to 15th in 1987, the Fortieth World Health Assembly held in Geneva,
Switzerland, adopted Resolution WHA40.13, known as the “Guiding Principles on Human Organ
Transplantation,” which called for measures to be taken by “some Member States to regulate
human organ transplants and. . . develop a unified legal instrument to regulate these operations.”23
These guidelines were intended to “provide an orderly, ethical, and acceptable framework for
regulating the acquisition and transplantation of human organs for therapeutic purposes,” and were
undeniably aimed at China with its recent passing of the “Provisions on the Use of Dead Bodies
or Organs from Condemned Criminals.”24 In these guidelines were nine particular principles the
World Health Organization (WHO) believed would more properly regulate China’s position on
organ harvesting: consent, financial consideration, and overall ethical practice being some of the
most prevailing matters regarding organ donation and transplantation.25 Although the “Guiding
Principles on Human Organ Transplantation” were eventually endorsed in 1991, there were still
no concrete international laws to mandate authority in criminalizing the Chinese law regarding
the human organ trade, because the WHO used “discretionary” language in its resolution that
subsequently failed to “establish a process for investigation and discipline.”26
Without direct foreign intervention, China continued harvesting organs from its executed
prisoners at an ever-increasing rate. Eventually, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations convened a hearing in May of 1995 concerning the expanding trade of human body
parts, or organs, in China.27 With ghastly evidence from both Harry Wu, a Chinese American
human rights activist who spent nearly twenty years as a prisoner in one of China’s labor camps
and currently serves as the executive director of the Laogai Research Foundation in Washington,
DC, as well as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the United States Senate illuminated
the internal and interconnected operations of Chinese correctional facilities and transplant units
and firmly demanded an immediate end to the entire operation.28
From his own personal observations, Wu began his testimony by specifying that “[t]he Chinese
Government policy states that under the absolute control of the government, organs of death row
prisoners for sole use in transplant surgeries are to be collected on a large scale and in an organized,
systematic, premeditated fashion.”29 Therefore, Chinese operations in organ harvesting were
primarily concerned with acquiring massive quantities of organs to be immediately sold in the
commercial sphere rather than appropriately and ethically contributing necessary and life-saving
instruments to patients across the globe. Furthermore, even though the 1989 “Provisions on
the Use of Dead Bodies or Organs from Condemned Criminals” outlines consent as a major
contributor in discerning which executed prisoners can be used as organ donors, Wu explains that
22Death Penalty Database, Cornell Law School, Apr. 10, 2014.
23“Human Organ Transplantation,” 5.
24Ibid., 7.
25See Appendix A.
26Bellagio Task Force, “Report on Transplantation, Bodily Integrity, and the International Traffic in Organs in
Transplantation Proceedings,” International Committee of the Red Cross, January 1, 1997.
27China: Illegal Trade in Human Body Parts; Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States
Senate; 104th Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.
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“many family members of the executed prisoners dare not, would not, or are unable to claim their
loved one’s bodies,” and are thus immediately and unavoidably claimed as government property
upon execution. Additionally, “the Chinese government has yet to exhibit any form by which the
death row prisoners or their family members give signed consent to donate organs, nor has it been
explained under what conditions they may give such consent.”30
Not only did Wu provide credibility behind the consensual issues surrounding organ transplantation from executed prisoners in China, but he also thoroughly outlined the heinous practice
Chinese health and criminal officials had attempted to shield from foreign eyes. Aside from his
own personal experiences, Wu conducted various interviews with figures previously involved
in China’s organ transplantation program and discovered outrageously unethical results. Wu
explained:
[W]hen I was in Germany in 1992, I happened to make the acquaintance of a surgeon
who graduated from the Huaxi University of Medical Sciences in Chengdu. He told
me that one night around midnight, on orders of the party committee of the hospital,
he and other surgeons were driven to an anonymous prison, where they removed two
kidneys from a living prisoner. The removed kidneys were then transported by an
air force helicopter to the hospital and immediately transplanted into the body of a
waiting patient. . . . The kidney-less prisoner was executed the following morning.31
Wu revisited China in 1994 with the BBC to interview other high-ranking members, including
doctors, nurses, and law officers, directly involved in the harvesting of organs from executed
prisoners. Unfortunately, the majority of Wu’s interviewees were uncooperative and denied any
misconduct or violation in their transplantation practices or subsequent commercial endeavors. In
response to Wu’s claims and the largely adversarial nature of those he interviewed, the attendees
of the congressional hearing in 1995 gave a list of five crucial recommendations for the United
States Committee on Foreign Relations:
1). Condemn the practice of using organs taken from the bodies of executed prisoners.
2). Call on the Chinese government to put an immediate end to the practice of
harvesting organs from the bodies of executed prisoners and to replace this source of
organs with a truly voluntary system of living-donor and cadaveric organ donation in
accordance with World Health Organization guidelines.
3). Call on the Chinese government to review the practice of the death penalty with a
view to correcting the gross inadequacy of judicial safeguards against human rights
abuses, and with a view to the curtailment of the use of the death penalty.
4). Call on Chinese health professionals to refuse to participate in the unethical
retrieval of organs from executed prisoners or the use of such organs, whatever the
stage of the process in which they are involved.
5). Call on the Chinese Medical Association to adopt a policy against the retrieval of
organs from executed prisoners or the use of such organs, in conformity with the
consensus of the international medical community.32
30Ibid.
31Ibid., 5-6.
32Ibid., 41.
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In 1998, Delon Humann, the secretary of the WMA; Anders Milton, chairman of the
WMA; and Dr. T. J. Moon of the Korean Medical Association reached an agreement with the
Chinese Medical Association that the practice of harvesting organs from executed prisoners was
“undesirable” and would be jointly investigated with an eventual discontinuance of the entire
operation.33
In July of 1999, however, the former General Secretary of the Communist Party of China,
Jiang Zemin, declared war on the entire Falun Gong organization after nearly ten thousand
members “surrounded the high walls of the Communist leadership compound in Peking in a
peaceful vigil to demand recognition as a legitimate organization,” which had been the largest
demonstration in Peking since the infamous pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square in
1989.34 The Chinese government formally prohibited members from continuing their practice of
Falun Gong and distributed circulars with several restrictions:
No one may hand or post in any place streamers, pictures, insignias, or other signs
that advertise Falun Dafa (Falun Gong).
No one may distribute in any place magazines, books, audio and video products and
any other propaganda materials that advertise Falun Dafa (Falun Gong).
No one may assemble in any place people for promoting Falun Dafa (Falun Gong)
activities, such as “synthesizing energy” or “fostering the Falun law.”
Activities such as assemblies, parades and demonstrations held in the form of sitting
in and submitting petitions, for the purpose of protecting and advertising Falun Dafa
(Falun Gong).
All forms of activities inciting the public to disturb social order through fabricating
and distorting facts or spreading rumors deliberately are prohibited.35
No one may organize, link up and command activities contesting relevant government
decisions.
Falun Gong members who refused to adhere to the Chinese government’s demands or continued to
defy ideals held by the Chinese Communist Party were “swept up” in “hordes” by Chinese police
officers and arrested.36 The following year, organs originating from Chinese transplant centers
skyrocketed to unbelievable proportions, and the Chinese Medical Assocation subsequently
withdrew from its partnership and conjoined investigation with the WMA and the Korean Medical
Association.37
Following the persecution of Falun Gong, additional testimony concerning the harvesting
of organs from Chinese prisoners on death row surfaced through former Chinese Army doctor
and political asylum-seeker, Wang Guoqi, in June of 2001. Guoqi explained to the United States
House Committee on International Relations that, between 1989 and 1995, he had assisted in
removing the skin and corneas from more than one hundred executed prisoners and only withdrew
from the practice after 1995 when he witnessed “doctors remove the kidneys from a man who was
still breathing.”38 Guoqi also asserted that, while most of the profit from prisoners’ organs went
33Hillman, “Harvesting Organs,” 1254.
34Lorien Holland, “China Bans Sect of 100 Million Over Suspected Political Agenda,” London Independent, July 23,
1999, 11.
35Ibid.
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37Hillman, “Harvesting Organs,” 1254.
38Craig S. Smith, “Doctor Says He Took Transplant Organs from Executed Chinese Prisoners,” New York Times, June
29, 2001.
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straight to army hospitals, court officials in China were also paid around $40 for every prisoner
that he and his colleagues were allowed to strip of organs.39 A spokeswoman of China’s Foreign
Ministry, Zhang Qiyue, responded to Guoqi’s allegations by declaring them as “sensational lies”
and “a vicious slander” against China.40 Qiyue upheld that the majority of China’s human organs
came from “voluntary donations from Chinese citizens,” even though voluntary organ donation in
China was, and still is, extremely rare and could in no way account for the sheer amount of organs
being distributed from Chinese transplant hospitals.41
Despite an increasing number of criminalizing allegations and first-hand testimonies, Chinese
officials continued to deny China’s participation in the practice of removing organs from both
condemned criminals and Falun Gong members for several years. In December of 2005, Deputy
Health Minister Huang Jiefu professed that China needed to “tidy up” its organ transplantation
practices and “push for regulations on organ transplants to standardize the management of the
supply of organs from executed prisoners.”42 Jiefu contended that these proposed regulations
would help to improve China’s image of organ transplants, give death row prisoners greater
authority in potentially donating their organs upon execution, and make it more difficult to
purchase organs removed from executed prisoners.43
Jiefu failed to acknowledge the ongoing war against Falun Gong, which many global
investigators speculated to be linked to China’s expanding organ transplantation program. Under
the Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong (CIPFG), Canadian attorneys and human
rights activists David Matas and David Kilgour launched an investigation in 2006 to determine if
China was also forcefully harvesting organs from detained Falun Gong practitioners. Matas and
Kilgour interviewed dozens of figures formerly stationed in Chinese transplant hospitals; one of
their more preeminent interviewees, a former employee of the Liaoning Thrombosis Treatment
Center of Integrated Chinese and Western Medicine using the pseudonym “Annie,” claimed to
have witnessed organs being removed from Falun Gong members. Annie’s unnamed ex-husband
was also a surgeon working in the same hospital. In her interview, Annie told Matas and Kilgour:
My ex-husband and I worked at this hospital from 1999 to 2004. . . . He was
responsible for removing corneas from Falun Gong practitioners including living
Falun Gong practitioners. . . . I can testify to the atrocious crime that this hospital
forcibly removed organs, such as livers and corneas, from a large number of living
Falun Gong practitioners. Some practitioners were still breathing after their organs
were removed, but they were thrown in the hospital’s incinerator. . . . So far, no
Falun Gong practitioner has come out alive. Of several thousand practitioners there,
many had their kidneys, corneas, and even their skin taken, and their bodies were
exterminated to destroy the evidence.44
Matas, Kilgour, and additional investigators also contacted several hospitals throughout China
and posed as patients seeking available organs. A doctor at the Shandong Qianfoshan Liver
Transplant Center in Jinan, Shandong, China stated to investigators that the number of Falun
Gong “donors” was “gradually increasing,” and a receptionist at the Wuhan Tongji Hospital in
39Ibid.
40Ibid.
41Ibid.
42Jane Macartney, “China to ‘Tidy Up’ Trade in Executed Prisoners’ Organs,” Coalition to Investigate the Persecution
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Jianghan, Wuhan, Hubei, China stated that acquiring organs from a Falun Gong practitioner was
“not a problem.”45 On May 22, 2006, investigators (Q) recorded this shocking conversation with
Dr. Lu Guoping (A) of the Guangxi Nationalities Hospital in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region of China:
Q: Is their [the hospital’s] source of organs also from Falun Gong practitioners?
A: Yes, yes, yes.
Q: . . . Where did you get them? Did they come from detention centers or from
prisons?
A: From prisons.
Q: Do you think they can find a Falun Gong donor for me?
A: If you go there [the hospital] it shouldn’t be a problem at all. . . . I can tell you, it’s
an easy job for them to get organs.46
Guoping also guaranteed investigators that the healthiest organs from Falun Gong members would
be used to assure “the quality of our operations.”47
Matas and Kilgour were also able to interview several Falun Gong practitioners who had
miraculously survived detainment in China and escaped further persecution by leaving the country
altogether upon their releases from detention. Many of the surviving Falun Gong interviewees
claimed to have been “blood tested and organ examined” during their imprisonment.48 Cindy
Song, a Falun Gong practitioner and labor camp survivor shared her story with investigators:
Several male policemen used force. They dragged me to the room and forced me to
undergo a physical examination. A male doctor in his 40s said he wanted to do a
blood test on me. I said, “I am healthy, I don’t need a physical examination.” He
said viciously, “You don’t want to do it? Okay, I’ll use a large syringe and drain your
blood!” Then the policemen dragged me to another room. They held me on a bed
and an examination on my organs was conducted, including a chest X-ray and an
ultrasound.49
Another Falun Gong practitioner and labor camp survivor, Yumei Liu, stated that “When I was in
detention, the police said to me, ‘If you don’t give us your name and address, we’ll take your
heart and liver out. Nobody would ever be able to find your body.’”50 Organ donation recipients
and donors themselves must possess the same blood type, except for those with blood type O,
who qualify as universal donors, and doctors must ensure that the patient receiving the transplant
has no antibodies against any certain proteins that are tested for in the donors. According to
Dr. Torsten Trey of the DAFOH, by testing and examining the blood and organs of Falun Gong
detainees, doctors were “categorizing living people – categorizing prisoners of conscience – into
the blood types and tissue factors to provide a pool of living [organ] donors.”51
45Lee, Human Harvest.
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47Steven J. Jensen, ed., The Ethics of Organ Transplantation (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,
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Matas and Kilgour concluded their report, which they entitled “Bloody Harvest,” in July of
2007 with thirty-three overarching pieces of evidence leading them to confirm that China was, in
fact, using detained Falun Gong practitioners as organ supplies for their human organ donation
program.52 The two investigators traveled to over thirty countries where they presented their
findings to several government bodies, organizations, and individuals.53 Mao Qunan, a spokesman
of the Chinese Ministry of Health, responded to the investigation by stating, “The impact it [the
investigation] exerts especially on the overseas public goes beyond the organ transplant issue.
It is an intentional attack on China and the Chinese government.”54 Matas and Kilgour were
also accused by Chinese officials of tampering with the recorded transcripts from their calls to
various Chinese hospitals; Dr. Lu Guoping himself denied his comments in one of the transcripts
admitting China’s use of organs from Falun Gong practitioners despite being audibly taped.55
After China’s continued denial, the US Consul in China proposed an additional investigation on
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of
the investigation three weeks prior to its date. According to Matas, “China is very adept at putting
on these phony shows for western observers,” so various transplant units were promptly cleaned
and swept of any incriminating evidence, leading to the investigation only lasting around five
hours.56
In response to increased foreign pressures, particularly by the WHO and WMA, for internal
organ transplantation procedures, China passed the “Human Organ Transplant Regulations” only
two months prior to the release of Matas and Kilgour’s report. The new “regulation” was little
more than a lightly updated version of the 1984 “Provisions on the Use of Dead Bodies or Organs
from Condemned Criminals.” Instead of condemning the practice of removing organs from
executed prisoners altogether, the “Human Organ Transplant Regulation” asserted that Chinese
surgeons could only harvest organs from executed prisoners upon their signed and informed
consent and also banned human organs from being sold or purchased as a commercial product.57
The “Human Organ Transplant Regulation” halted the marketing of human organs through illegal
platforms like online black markets but did little to actually alter the practice of harvesting organs
from recently executed prisoners and prisoners of conscience.58 After Matas and Kilgour’s
investigation was published, Chinese officials decidedly chose not to revise the “Human Organ
Transplant Regulation” to include Falun Gong practitioners.
The United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs convened on September 12, 2012, to
further discuss and potentially impede organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience, including
Falun Gong practitioners, in China. Guided primarily by spokesman Damon Noto and with
supporting testimony compiled by investigative writer Ethan Gutmann, the US House Committee
condemned the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for its persecution of Falun Gong and outlined
several ways in which the United States medical community could raise awareness toward Falun
Gong members still detained in Chinese labor camps and prisons. Noto begins the hearing by
specifying the violations and offenses conducted by the CCP:
Since the CCP began its crackdown in 1999, and began to call the peaceful practice
of the Falun Gong an evil cult, thousands have been killed and their organs ripped
52See Appendix B.
53“Matas and Kilgour Report,” Doctors Against Forced Organ Harvesting.
54Lee, Human Harvest.
55Ibid.
56Ibid.
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People’s Republic of China, April 6, 2007.
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out of their body while they were still warm and transplanted into the bodies of rich
Chinese and foreign accomplices. Members of the CCP do this in order to make
themselves and their children rich, and because the Falun Gong was and remains a
peaceful and indigenous movement which attracts tens of millions of followers in
China. The CCP cannot allow any independent group in China to exist which can
motivate so many people. Any group the CCP does not control is a threat and must
be penetrated, subverted and destroyed.59
Like the observations made by Matas and Kilgour, Gutmann interviewed several Falun Gong
members who had been previously detained:
[They also were all] given strikingly similar medical exams. The doctor would draw
a large volume of blood, then a chest X-ray, then a urine sample, probing of the
abdomen, and in most cases, a close examination of the corneas. Did the doctor ask
any of them to trace the movement of his light? Did he wiggle his fingers to check
their peripheral vision? No. Only the corneas. Nothing involving brain function.
The doctors were checking the retail organs and nothing else.60
These first-hand accounts are crucial to understanding why so many imprisoned Falun Gong practitioners were medically examined; Chinese doctors and health professionals were systematically
screening all detained Falun Gong members in order to match them with sick patients seeking
biologically compatible organs.
Although Chinese officials continued to deny any allegations regarding both the forceful
removal of organs from Falun Gong practitioners and the ethical issues concerning the use of
organs from executed prisoners, the research and investigations conducted by Gutmann, Matas,
and Kilgour generated a massive governmental response across the globe. In Queensland,
Australia, the Prince Charles and Princess Alexandra Hospitals completely banned the training of
Chinese surgeons in December of 2006 after the Chinese government failed to produce written
assurances stating that the allegations concerning the practice of harvesting organs from Falun
Gong prisoners were false.61 In 2008, the Declaration of Istanbul was adopted by 150 countries,
which urged other nations to pass legislation banning transplant tourism in countries where the
source of organs was questionable.62 According to Dr. Jacob Lavee, an Associate Professor of
Surgery at Tel Aviv University in Israel:
The Health Committee of the Israeli Parliament finally brought to the Israeli
Parliament, which is called the Knesset, on March 31, 2008, the [sic] orders were
given to all Israeli insurance compan[ies] performed anywhere around the globe
where its illegal, and targeting mainly China.63
In 2010, Spain changed its penal code to introduce two new offenses: the crime of organ trafficking
and of illegal organ tourism.64 The European Parliament unanimously passed a resolution in
Strasbourg, France, on December 12, 2013, which again called on China to immediately end
the practice of forced organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners and other prisoners
59Organ Harvesting, 1-2.
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of conscience.65 Kristiina Ojuland, a member of the European Parliament who attended the
resolution’s meeting, stated “[t]he practice must be ended immediately, and the least the E.U. can
do to stop it is to condemn publicly organ transplantation abuses in China, and to inform those
European citizens who travel to China for organ transplants.”66
The globe’s perception of China changed drastically due to publicized allegations and
governmental resolutions and regulations condemning the process of organ transplantation in
China. A massive protest was organized by Falun Gong practitioners and sympathizers from
more than thirty countries in Vienna, Austria, on September 19, 2015 to “raise awareness
about Falun Gong and the persecution in China.”67 Protestors performed exercises together, held
parades and candlelight vigils, provided information in various languages to those attending, and
physically reenacted images of torture and forced organ removals inflicted upon living Falun Gong
detainees in China.68 The protest had an overwhelmingly positive response; one attendee from the
Netherlands told reporters, “I have just read the call of the European Union to stop the persecution
and organ harvesting [of Falun Gong practitioners]. I have heard about tortures and abuses of
inmates in China. . . . It definitely needs attention from a political perspective.”69 Similar protests
were more recently held in the United Kingdom in April of 2018, where participants rallied
and marched through downtown London and Trafalgar Square, and Brazil in May of 2019 at
Liberdade Square in St. Paul and the city center of Brasilia.70
Popular entertainment platforms and social media users have also taken jabs at China’s
unethical practices. An episode entitled “Band in China” from the comedic cartoon South Park
was recently banned from the Chinese streaming service Youku after comments were made by
characters in the episode toward forceful organ transplants being performed on prisoners of
conscience in China.71 All posts pertaining to the episode were erased from Baidu’s Teiba, which
is one of China’s largest online discussion boards, and any existing South Park forums were
also deleted.72 Many political cartoonists, such as Peter Nicholson and Jeff Danziger, have also
created parodied images condemning Chinese figures involved in organ harvesting. For example,
one of Nicholson’s illustrations shows a Chinese police officer telling three shackled Falun Gong
detainees “In here, you’ll soon lose heart,” and one of Danziger’s animations depicts a similar
Chinese police officer telling a colleague to “Go out and arrest a couple of young kidneys. . . ”73
These forms of online and publicized protest have reached a much wider global audience and have
thus assisted in spreading awareness toward the atrocities occurring in China far more effectively
than traditional means of protest.
Huang Jiefu most recently affirmed at a conference at the Vatican in 2017 that “From
January 1st, 2015, organ donation from voluntary civilian organ donors has become the only
legitimate source of organ transplantations [in China].”74 He stated that Chinese reforms have
made “significant progress” by both promoting a legitimate and regulated donor system and
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repressing organ trafficking still taking place in China’s black markets.75 Although the number
of transplants taking place in China have decreased gradually over the course of the past two
decades, China continued to attract thousands of patients across the globe with its high organ
supply. Unfortunately, as of today, there has still been no definite settlement ending the use of
organs from executed prisoners of conscience in China. Additionally, although Chinese officials
like Jiefu claim that all present organs originating from China come from voluntary civilian
donors, thousands of Falun Gong members remain missing and are presumed to still be held in
labor camps where they are likely to be used as living human organ banks for Chinese hospitals
and transplant centers.
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A

WHO’s “Guiding Principles on Human Organ Transplantation” (1991)
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 1
Organs may be removed from the bodies or deceased persons for the purpose of transplantation if:
(a) Any consents required by law are obtained; and
(b) There is no reason to believe that the deceased person objected to such removal,
in the absence of any formal consent given during the person’s lifetime.
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 2
Physicians determining that the death of a potential donor has occurred should not be directly
involved in organ removal from the donor and subsequent transplantation procedures, or be
responsible for the care of potential recipients of such organs.
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 3
Organs for transplantation should be removed preferably from the bodies of deceased persons.
However, adult living persons may donate organs, but in general such donors should be genetically
related to the recipients. Exceptions may be made in the case of transplantation of bone marrow
and other acceptable regenerative tissues.
An organ may be removed from the body of an adult living donor for the purpose of transplantation
if the donor gives free consent. The donor should be free of any undue influence and pressure and
sufficiently informed to be able to understand and weight the risks, benefits, and consequences of
consent.
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 4
No organ should be removed from the body of a living minor for the purpose of transplantation.
Exceptions may be made under national law in the case of regenerative tissues.
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 5
The human body and its parts cannot be the subject of commercial transactions. Accordingly,
giving or receiving payment (including any other compensation or reward) for organs should be
prohibited.
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 6
Advertising the need for or availability of organs, with a view to offering or seeking payment,
should be prohibited.
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GUIDING PRINCIPLE 7
It should be prohibited for physicians and other health professionals to engage in organ transplantation procedures if they have reason to believe that the organs concerned have been the subject of
commercial transactions.
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 8
It should be prohibited for any person or facility involved in organ transplantation to receive
payment that exceeds a justifiable fee for the services rendered.
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 9
In the light of the principles of distributive justice and equity, donated organs should be made
available to patients on the basis of medical need and not on the basis of financial or other
considerations.
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B

Matas and Kilgour Report: Summary of the Thirty-three Pieces of Evidence
General Considerations:
1. China is a systematic human rights violator. The overall pattern of violations makes it
harder to dismiss than any one claimed violation.
2. The government of China has reduced substantially financing of the health system. Organ
transplants are a major source of funds for this system, replacing the lost government funding.
3. The government of China has given the military the green light to raise money for arms
privately. The military is heavily involved in organ transplants to raise money for itself.
4. Corruption in China is a major problem. There is huge money to be made from transplants
and a lack of state controls over corruption.
Considerations Specific to Organ Harvesting:
5. Technology has developed to the point where organ harvesting of innocents for their organs
has become possible. Developments in transplant surgery in China fall prey to the cruelty, the
corruption, [and] the repression which pervades China.
6. China harvests the organs of prisoners sentenced to death without their consent. The Falun
Gong constitute a prison population who the Chinese authorities vilify, dehumanize, depersonalize,
[and] marginalize even more than executed prisoners sentenced to death for criminal offenses.
7. There is no organize system of organ donations in China. There is a Chinese cultural
aversion to organ donation.
8. Waiting times for organ transplants in China are incredibly short, a matter of days.
Everywhere else in the world, waiting times are measured in months and years.
9. Hospital websites post self-incriminating information boasting short wait times for all
organs for big payments.
10. Donor recipients whom we have interviewed tell us about the secrecy with which transplant
surgery is undertaken and the heavy involvement of the military. Information given to patients is
kept to a minimum. Transplants are performed in military hospitals and, even in civilian hospitals,
by military personnel.
11. There is huge money to be made in China from transplants. Prices charged to foreigners
range from $30,000 U.S. for corneas to $180,000 U.S. for a liver-kidney combination.
12. There are no Chinese transplant ethics separate from the laws which govern transplants.
China does not have a self-governing disciplinary body for transplant professionals.
13. There are huge gaps in foreign transplant ethics. It is rare for foreign transplant ethics to
deal specifically with either transplant tourism or contact with Chinese transplant professionals or
transplants from executed prisoners.
14. The practice of selling organs in China was legal until July 1st, 2006. Even today, the new
law banning the selling of organs is not enforced.
15. Foreign transplant legislation everywhere is territorial. It is not illegal for a foreigner in
any country to go to China, benefit from a transplant which would be illegal back home, and then
return home.
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16. Many states have travel advisories warning their citizens of the perils in travel to one
country or another. But no government has posted a travel advisory about organ transplants in
China.
17. Organ transplantation surgery relies on anti-rejection drugs. China imports these drugs
from the major pharmaceutical companies. No state prohibited export to China of anti-rejection
drugs used for organ transplant patients.
18. Some state[s] administered health plans [to] pay for health care abroad in the amount that
would be paid if the care were administered in the home country or pay for aftercare of patients
who obtain transplants abroad. Where that happens, there is not, in any country, a prohibition of
payment where the patient obtains an organ transplant in China.
Considerations Specific to Falun Gong:
19. The Communist Party of China, for no apparent reason other than totalitarian paranoia,
sees Falun Gong as an ideological threat to its existence. Yet, objectively, Falun Gong is just a set
of exercises with a spiritual component.
20. The threat the Communist Party perceives from the Falun Gong community has led to a
policy of persecution. Persecution of the Falun Gong in China is officially decided and decreed.
21. Falun Gong practitioners are victims of extreme vilification. The official Chinese position
on Falun Gong is that it is “an evil cult”. Yet, Falun Gong shares none of the characteristics of a
cult.
22. Falun Gong practitioners are victims of systematic torture and ill treatment. While the
claims of organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners have been met with doubt, there is no
doubt about this torture.
23. Falun Gong practitioners have been arrested in huge numbers. They are detained without
trial or charge until they renounce Falun Gong beliefs.
24. There are thousands of named, identified Falun Gong practitioners who died as a result of
torture. If the government of China is willing to kill large number[s] of Falun Gong practitioners
through torture, it is not that hard to imagine they would be willing to do the same through organ
harvesting.
25. Many practitioners, in attempt[s] to protect their families and communities, have not
identified themselves once arrested. These unidentified are a particularly vulnerable population.
26. Falun Gong practitioners in prison are systematically blood tested and physically examined.
Yet, because they are also systematically tortured, this testing cannot be motivated by concerns
over their health.
27. Traditional sources of transplants – executed prisoners, donors, the brain dead – come
nowhere near to explaining the total number of transplants in China. The only other identified
source which can explain the skyrocketing transplant numbers is Falun Gong practitioners.
28. The money from organ transplants to be made has led to the creation of dedicated facilities,
specializing in organ transplants. The Chinese authorities must have the confidence that there
exists into the foreseeable future a ready source of organs from people who are alive now and will
be dead tomorrow. Who are these people? A large prison population of Falun Gong practitioners
provides an answer.
29. In a few cases, between death and cremation, family members of Falun Gong practitioners
were able to see the mutilated corpses of their loved ones. Organs had been removed.
30. We had callers phoning hospitals throughout China posing as family members of persons
who needed organ transplants. In a wide variety of locations, those who were called asserted that

China’s Illegal Organ Trade

71

Falun Gong practitioners (reputedly healthy because of their exercise regime) were the source of
the organs. We have recordings and telephone bills for these calls.
31. We interviewed the ex-wife of a surgeon from Sujiatun who said her husband personally
removed the corneas from approximately 2,000 anaesthetized Falun Gong prisoners [at the]
Sujiatun Hospital in Shenyang City in northeast China during the two-year period before October,
2003. Her testimony was credible to us.
32. There have been two investigations independent from our own which have addressed the
same question we have addressed, whether there is organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners in
China, one by Kirk Allison of the University of Minnesota [and] another by European Parliament
Vice President Edward McMillan-Scott. Both have come to the same conclusion we did. These
independent investigations corroborate our own conclusion.
33. The government of China has responded to the first version of our report in an unpersuasive
way. Mostly, the responses have been attacks on the Falun Gong. The fact [that] the government
of China, with all the resources and information at its disposal, resources and information we do
not have, was not able to contradict our report suggests that our conclusions are accurate.
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The Role of Women within the Mine Wars
K IRSTEN HY LT O N
This paper examines the impact that the Mine Wars had on women who lived within the mine camps directly affected by
labor unrest. While women were usually not the ones on the front lines of the Mine Wars, they still were impacted by
and involved with the action. Just like the men of the camps, women were evicted from their homes, brutalized by mine
guards, and were forced to change their lives. Assuming that the events of the Mine Wars were perceived in the same way
by both men and women would be leaving out a large portion of the narrative. For this reason, in order to understand the
full impact of the Mine Wars, the women of the mine camp’s stories have to be looked at separately.

An oral interview conducted with Mr. and Mrs. William Carey, who lived in the middle of the
Paint Creek-Cabin Creek Strike, revealed that the couple remembered the lasting legacy of the
Mine Wars differently. The couple was evicted from their home by the mine company Mr. Carey
worked for and forced to live in a tent colony located in Goodman Holler. For two years, Mr. and
Mrs. William Carey lived their lives while making a home within a tent. On one hand, Mr. Carey
regards the time period as tough and comments on how his wife had to make sacrifices in order
for them to survive.
However, Mrs. Carey believed the tent colony “wasn’t so bad.”1 When asked how she dealt
with living inside of a tent for two years she stated that she was “young and stupid and didn’t pay
much attention to it.”2 She goes as far as stating that the “tent colony was a happy place.”3 For
Mrs. William Carey, the tent colony represented a time of togetherness and community. She no
longer spent her time worrying about her husband succumbing to the dangers found underground;
instead, he was right there next to her. A strong sense of community was born out of the closeness
created by the mutual struggle experienced within the tent colonies. Mrs. William Carey used the
example of neighbors coming together during this time period in order to support one another.
She used the specific example of her neighbors willingly watching her children on days she had to
wash clothes. For Mrs. William Carey, the tent was a sufficient home with comforts such as “a
stove to cook on, a table to eat on, and chairs to sit on.”4 All of these comforts provide a stark
contrast to the picture painted by Mr. Carey. To him, the period they lived in the tent colonies was
one marked by struggle: mainly, the struggle to provide. This account of conflicting perceptions
shows that the labor unrest in the period of the Mine Wars did not impact the players within the
situation in the same ways. Both men and women were faced with a set of challenges within
this time period, which they dealt with and perceived in different ways. It is for this reason that
a closer look must be taken at the experiences of women in the Mine Wars to understand the
situation fully.5
Kirsten Hylton is pursuing a BA in History with a minor in Political Science. Her research interests include
Appalachian history and labor history. She wishes to pursue a MA in History after her graduation.
1Mr. and Mrs. William Carey, Interview with Keith Dix, C179 R168-169, West Virginia and Regional History
Center.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
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While women were not the ones who were striking due to their jobs underground, their lives
were still directly impacted by this action. Women were evicted from their homes along with
men, brutalized by mine guards like the men, and were forced to change their lives like the men.
For this reason it is important to take a look at how the action of the Mine Wars directly affected
women. Assuming that these actions impacted them in the same way as the male coal miners
would be skipping the narrative of a large portion of the people affected by the Mine Wars. In
order to understand the full scope of the impact created by the Mine Wars, women of the mine
camp’s stories have to be looked at separately from the other players within the Mine Wars.
The term Mine Wars started being used to describe the time period of labor unrest after
the book Bloodletting in Appalachia: The Story of West Virginia’s Four Major Mine Wars and
Other Thrilling Incidents of Its Coal Fields by Howard B. Lee first used the term.6 Since the
actual labor unrest occurred, events pertaining to it have been covered through multiple forms
of media, such as books, movies, and articles. While over the years many different subjects
have caught the attention of those wishing to learn more about this time period, originally the
period was understood through the narrow scope of large-scale events and sensationalized figures.
Action-packed events and memorable players quickly stole the stage from the everyday people
who lived through the labor unrest. Saying that women in the Mine Wars have not been looked
at before would be untrue. Their stories have been looked at in previous accounts of the Mine
Wars. However, they are usually looked at as a complementary substance to form other arguments.
One particular book that covers the position of women within the Mine Wars is Never Justice,
Never Peace: Mother Jones and the Miner Rebellion at Paint and Cabin Creeks by Ginny Savage
Ayers.7 While this book is centered on Mother Jones, the authors do go into detail about the
conditions of women in the Paint Creek and Cabin Creek areas. In addition to this, another book
that shows the movement into a more narrow approach on individuals’ impact on West Virginia
and Appalachian history is seen in the book Coalfield Jews: An Appalachian History by Deborah
R. Weiner.8 In this book, a closer look is taken on the amount of dependency citizens of coal
camps have on the company store. Together, this shows that the fields of West Virginia and
Appalachian history are moving from a broad approach to one that is more narrow and focuses on
the lives carried out by everyday citizens.
This paper will serve the purpose of taking a look exclusively at the effects that the Mine Wars
had on the women who lived within the mine camps in areas of labor unrest. Primary sources
have been the main source material used in producing this paper. The main documents used in the
creation of this paper are oral histories and court documents. The goal of this paper is to provide
a better explanation as to what women living day to day in Paint Creek and Cabin Creek had to
experience. However, due to a lack of accounts coming solely from women on their experiences,
accounts given by men and more sensationalized figures like Mother Jones must be used in order
to decipher what women were going through in this time period. To accomplish the goal of
presenting experiences of women living within the coal camps within the time period of the Mine
Wars, this paper will look at multiple different factors that correlated in both Paint Creek and
Cabin Creek and the Logan and Mingo County area. These correlating factors include eviction
from company-owned homes and the process of moving into conglomerates of tents provided by
the union; intimidation, disruption, and violence at the hands of the Baldwin-Feltz guards; and
6Howard B. Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia: The Story of West Virginia’s Four Major Mine Wars and Other Thrilling
Incidents of Its Coal Fields (Parsons, WV: McClain Printing Co., 1969).
7Ginny S. Ayers, Never Justice, Never Peace: Mother Jones and the Miner Rebellion at Paint and Cabin Creeks
(Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2018).
8Deborah H. Weiner, Coalfield Jews: An Appalachian History (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006).

74
women-driven protest of scabs and the treatment of scab’s wives. Finally, it will take a look at
the displacement that occurred after the time period of the Mine Wars. All of these situations
affected women and changed the way their lives had normally functioned before the labor unrest.
All of these elements dictated the lives carried out by women within the time periods of labor
unrest called the Mine Wars.
In the time period leading up to the Mine Wars, tensions had grown between miners who
desired to unionize in order to achieve better working conditions and those representing the mine
who wanted to prevent unionization. The periods of 1912 to 1913 in Paint Creek and Cabin
Creek and 1919 to 1922 in Logan and Mingo counties were marked with periods of extreme
labor unrest.9 The time period of the Mine Wars started in the year 1912 when miners from Paint
Creek and Cabin Creek joined the United Mine Workers movement of striking. The striking
miners desired the right to organize, recognition of rights granted to them by the Constitution,
an end to the practice of blacklisting men with union affiliation, and an end to the use of mine
guards, amongst other demands relating to how they were paid and how they must perform their
jobs.10 The labor unrest came to violence when tensions between miners, operators, and hired
guards grew. On April 14th, 1913, miners were forced to end the strike with the condition that
changes would be implemented, including no longer discriminating against union men, better
work conditions, and other stipulations. However, this agreement did not take actually sustainably
change any problems faced by striking miners and left them unsatisfied. In 1919, the Mine Wars
continued in Logan and Mingo counties. These counties were left without the presence of an
official union. Just like in the previous case, tension and violence came with the attempt to
unionize. These conditions were what set the stage for the events that actually took place during
the period of the Mine Wars.11
One of the first situations within the time period of the Mine Wars that caused women to
inherently struggle was the process of evictions. When miners started striking, the coal company
they worked for made it clear that the men refusing to work needed to make room for those who
would. This message came through in the form of eviction of miners and their families from
company-owned property. While the miners were sometimes given written notices by the mine
company they worked for, the process of eviction was carried out without due process of law,
leaving miners with the complaint that they were not “legally summoned or notified to vacate the
property.”12 While the written notices were signed by operators or their agents, the process did
not proceed through a civil court.13 Those who received notices in the Paint Creek and Cabin
Creek area were given around sixty days after the first notice to vacate their homes.14 In the case
of the miners within Logan and Mingo counties, miners were given “a 10-day notice from the
company. . . also a 3-day notice and after that they were evicted.”15 Miners, their wives, and their
kids were all expected to leave the homes they had settled in within the company-owned property.
9The dates used for the Mine Wars varies depending the source. Some prefer to extend the period to include other coal strikes that happened through West Virginia. Since I am focusing on the events of Cabin/Paint
Creek and Mingo/Logan County, I will stick to their commonly used dates. West Virginia State Archives, “West
Virginia’s Mine Wars,” West Virginia Department of Arts, Culture and History, accessed November 1, 2019,
http://www.wvculture.org/history/archives/minewars.html.
10Ibid.
11Ibid.
12Testimony of A.M. Belcher, Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, Conditions in the Paint
Creek District (Washington, DC: Washington Government Printing Office, 1913), 566.
13Testimony of S.P. Smith, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 425.
14Testimony of William Rayner, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 1101.
15Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings (Washington, DC:
Washington Government Printing Office, 1921), 92.
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The evictions were carried out by the hands of the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency, whose men
carried rifles with them through the process of eviction.16 This directly affected women because
they were forced to leave the homes they had settled and based their lives around while their
husbands were gone for around ten hours a day in the mines.17
When the families of miners were forced to leave their homes because of eviction, it was often
in a rush and under violent circumstances. A miner named Mr. W. E. Hutchinson, who worked
in Mingo County for the span of five years, described how the process of his eviction went by
stating:
My door was broken open by forcible means. I had the door locked and fastened
with a key and also with a nail on the inside. They forced their way in at the front
door, went in, and piled the contents, furniture, and things outside in front of the
house, 20 yards from the house, up against the fence. Then they moved it back of the
company store, moved it the second time, and piled it up against the company store,
and to-day it is laying there as it was, only rotten. It has not been carried off. It is
laying there yet.18
The written notice did not do many families good because they had nowhere they could go if they
left. Mrs. Inez L. Smith, wife of miner William Smith, stated that she and her husband would
have been willing to leave their company-owned home, “but he had no work. He wouldn’t move
away not knowing where he was going.”19 Those who were evicted from their houses did not have
pleasant encounters with the Baldwin-Feltz guards who were presented with the task of evicting
them. Mrs. Maud Fish of Paint Creek recalled how she was evicted in the middle of a meal.20
She stated:
On Friday morning they came to our house before I had breakfast; there were 22
men, guards, with their Winchesters, and there were two who didn’t have any guns...
They came to my window before I knew they were on the place, and they says, “Mr.
Fish, have you got your things out?” I didn’t give Mr. Fish time to answer, and I says,
“Mr. Green, we don’t want our things any place; leave them here; we are perfectly
satisfied to leave them as it is until we are ready to move.” He said, “I didn’t ask
you that; I asked you where you want the things put.” He said he had come there to
throw the things out. I said he should go ahead and throw them out; we couldn’t help
ourselves; “you are here with 22 of your men, and what can two of us do?” I said,
“Mr. Green, you will certainly give us time to eat our breakfast,” and he said, “You
have had time to eat your breakfast. . . ” He asked me how long it would take for us
to have breakfast, and I had the biscuits in the stove; I had everything else ready, and
just had the biscuits in the stove. But they would not give us time to eat our breakfast;
they threw my breakfast things out, and we didn’t have anything to eat until the next
day at 2 o’clock.21
This is an example of how the homes may have been owned by the mine company, but it was the
center of life for miners and their families. For Mrs. Fish, she was being taken away from what
16Testimony of Inez L. Smith, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 1095.
17Testimony of Joe Huber, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 661.
18Testimony of W. E. Hutchinson,West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 85.
19Testimony of Inez L. Smith, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 662.
20Testimony of Maud Fish, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 468.
21Ibid. 469-70.
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she worked for and cared for over her span of time living within Paint Creek. As stated above,
this stood especially true for the women who were tasked with caring for the homes while their
husbands worked the majority of the day.
To accommodate the loss of housing, tents were utilized as makeshift housing. Tents were
provided to families by the union and were grouped together in units.22 The conglomerate of
tents became known as tent colonies. To set the scene, the example of Holly Grove can be used.
This was a location in which the strikers of Paint Creek and Cabin Creek set up a tent colony,
and was described by a journalist as having “rows of tents and shacks for about 200 yards on
either side of a curved track.”23 In the tent colony named “Goodman Holler” it was estimated that
there were thirty-two tents split between twenty-five families.24 Women and children represented
the majority of the population that lived within these tent colonies. According to a census of
all the tent colonies in Mingo County, 284 women and 709 children lived in tents. Grown men
only totaled to 273 people who lived in the tent colonies within Mingo County.25 Smaller family
units would occupy one tent, while larger families were able to occupy two. A writer gives the
following description of how evicted families looked from the outside:
I once drove up on a union truck loaded with tents and food to the outskirts of a town
where an hour before sunup six families had been set out. Through slashing rains,
our truck sloshed along a valley trail to the coal camp where we found women in
drenched house dresses trying to calm their frightened children. They had taken
refuge under the shed back of a small church. . . . In the sulphur-yellow water there
was a confusion of broken bedsteads, cribs, tables, chairs, toys.26
On the inside, the state of the tents largely varied. In some tents, like the one occupied by Mr.
and Mrs. William Carey, there were items needed for basic survival and comfort, such as stoves
and chairs. In her oral interview, Mrs. William Carey stated that her tent had a “stove to cook on,
table to eat on, and chairs to sit on.”27 For some, what the tent provided was all they needed to
survive at the time. However this was not always the case.
As discussed previously, Mrs. William Carey conveys an example of a woman who remembers
her time within the tent colonies as a positive experience. Mr. and Mrs. William Carey estimated
that they lived within the tent colonies for two years. However, Mrs. William Carey did not live
with her husband in the tent colonies year-round. She recalled leaving the tent colony to live
with other family members in the winters and when she was nearing the birth of her children.28
Overall, she remarked that the time spent within the tent colonies was the “happiest days” of her
life.29 The happy experience Mrs. William Carey recounted is not the universal experience held
by all women who lived in tent colonies. For some, the tent colonies represented a time period
when they had to fight in order to survive. Betty Smith of Matewan remembers the time spent in
the tent colonies as a harsh struggle. When her family was evicted from their company-owned
home it was the middle of winter. When asked about her family experience Smith stated “It
22Testimony of Winthrop D. Lane, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 998.
23Fremont Older, “Mrs. Fremont Older Pictures Battle-Scene in West Virginia War,” San Francisco Bulletin, March
24, 1913.
24Mr. and Mrs. William Carey, Interview with Keith Dix.
25Testimony of J. R. Brockus, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 340.
26Hoyt N. Wheeler, “Mountaineer Mine Wars: An Analysis of the West Virginia Mine Wars of 1912-1913 and
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was snowin’. I don’t know how deep the snow was but it was a terrible time and they were livin
in tents.”30 Harsh winters spent in the camps are what separate Mrs. William Carey’s happy
experience from Betty Smith’s tale of a fight for survival. While Mrs. William Carey’s tent had
basic comforts, this was not universally true for all tents. Mr. Winthrop Lane recalled seeing the
tents in Mingo County, stating that:
They lacked floors — the tents did. Winter was coming on and the inhabitants of the
colonies were exposed to snow. Many of them leaked so the rain got in. Trenching
had not yet been done in many of them; that is. I am speaking now of the many
individual tents that had not been trenched.31
The added stress of having to provide under harsh winter conditions affects the impact of the
time period. The winters in Paint Creek and Cabin Creek were described with occurrences of
“snow, rain blizzards, high water, and arctic cyclones.”32 When asked further about the conditions
within the tent colonies, Smith recounts her mother’s story of living in the tent colonies during
winter: “I thought I would die but she said, I had my babies and she said I crawled out to the cow
and milked the cow so my other children could have milk.”33 Women had to deal with not only
making sure they did not freeze or starve to death, but also making sure that their children did not
freeze or starve to death. Mr. Neil Burkinshaw recalled what those who lived in the tent colonies
in Mingo County looked like. He stated that:
These people were driven like cattle from their homes, and their goods were thrown
out into the roads, and some lived in tents and railroad stations and temporary shelters,
and others even were without shelter until the United Mine Workers’ organization at
Charleston sent them tents, and to this day those people are living in tents. They lived
there during the winter. I was down there last November and saw barefoot children,
women with a single garment, and men barefooted with nothing but overalls, living
in that cold. It is a high mountain country and it is very cold. They suffered tortures
that I have never seen before in this or any country.34
Overall, the conditions that existed within the tent colonies were not good. The cold was plentiful
but the food and the supplies were not. Mother Jones described the conditions in the tent colonies
in the winter by stating, “More hungry, more cold, more starving, more ragged than Washington’s
army that fought against tyranny were the miners of the Kanawha Mountains.”35
The difference warm shelter created during this time period of extreme labor unrest was
further confirmed by Addie Nowlin of Matewan. She recalls her father having pro-union stances
that caused him to lose his job, but they were not forced out of their house because they owned it.
Addie Nowlin’s interview serves to prove that existing within the tent colonies created a more
lasting impact on people. This conclusion can be drawn, because Addie Nowlin did not remember
the Mine Wars other than the sensationalized stories she had passed down to her.36
30Betty Smith, Interview with Rebecca Bailey, October 19, 1990, Box 1, Folder 6, Matewan Oral History Project,
West Virginia and Regional History Center.
31Testimony of Winthrop Lane, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 989.
32Ayers, Never Justice, Never Peace, 139.
33Ibid.
34Testimony of Neil Burkinshaw, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 5.
35Ayers, Never Justice, Never Peace, 135.
36Addie Nowlin, Interview With Rebecca Bailey, June 10, 1990, Box 1, Folder 17, Matewan Oral History Project,
West Virginia and Regional History Center.
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The Baldwin-Feltz guards were another commonality in the different locations of the Mine
Wars. They were hired by the mine companies and were “notorious for patrolling the coal camps
evicting striking miners and their families, and intimidating and harassing them.”37 The presence
of these hired hands during the eviction process has already been highlighted above; however, this
was far from the only way that their presence affected miners and their families. Intimidation and
violence at the hands of the Baldwin-Feltz guards were felt by all who experienced the Mine Wars.
Women were often a target of direct intimidation and violence; Baldwin-Feltz guards did not
discriminate based on sex. In a speech given by Mother Jones, she described the Baldwin-Feltz
guards as a “force of armed guards of men belonging to the reckless class, the criminal and lawless
class [who] beat up. . . [their] citizens on public highways. . . insult our wives, our daughters,
arrest honest citizens in lawful discharge of their duties.”38 The speech takes time to mention the
fact that the women of these communities were also subjected to the violence felt by men. No one
was safe from the wrath of the Baldwin-Feltz guards.
In the case of Paint Creek and Cabin Creek, the local post office represented a headquarters of
intimidation. In the questioning of miner Joe Huber, it was revealed that “Baldwin guards. . . would
stay in the post office, and sometimes there would be as high as 10 or 12 of them in there.”
He continued on to say “it was dangerous for any man or woman to go in there with all the
ammunition and guns.”39 In another testimony, Mr. S. F. Nantz stated that his wife would not even
attempt to get their mail, saying “she never bothered there none while the militia [Baldwin-Feltz
guards] was in power.”40 This infrastructure being taken over led to women being disrupted in
their daily life routines. In some instances, run-ins within the post office turned violent. When
miner Tony Sevilla was arrested at the post office, his wife Jeanina Sevilla attempted to help him.
Edward Brag, a sheriff employed by the mine company, described the situation by stating “The
woman started in to see her husband. . . and one of the guards reached up and caught her by the
hair or back of her dress. . . and jerked her down off the steps.”41 Women were not able to carry
on with tasks that were part of their daily routine before the outbreak of labor unrest.
The interruption of daily life did not stop with the guards infiltrating the post office, as just
walking around became a dangerous task for women. Mine guards would stop just to intimidate
women they saw moving around within the space of the mine camp. Mrs. Sarah Blizzard, who
lived in the Cabin Creek area, recounted how she was stopped from moving about in her town by
mine guards. In her statement she said:
Well, I went up to Leewood on or about the first Sunday in April, and one came out
and ordered me not to go another step, and would not let me go another step. He had
his gun in his hands and he would not let me go one step farther. I kept walking up,
and I said I would go farther, and he told his gun in his hands and he would not let
me go one step farther. I kept walking up, and I said I would go farther, and he told
me that I could not go any farther; that if I did he would not let me go any farther, and
he just dared me to go and give one step more. Mr. Jackson, he said his name was.42
Another example of a woman who was prevented simply from walking comes from Mrs. Inez L.
Smith who recounted in an investigation a time when she was scared to travel around by foot.
37Ayers, Never Justice, Never Peace, 5.
38Ibid., 47.
39Testimony of Joe Huber, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 288.
40Ibid., 290.
41Ayers, Never Justice, Never Peace, 21.
42Testimony of Sarah Blizzard, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 653.
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She stated that “Eight men come out on Sunday and stopped me in the road. One followed me
a long time, and I started back to home and met some more women. I was afraid. . . . [T]hey
stopped us—eight men, with guns—Winchesters—going out on Sunday.”43 When asked if the
guards she encountered spoke to her she said that they told her “I will have the last G d one of
you arrested.”44 Violent threats often kept women from getting around locations near their homes,
even if the places they were attempting to travel to had nothing to do with the ongoing labor strife.
This fear was exemplified once again when Nina West and her friends attempted to walk to one
of their homes for a visit. When the group of women was stopped by a mine guard, they had to
give up hope of making it to their original location because the guard told West’s friend “that if
she took another step he would mash her face.”45 This intimidation while simply just trying to
exist was seen again when May Claypool, who lived in Holly Grove, recounted an encounter with
the Baldwin-Feltz guards: “they [the Baldwin-Feltz guards] started shooting at our tent and we
started on the open road. . . they stopped me and asked me where I was going and where I had
been. They told me I could not cross the bridge and had to wade the creek.”46 Just like the union
men of the mine camps, women with union affiliation experienced harassment. This was not an
isolated incident. Miss Fish was not even allowed to walk on a path when she encountered mine
guards along with Miss Claypool. Instead, the women were expected to wade the creek while the
mine guards pointed guns at them:
They called us red necks, and told us we had to wade the creek, we couldn’t come up
the railroad; and I was scared, as anyone would be, to pass them when they were
shooting that way, but we intended to go up to the bridge and cross, and were not
saying anything to them.47
She was never given a reason why she was not allowed to walk on the path; she was not even
allowed to take her shoes off or pull her dress up. The mine guards did not remove the women
from the aim of their guns until they had cleared the creek.48 Women were even stopped by the
mine guards when they were on their way to perform important tasks. An example of this comes
from Mrs. Georgia Parker. She stated that:
Me and two more parties started to Red Warrior Cemetery and had got up there at
Leewood, and Mr. Jackson stops us and turns us back. He first asks us what our
names were, and we told him, and then he asked us where we were going, and we
told him we were going to Red Warrior Cemetery, and he asked our business at the
cemetery, and I told him I had a baby buried there and I would like to go and clean
the grave off. He dropped his head and he said. “I don’t know much about it; I don’t
know where you are going,” and so we stopped, and he said that he was put there
to stop ladies and gentlemen from going up the road, and he said we could go no
further, so he got ahold of Mrs. Nace’s arm and turned her around and told her she
could not go any further, and threw his gun up in front of me and told me I could not
go any further unless I would let some of his men go with me.49
43Testimony of Inez L. Smith, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 653.
44Ibid.
45Testimony of Nina West, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 466.
46Testimony of May Claypool, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 763.
47Ibid.
48Ibid.
49Testimony of Georgia Parker, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 460-461.
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Because of the presence of the mine guards, Mrs. Parker was not allowed to properly mourn the
death of her child. This serves as an example of how much of the lives of these women were
interrupted by the labor struggle. Every piece of their normal routine was torn from their grasps.
Women were often put in the position of being in the middle of violent outbursts at the hands
of Baldwin-Feltz guards. Often, they were presented with no option other than sitting back and
watching in horror. An example of violent horror at the hands of Baldwin-Feltz guards occurs
when Mrs. Maud Estep recalled what she went through the night her husband, Francis Francesco,
was murdered by Baldwin-Feltz guards:
We heard the train come shooting, and he [Mr. Estep] hollered for us to go to the
cellar, and he went out the front door. I went through the kitchen way, and I never
got any farther than the kitchen door; we were all trying to get to the cellar. He was
standing right at the corner of the cellar near the kitchen door where I was standing
hollering for me to go and get into the cellar. It was so dark that I could just see the
bulk of him. It scared me so—and I had a little one in my arms—that I could not go
any farther. His cousin was there on a visit, and after the train commenced shooting
he took hold of me and told me not to fall, and about that time a shot struck him in
the leg.50
Traumatizing situations such as this murder did not present the women of the mine camps with
many opportunities for escape. Attempting to help their husbands would often place them directly
in the way of danger. In addition, women like Mrs. Maud Estep had children to watch over that
they wanted to keep away from the face of danger. Second-hand intimidation came from the fear
of losing their husbands when they attempted to go out. Mr. George Echols testified, “If we go to
town we have to go in such a way that we have to tell our wives good-by, for we know that we
might not come back, and that we may be under lock and key.”51
Women were not spared from outright violence and brutality at the hands of the Baldwin-Feltz
guards. One example of the Baldwin-Feltz guards assaulting a women turned up when Mrs.
Mollie Fish of Holly Grove gave an account of her assault in the form of a testimony during
a government investigation of Paint Creek and Cabin Creek: “Mr. Phaup, one of the guards,
grabbed me by the throat and hit me on the arm with his fist. . . . He struck me several times.”52
Women whose husbands had pro-union ties during the Mine Wars had to deal with being harassed
and violently assaulted by the Baldwin-Feltz guards just as their husbands were. Bud Frances
recounts what happened to his wife after he was arrested:
They abused her and left her up there and they poured out all of her groceries and
poured kerosene in the baby’s milk, and they busted up her rocking chair and broke
up pretty nearly all of the furniture in the tent. She had to do without anything to eat
from that morning until along at night when she went to town, and the United Mine
Workers of America took her to a hotel and got her supper, and they had me in jail at
that time.53
Jeanina Sevilla was brutalized once again by mine guards when they came looking for her husband
at their cabin in Wacomah. The non-native English speaker tried to explain that he was not at
50Testimony of Maud Estep, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 460-461.
51Testimony of George Echols, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 470.
52Testimony of Mollie Phish, Conditions in the Paint Creek District.
53Testimony of Bud Frances, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 477.
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home; the only people inside were herself and her children, but the men did not believe her.54
She recounted the situation through an interpreter by stating:
I heard this shooting, and I went to the door to see what was the matter. I saw the
guards coming down the hill. . . . Then they came to our house, and they opened the
door, and they came in and looked under the bed; and then on the bed was my baby,
and it was asleep, and I told the guards to let the baby alone because it was on the
bed; and they struck me and I fell down, and then they kicked me in the stomach and
then they hit me with their fist here [indicating] and then they knocked me down.55
At the time of this attack Sevilla was five months pregnant.56 However, after the attack, Sevilla
did not feel her unborn child move for two months, at which point the baby was delivered dead
by a physician.57 Just existing within the property of the mines presented dangerous situations.
For example, in a timeline of the events within Logan and Mingo counties it was stated that the
“camp and store [were] shot up from Weirwood property, one bullet missing Mrs. Lloyd Eden by
a few inches. Five bullets entered Mrs. Smith’s boarding house.”58
In the case of the labor effort within Mingo and Logan counties, the feud between men with
the wish to unionize and those who wanted to prevent unions took a particularly violent turn.
Violence on the behalf of the union men also came out during the trial. Mr. Perkins recounted
how he saw school teacher Mrs. F. J. Short shot at, saying:
I saw a woman trying to get from the tipple to the boilers with a baby in her arms,
and they fired at her repeatedly. And she ran from the tipple to the steel car on the
track, and they fired four or five shots. Finally, she got behind the boilers with the
baby, and then she went across a clearing, and then they fired at her six or eight shots.
I never felt so sorry for anybody in my life.59
While this represents a woman of the mine camp being harassed at the hands of union men, it
came out in trial that the situation was still instigated by the Baldwin-Feltz guards. The difference
this time is that they did not present themselves as Baldwin-Feltz guards, but instead as union
men. Figures such as Mr. Lively would instigate violence on behalf of union men in order to
cause drama, which means that more often than not, the violence women experienced in the time
of the Mine Wars came as a direct result of the presence of Baldwin-Feltz guards.60
The Logan and Mingo County feuds took an especially violent turn when Sid Hatfield and
Ed Chambers were shot to death by Baldwin-Feltz guards while attempting to enter the court
building in McDowell County to attend trial over their involvement in the Matewan Massacre.
This presented an opportunity to affect women because the unarmed men were killed in front of
their wives. Mrs. Sid Hatfield recounted how she was scared to even enter McDowell County for
her husband’s trial. She said that:
We [herself and Mr. Hatfield] were afraid to come into that county [McDowell],
because they say they beat up people and drag them off the trains from Mingo,
54Testimony of Jeanina Sevilla, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 477-478.
55Ibid., 478.
56Ibid., 479.
57Ibid.
58West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 934.
59Testimony of George H. Perkins, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 503.
60Testimony of Winthrop Lane, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 1017.
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wouldn’t let people come in off the trains from Mingo and all that kind of thing, and
so I was afraid to come into that county.61
Mrs. Hatfield did not see her husband shot; when she heard the gunfire, she ran to where she
assumed safety would be. Mrs. Ed Chambers was not as lucky. She described seeing her husband
die during an interrogation, stating:
He [Lively] was up on the step in front of me and kind of on this side...and my
husband was on this side of me [indicating], and [Lively] kind of reached his arm
across in front and shot my husband that way, you see, in the neck. My husband,
he rolled back down the steps and I looked down this way and I seen him rolling
down and blood gushing from his neck, and I just went back down the steps after
him, you see, and they kept on shooting him, and when he fell he kind of fell on his
side leaving his back up, you know, toward the steps and they were shooting him in
the back all the time after he fell.62
While these women are part of a story that has been sensationalized, their experience still offers
up an important view of the lives women involved in the labor unrest. Like many others, these two
women watched their husbands ruthlessly executed. To add insult to injury, one of the thirteen
men who fired upon Ed Chambers and Sid Hatfield was Mr. Lively, who costumed himself as a
union man for sometime while actually causing trouble on behalf of the Baldwin-Feltz guards.
While women were not the ones underground mining, they still pursued the interests of those
they loved who were. While the pursuit was done by sticking with their husbands through eviction,
all while experiencing violence and turmoil, women also stood in solidarity by protesting. As
strikebreakers filed into the Creeks, they were met by groups consisting often of many women who
were not happy with their presence. Reports described the women protesting strikebreakers as
“uncouth, ill-bred, poorly clad, almost vicious women.”63 The media also attributed the women’s
desire to persuade strikebreakers to leave to the presence of the sensationalized figure of Mother
Jones. In reality, these women had their own stake in this fight and were just playing what they
believed their part was in dissuading strikebreakers. Lillian Dwyer recounted her experience as a
woman dealing with scabs, saying:
We told the transports that our husbands were fighting for their rights and they, too,
should join in this fight. We told them how we had been driven from our homes and
how we were forced to live in tents with our children.The mine guards threatened to
kill us. They treated us like dogs. That is the way they have always treated us. We
told the thugs that their mothers would be ashamed of them if they only knew what
their sons were doing to help enslave the miners.64
This testimony proves that women were not driven to protest in order to please Mother Jones.
Instead, women were driven to protest due to the conditions they and their husbands were forced
to experience at the hands of mine operators and mine guards. While the women probably did
come off as rowdy, the real problem the anti-union men who ran the mines had with this display is
that the women were warning the strikebreakers of what treatment they and their families would
receive.
61Testimony of Mrs. Sid Hatfield, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 734.
62Ibid., 738.
63Ayers, Never Justice, Never Peace, 119.
64Ibid., 120.
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The women who came in with the strikebreakers were also negatively impacted by the labor
unrest that was occurring. The men that came in as strikebreakers were labeled with the derogatory
term “scab.” Scabs were disliked because they substantiated the mine companies’ belief that they
did not have to improve labor conditions; they just had to bring in new workers. In Logan and
Mingo counties, scabs were not greeted with smiling faces. Instead:
[T]hey will influence the children. His children will say that the other children “won’t
play with me; they call me a scab.” Then they also influence the wife. She finds that
the women will not associate with her. And she says, “Women will not associate
with me and they call me a scab’s wife.” There is a pressure put on him and it is
absolutely impossible for him to resist it.65
In another account from Logan and Mingo County, it was described how wives of strikebreakers
would complain that “I can not live here. They call me a scab wife.”66 This attitude towards
strikebreakers and their families was not confined to Logan and Mingo County. During the
investigation into the Paint Creek and Cabin Creek District, Mrs. West admitted, “I wouldn’t
speak to a scab at all.”67 While women were affected by the bad blood between the striking
workers and their families and the strikebreakers and their families, it was not a result of their
own actions. Instead, it was a result of the environment fostered by the mine companies that knew
bringing in strikebreakers during this period would only worsen the situation.
In the aftermath of the Mine Wars, many families were left displaced. In the wake of losing
their jobs, and often their houses, miners that formerly worked in the locations in which the
Mine Wars took place were forced to leave. This displacement is made apparent through court
documents when the people questioned are asked where they reside now. Almost none of those
questioned about the events of the Mine Wars continued to reside where the labor unrest took
place. The main reason miners and their families left was to find new and sustainable work.
However, families did stay tied to the tent colonies for long increments of time, either because
they had nowhere else to turn or because they still wanted to fight. An example of this can be
found in the testimony of Grover Coleman, who when asked where he lived stated “I am not
exactly anywhere now; I used to live on Cabin Creek.”68 This represents the displacement felt by
those who were displaced after the drama of the Mine Wars. Eventually, they had to begin their
lives again. Starting over directly impacted women because they had to leave behind what they
knew, and all they had made, in order to find more stable living conditions with their families.
All those within the areas of labor unrest during the Mine Wars felt an effect. However, it is
important to look at the women who were living within the mine camps because they were a direct
player in the action that took place during the time period of the Mine Wars. This period can be
accurately summed up by an account Mrs. Fish gave in the investigation into the conditions in the
Paint Creek and Cabin Creek District. She stated:
I believe it was July 17th, and [I] helped my sister-in-law on the train with her baby
and there were some transportation men came off and I got upon the car and there
were thirteen of the guards on the ground with transportation people. I was getting
upon the car when they were and I saw the transportation people and said “Boys
there is a strike on Paint Creek and you had better stay away from there and not take
65Testimony of William M. Willey, West Virginia Coal Fields Hearings, 522.
66Ibid., 989.
67Testimony of Nina West, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 467.
68Testimony of Mrs. West, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 466.
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our work from us.” Mr. Phaup, one of the guards, grabbed me by the throat and hit
me on the arm with his fist and some of them said “Watch out, that is a lady you
are striking.” He said “God damn the lady; let her stay in her place.” He struck me
several times.69
This story demonstrates so many core positions held by the women who lived through the action of
the Mine Wars. To start with, Mrs. Fish was ready to defend her husband against the strikebreakers
who were coming through. She did not do this because Mother Jones was calling for her to, she
did it because the strikebreakers’ presence in the Mine Wars had threatened to destroy what the
miners and their families had worked for. In addition to this, Mrs. Fish was a victim of the harsh
brutality that the Baldwin-Feltz guards dished out. Outsiders knew it was wrong for the guards to
be handling a woman like that, but in the realm of the Mine Wars, no one was safe. If no one was
safe or spared from the violence in this period, it is only fair to take a look at how each group was
impacted.
In conclusion, women living within the coal camps were directly impacted by the period of
labor unrest known as the Mine Wars. They were not the ones who were unionizing in efforts to
create better conditions, but this does not minimalize their position within the conflict. Women
were thrown out of their homes along with their husbands and their families. They were forced
to leave the homes they had spent countless time making and caring for. When thrown out of
their homes, they were forced to live within tents with their husbands and families. This placed
them in a position in which they were lacking most comforts and were forced out into the cold.
They were interrupted, intimidated, and brutalized by the Baldwin-Feltz mine guards just as the
union men were. Every aspect of their daily life and routine was impacted by the presence of
the Baldwin-Feltz guards. They were not allowed to indulge in normal tasks such as checking
their mail or grieving a lost loved one. In addition to this, just like their husbands, they were
brutalized and beat by the Baldwin-Feltz guards for little to no reason. They protested to advocate
for improved situations by warning and shunning the strikebreakers who were hired to replace
their husbands’ positions within the mine companies. This was not an action done to appease the
media or any other figures; instead it was done for themselves and the men they loved. Finally,
at the end of the struggle, they had to relocate in order to rebuild their lives. In the end, they
had to pick up their lives and start elsewhere in many cases. Together, all of the above instances
prove that the labor struggle forever changed the lives of the women who lived through them. Not
only did their day-to-day lives completely shatter due to the unrest, they experienced widespread
violence and chaos. All of this left the women of the Mine Wars with a harsh burden to carry on
with them for the remainder of their lives.

69Testimony of Elizabeth Fish, Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 478.
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The American Public’s Reaction to the Japanese American
Internment
N ICHOLAS TAY L O R
The American public voices its concerns over fundamental issues, like the justice system, that pertain to the US
Constitution. The American public in World War II, however, faced many challenges in voicing its concerns over the
Japanese American internment due to the dominance of racism at the time. This paper explores the background of
Executive Order 9066, the document that provoked mass evacuation, in order to understand why President Franklin D.
Roosevelt enforced it and why most people, particularly on the West Coast, advocated for Japanese American evacuation.
More fundamentally, the bulk of the paper centers on the argument that different individuals and groups broke their
silence on the matter. They reminded other people of the importance of democracy during wartime as it applied to every
Japanese American citizen as well as Japanese immigrants who were trying to achieve the American Dream.

When people attending school or visiting historic sites today first begin to learn about the Japanese
American internment, it is obvious that they view the evacuation as morally wrong. However, the
way that Americans during World War II viewed the Japanese American internment was divisive.
A poll from the American Institute of Public Opinion in March 1942 shows that 93 percent of
Americans were in favor of the removal of Japanese immigrants and 59 percent supported the
removal of Japanese American citizens. Only 1 percent opposed the internment of Japanese
immigrants, while 25 percent opposed the internment of Japanese American citizens.1 While
most Americans did not generally recognize Japanese American citizens and aliens as ordinary
people, others from the 1 percent and the 25 percent shed some light on the truth of the situation
involving the evacuees. Those people, who were well ahead of their time, believed that the
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt did not enact Executive Order 9066 because of “military
necessity,” as they called it. In fact, they believed it was the public’s overall lack of acceptance of
Japanese Americans that caused the government to evacuate the entire Japanese population on
the West Coast while they disregarded the facts.
The reality was that many Caucasian Americans grievously had mistreated people of Japanese
descent before evacuation, which is at odds with the fact that this set of individuals clearly did not
pose a threat or do any harm to the country domestically. This is especially true compared to
German immigrants, who actually posed a threat to national security with the rise of the German
American Bund, a pro-Nazi organization of around 40,000 people of German descent.2 Still,
even before the Japanese military bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the government
was skeptical of the loyalty of Japanese Americans.3 In the fall of 1941, the Alien Divisions of
the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation created a list of alien groups,
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including West Coast Japanese, who, they believed, could threaten national security.4 They
proposed that they should place them in internment camps if the US went to war with their
ancestral countries.5 Journalist John Franklin Carter put together an intelligence unit of the Office
of Strategic Services, which is now the Central Intelligence Agency, to investigate the loyalty of
aliens in the United States.6
Carter reported businessman Curtis L. Munson’s findings about the Japanese Americans to
President Franklin Roosevelt.7 According to Munson, an “overwhelming” majority of the Nikkei
were loyal to the United States and they had no intention to harm the country.8 Additionally, US
Naval Intelligence Officer Kenneth D. Ringle, who was fluent in the Japanese language, clarified
that more than 90 percent of the Nisei, the second generation of Japanese Americans, and 75
percent of the Issei, the first generation of Japanese immigrants, had no loyalty to the country
of Japan.9 Ringle eventually went on to disagree with the Japanese American evacuation once
FDR signed Executive Order 9066. He argued that “there was never a shred of evidence found of
sabotage, subversive acts, spying, or fifth column activity on the part of the Nisei or long-time
local residents” following his “careful investigations on both the West Coast and Hawaii.”10
Munson and Ringle’s findings provided real evidence regarding the Japanese Americans’ overall
behavior towards the United States.
Despite factual evidence that the majority of Japanese Americans did not commit any sabotage
on the West Coast, there were still problems that remained in the minds of government officials
that were eventually passed on to the American public. Similar to how some Americans are
currently dealing with the coronavirus pandemic, one major factor led to the decision to relocate
Japanese Americans to internment camps, and that was hysteria. As the Japanese bombed Pearl
Harbor and America entered the war, Americans became extremely worried. However, it was not
until the spread of “fake news” from US Army Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, commander
of the Western Defense Command, that Americans incomprehensibly put the blame on Japanese
Americans.11 DeWitt expressed anti-Japanese sentiments by stating “a Jap is a Jap. It makes no
difference whether he is an American citizen or not. I don’t want any of them.”12 In a phone call
with US Army Major Karl Bendetsen on January 24, 1942, DeWitt said he believed that Japanese
Americans corresponded with the Japanese Navy to commence the Pearl Harbor attack.13 He,
therefore, proposed the evacuation of Japanese Americans due to his own belief that Japanese
Americans posed a security threat to the United States.14 Without any legitimate information,
DeWitt’s belief undoubtedly sparked public hysteria amongst West Coast residents as well as
government officials.15 Unsurprisingly, historians question DeWitt’s judgement and his ignorance
of Japanese Americans. According to historian and scholar Tetsuden Kashima, DeWitt was “not
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an analyst or careful thinker who sought balanced judgements of the risks before him,” and he
“did little to calm the fears of West Coast people.”16
Informed by DeWitt’s lies to the public, many Americans believed his words rather than
fact-checking him as people often do today with politicians and military leaders. Among the
majority of Americans who were extremely averse to hosting Japanese citizens, Earl Warren, then
Attorney General of California, defended DeWitt’s proposal. Warren argued that the fact that
there were no incidents before the attack on Pearl Harbor meant that Americans were “being
lulled into a false sense of security” and that “our day of reckoning is bound to come.”17 This was
obviously a sign of hysteria and hatred towards Japanese Americans in the United States.
DeWitt’s proposal caught the attention of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who not
only advocated for Japanese American evacuation, but also was responsible for carrying out the
executive order following its approval. Roosevelt told Stimson to “be as reasonable as you can”
when carrying out the evacuation.18 Like DeWitt, Stimson ignored the real facts. He, especially,
did not listen to the concerns of his top military advisors from the Army and Navy Departments,
for they believed that “there was no possibility of invasion [of the West Coast]” by the Japanese,
and it was not necessary to carry out evacuation orders.19
Members of FDR’s staff were not entirely in favor of Japanese American removal. US Attorney
General Francis Biddle and FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover both expressed concerns regarding the
evacuation.20 Biddle, as with the entire Justice Department, did not find the evacuation to be
necessary. He wrote a memorandum to FDR on February 17, 1942, regarding his concerns for the
California economy as well as the behavior of West Coast residents. While he reluctantly agreed
that the War Department was to carry out evacuation orders for the soon-to-be evacuees, Biddle
argued that the evacuation “would materially disrupt agricultural production in which they play a
large part” and that “the farm labor” was “so limited that they could not be quickly replaced.”21
He also added that “it is extremely dangerous for the columnists. . . to suggest that an attack on
the West Coast and planned sabotage is imminent when the military authorities and the FBI have
indicated that this is not fact.”22 Hoover backed Biddle’s argument, saying that “the necessity for
mass evacuation is based primarily upon public and political pressure than on factual data.”23
Despite warnings from Hoover and Biddle, Roosevelt did not heed their advice, and portions of
the public soon began to question the government’s handling of the evacuation.
Indeed, FDR was under pressure when he made the decision to evacuate thousands of
Japanese Americans, both citizens and aliens alike. The advice he received from his cabinet
and other executive officials was “conflicting.”24 While he was not reluctant to approve the
unethical executive order, he was not resolute either. He understood the ramifications that the
evacuation order would have on Japanese residents and the question about the constitutionality of
the issue, but he never considered civil rights as the primary concern for America at the time.25
Unquestionably, Roosevelt focused more on the war effort above everything else. According to
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FDR scholar Greg Robinson, Roosevelt’s approval of the evacuation order was a “failure” that
proved to be “a lack of compassion, or more precisely, of empathy” and that his decision “was not
of malice but indifference.”26
FDR’s approval of the evacuation order was, indeed, a failure, and at least part of the public
was profoundly disappointed in his decision. On February 19, 1942, “another day that will live in
infamy” in the minds of Japanese Americans, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order
9066. This order gave Secretary of War Henry Stimson the authority to establish military areas
on the West Coast and remove 120,000 people of Japanese descent from those districts.27 About
60 percent of the affected people were those of the Nisei generation, the first Japanese Americans
born in the United States whose Fourteenth Amendment rights the government violated.28 While
the public opinion poll from March 1942 seems to suggest that a majority of Americans supported
the evacuation, there were groups and individuals who opposed the order.
Indeed, a vast majority of West Coast residents were in favor of Japanese removal given
their anti-Japanese sentiments and the fact that they wanted to segregate from Japanese residents.
There were also some competing white farmers who hoped to profit by buying their property at
fire-sale prices. Their response to Roosevelt’s executive order was filled with praise and relief
when West Coast newspapers announced the relocation of Japanese Americans.29 Many groups
on the West Coast, such as the California Farm Bureau Federation and the Western Growers
Protection Association, believed that the removal would lead to the reduction of economic
competition between Japanese and white residents.30 This belief, however, contradicts Biddle’s
above argument that the evacuation was going to cause a labor shortage, as Japanese American
farmers were assets to the agricultural economy in California.
From the perspectives of many evacuation supporters, the executive order did not completely
fulfill their expectations. On May 9, 1942, Lawrence Davies, a columnist for the New York Times,
had mixed views on the evacuation. He reported an incident in the Salinas Valley where the US
military temporarily settled Japanese Americans into an assembly center near white residents’
houses before they shipped them to permanent camps. One Salinas Valley resident, who felt that
the government was going back on its word, shouted in anguish, “Why do they have to put the Japs
right here? We thought we were going to get rid of them for good; now we find they’re bringing
them in from other places and dumping them on us.”31 He believed that so long as the evacuation
was done humanely, democracy was “not inert” in retaining the rights of Japanese Americans.32
Despite the obvious wrongdoing of the US military by unconstitutionally relocating thousands of
Japanese residents from the West Coast, Davies’s argument indicates that Japan’s view of the
US’s handling of the Nikkei was meant to be different than the US’s view of Germany’s handling
of the Jews in Europe.
Besides the New York Times, other newspapers across the United States reacted to the executive
order as representing a defense of democracy rather than the government’s mistreatment of
citizens. On February 21, 1942, two days after FDR signed the executive order, the Washington
Post carried a story with the subtitle “Nisei Reaffirm Their Loyalty.” The article briefly stated that
a group of Nisei women gathered to sign a pledge of their loyalty to the United States and that
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they devoted themselves and their “all-out energy to defeat Japan and the Axis.”33 The article
suggested to the public that the Japanese Americans were just as loyal and supportive of the war
effort as other Americans, which indicated that the order to evacuate them from the West Coast
was not the answer.
Other columnists continued to raise issues with the Japanese American evacuation. Ernest L.
Lindley, a columnist for the Richmond Times-Dispatch in Richmond, Virginia, also had mixed
thoughts. While he agreed that the evacuation order was necessary for the sake of national
security, he added that it was “a confession of ignorance.”34 He argued that both the Nisei and
the Sansei, also known as third-generation Japanese Americans, “have been imbued with a real
sense of devotion to this country and its institutions.”35 This was yet another piece that showed
the public’s recognition that Japanese Americans were not terrorists, even if they believed the
evacuation was mandatory because of “military necessity.”
Despite the public’s mixed response to the Japanese American evacuation, many different
organizations and groups across the country took a more radical approach. However, one cannot
understand their progressive arguments without understanding the Japanese Americans’ own
reaction to the executive order. To many Japanese Americans during that time, the news of the
executive order left them with shock and devastation. Take, for example, Star Trek actor George
Takei, a then five-year-old boy who remembers seeing the look in his mother’s eyes as they filled
with tears when the news of the executive order came to her. He stated, “I will never be able to
forget that scene. . . . [I]t is burned into my memory.”36 The conflicted emotions of Japanese
Americans like Takei’s mother justified their feelings of betrayal by the government and why
many Americans across the country were so eager to defend their civil liberties.
The poor conditions that existed in the relocation camps is critical to the response of both
Japanese Americans and those outside of that ethnic group. Upon move-in to the relocation
camps, many Japanese American evacuees lived in extremely poor conditions that caused further
uncertainty. When Takei and his family first evacuated along with thousands of evacuees, the
military forced them to sleep in horse stalls. Takei described the moment he and his family walked
into the horse stall: “As a kid, I couldn’t grasp the injustice of the situation.”37 To Takei’s parents,
who clearly remembered the circumstances of the camps, “it was a devastating blow. They had
worked so hard to buy a two-bedroom house and raise a family in Los Angeles. Now we were
crammed into a single, smelly horse stall. It was a degrading, humiliating, painful experience.”38
The inhospitable environments in which the camps were located also contributed to the
Japanese American sense of despair. Yuri Kochiyama, a Nisei woman, stated that the camps were
“in mountainous areas, deserts, and swamplands.”39 They were “not the nicest kinds of places for
family life” and they were “climatically. . . rougher than anything” that she experienced living
in California.40 Poor living conditions had a negative impact on interned Japanese Americans.
That negative impact motivated other minority groups and portions of the public to come to their
defense and remind people of the Japanese Americans’ rights under the Constitution.
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Despite their misgivings, most Japanese American residents followed through with the
executive order without any form of resistance. The Tolan Committee hearings, which directly
responded to FDR’s executive order, called on members of the Japanese American Citizens
League to testify, including its national secretary, Mike Masaoka.41 Although they were “willing
to prove loyalty by making sacrifices,” Masaoka expressed concerns of his own by arguing that
Japanese Americans “had every right to protest” despite the executive order’s intended purpose.42
The word “sacrifices” meant for Japanese Americans to voluntarily give up their homes and
follow the government’s orders to show their loyalty despite their First Amendment rights. Only a
few Japanese Americans made their own “sacrifices” to follow something they believed as more
superior than the executive order: the Constitution.
Most Japanese Americans did, indeed, respond to the executive order by acceding to it.43
However, there were a handful of them who felt strongly opposed to it to the point that they
courageously defied the order and voiced Japanese Americans’ need for full recognition as
residents of America. Gordon Hirabayashi, a then twenty-four-year-old Nisei student from the
University of Washington, was among the first to do so.44 Instead of getting away with a violation
he knew he committed, he appeared before the FBI office in Seattle and turned himself in to the
authorities willingly. Many newspapers across the country described him as a “conscientious
objector” for sacrificing himself for the Constitution.45 Hirabayashi used his Christian beliefs
as his motivation for objecting to the order. During that time, he wholeheartedly argued in his
defense:
Since childhood I have been in contact with the personality of Jesus. This personality
became more vivid, more real, and more meaningful with each significant experience.
If I were to register and cooperate under those circumstances, I would be giving
helpless consent to the denial of practically all the things which gives me incentive
to live. I must maintain my Christian principles. I consider it my duty to maintain
the democratic ideals for [which] this nation stands. Therefore, I must refuse this
order for evacuation.46
Whether they objected to the order or they simply went along with it, Japanese Americans were
not alone in defending their civil liberties. Many liberals, in particular, despised the internment.
Among many radical liberals who opposed the executive order was journalist Galen M. Fisher. He
described FDR’s reason for evacuation as a “blanket phrase” when the latter referred to “military
necessity.”47 In Fisher’s view, given the proven loyalty of most Japanese Americans, there was no
justification to remove them. The government’s action was illegitimate because they chose to
relieve the public from “fear of sabotage” rather than rely on actual facts.48 It was unfortunate,
yet unsurprising, that the West Coast residents under John DeWitt’s influence did not care about
factual information, but instead chose prejudice over acceptance of Japanese Americans.
Carey McWilliams, an author and journalist for the New Republic, was also an outspoken
advocate who, like Fisher, criticized the government’s actions. In his 1944 book, Prejudice, he
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described the Pearl Harbor attack as “an earthquake that sent tremors throughout the entire Pacific
Coast” and called Japanese Americans “the victims of this social earthquake.”49 The “earthquake”
that McWilliams referred to was the war hysteria among white Pacific Coast residents who
used Japanese Americans as scapegoats. Given his argument on the Pearl Harbor attack and its
relevance to the mistreatment of Japanese Americans, McWilliams felt that there were flaws in
FDR’s executive order. In a March 2, 1942, magazine article, he proposed a fair congressional
committee be established to investigate the evacuation in California, which he described as “a
complicated situation.”50 He was more afraid that the white West Coast residents “might go
berserk and mob the Japanese population” than of the Nikkei population itself if an enemy attack
took place there.51 Similar to Attorney General Biddle’s argument, he expressed concern about the
economic consequences of the internment. More specifically, he argued that a forced evacuation
of thousands of Japanese Americans, many of whom were farmers, would cause a disruption in
California’s surplus economy by decreasing the supply in the agricultural industry.52 Although he
believed that Californian farmers in 1942 would “face a close balance of supply and demand for
farm labor” for their own benefit, he argued that Japanese American farmers would face an even
harsher labor environment in the internment camps.53
If the moral efforts of progressive liberals like Galen Fisher and Carey McWilliams were not
strong enough, then Norman Thomas, a member of the Socialist Party of America, took an even
more radical stance. Not only did he agitate against the executive order, but also against those
who either wanted to compromise or were not radical enough in their opposition to evacuation. In
early March 1942, he described FDR’s executive order as “the worst plot” and “the establishment
of military despotism.”54 In this case, Thomas compared FDR’s controversial decision to Hitler’s
totalitarian power in Europe and his persecution of Jews because of their non-Aryan race. He also
accused the American Civil Liberties Union of being too soft in its opposition to the evacuation,
calling it a “dereliction of duty” to accept FDR’s executive order as being “within the proper
limits of the President’s war powers.”55 While reluctantly accepting the internment for what it was,
he co-led the Post-War World Council with pacifist Oswald Villard to entice hundreds of liberals
and socialists to join his organization in order to end the mistreatment of Japanese Americans in
internment camps.56 It was movements like Thomas’s Post-War World Council that attempted to
bring likeminded liberals and evacuation oppositionists together to address the veracity of the
executive order. Unfortunately, the public did not seem supportive to his cause.57
Despite Thomas’s opinion, the ACLU did, in fact, contest FDR’s executive order. The ACLU
played an essential role regarding the response to the Japanese American removal because its
sole mission was to protect the rights of individuals, including Japanese Americans, in order to
make the Constitution relevant.58 On March 6, 1942, ACLU President Roger Baldwin wrote
a letter to President Roosevelt out of concern that the evacuation order was “open to grave
question on constitutional grounds by depriving American citizens of their liberty and use of
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their property without due process of law.”59 Baldwin’s argument refers to the violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, both of which grant citizens the right
to due process, including the Japanese Americans born in the United States. He also believed
that the military’s authority to “remove vast populations from areas” that were “declared to be
defense zones” against the Japanese military was “unchecked.”60 If the government removed
Japanese residents from the so-called “defense zones” without regard to their constitutional rights,
it opened the door to other violations of civil liberties justified by the war.
In the same letter to FDR, Baldwin not only expressed the ACLU’s concerns, but he also
strongly suggested the President revise the executive order, acknowledging the Constitution’s role
and importance. As part of his proposal, he argued that loyal Nisei Americans should remain
on the West Coast and that the military should only evacuate them if there was proof that they
attempted sabotage.61 He believed that “considerations both of public policy and of law” made
it necessary that “the rights of these citizens which are equal with those of other American
citizens should be given every possible protection.”62 His letter was not enough for FDR to change
his mind on the matter immediately. Baldwin knew that FDR struggled to keep faith with the
Constitution and carry out the wishes of the majority of Americans.
Despite efforts to convince FDR to release Japanese Americans from the internment camps,
Baldwin went so far as to challenge the legality of the evacuation in court.63 Unfortunately, the
ACLU was often not successful in defending their cases of Japanese Americans who violated the
evacuation order. In the case of Gordon Hirabayashi, Baldwin arranged with Mary Farquharson
to be Hirabayashi’s attorney as Farquharson had worked with Quakers like Hirabayashi prior to
the case.64 Funding issues within the board, in addition to Baldwin’s continuing efforts to entice
FDR to revise the order, prevented them from immediately advancing forward.65
Despite trying to maintain liberty when the question of the Constitution and Japanese
Americans came to mind, Baldwin was stuck in the middle of a divided ACLU. Some ACLU
members, such as Norman Thomas, John Haynes Holmes, and Arthur Garfield Hays, worked
with Baldwin to challenge the constitutionality of the executive order, while other members “were
blindly loyal to Roosevelt.”66 Among those who opposed the ACLU’s involvement, one member
compared the Japanese American internment to “a public health quarantine in measles.”67 This
shows that 1942 proved to be a challenging year for those like the ACLU and liberals outside their
organization who fought the Japanese American evacuation from the Pacific Coast.
Although Baldwin and many ACLU members ultimately accepted the evacuation, it does
not mean that they stopped believing in the constitutional rights of Japanese Americans. In the
latter half of 1942, some senior members of the ACLU exchanged letters with Dillon S. Myer,
the head of the War Relocation Authority at the time, in which they discussed ways to reform
regulations in order to improve the treatment of evacuees. When a letter from Myer came to
them communicating that the military had, in fact, begun to release certain Japanese Americans
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from internment camps, the ACLU responded with satisfaction.68 The ACLU also expressed
gratitude in a sense that the military did not separate Nisei children from their immigrant parents
knowing that it could have caused significant outrage from internees.69 Although it took the
government almost four years to realize what the ACLU meant, the latter’s role in maintaining
the civil liberties of Japanese Americans ignited other organizations and minority groups to
challenge the executive order and the overall internment. To that extent, the ACLU helped voice
their concerns not just throughout 1942, but during the entire war as well.
Not only did political groups express their concerns about the executive order, but also
many Christian communities on the West Coast in accordance with their moral and pacifist
beliefs. When FDR enforced the executive order in February 1942, many Christians were worried
that the incarceration would affect America’s relationship with other countries, particularly the
ones in Asia. They felt that the internment “would irreparably damage foreign missions” and
that it would also ruin “America’s chance to establish global peace by destabilizing domestic
race relations and damaging diplomatic ties with Asian nations.”70 Although that may not have
been the case realistically, the internment could have given the United States a bad reputation.
This especially would have been true if the perception of other nations was that the treatment
of Japanese Americans was as bad as Adolf Hitler’s treatment of European Jews, which was
obviously different in reality.
Many Christian leaders on the West Coast also played a role in assisting the already-interned
Japanese Americans. Several of them moved to Southern Idaho, where one of the internment camps
was located, to collaborate with Japanese Christian ministers and “maintain pastoral care.”71 Both
white and Japanese Christian leaders collaborated together to end the internment and integrate
the Nikkei into white church communities to “strengthen the integrity of American Christianity”
and “reduce national racial tensions.”72 Unfortunately, the goal to assimilate Japanese Americans
into white churches failed as many white and Nikkei congregants opposed their efforts.73 They
even went so far as to stop attending church services altogether.74 The government had already
betrayed the Nikkei, so it was understandable for them to refuse to congregate with white church
communities. Besides the war effort, the failed efforts of kindhearted Christians showed that
hatred and lack of acceptance of different racial groups dominated the American home front.
The Christian Century, a religious magazine, also played a more radical role in their opposition
to the removal of Japanese Americans. Its editors posed fundamental questions about the Japanese
American removal in an effort to capture the public’s attention. Like the ACLU, the editors saw
internment as an infringement on democratic principles by the government. However, they also
pointed out Christian solutions. In an article the Christian Century published in June 1942, they
argued that the evacuation policy was “headed in the wrong direction” and that all churches should
take an active role “to guard against further injustice” to Japanese Americans.75 Furthermore, the
magazine added that FDR and others responsible for the evacuation order should be like men
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who “declare their mistake as boldly and as widely as they declared their first faith.”76 None of
those men saw it that way.
Minority groups, more specifically African Americans and Jewish Americans, identified more
personally with the plight of Japanese Americans. Knowing about their negative feelings towards
the executive order, ACLU President Roger Baldwin argued that those groups had “a firm sense of
security that in fighting for the United States” they were “fighting for their own future security.”77
That was certainly the case for African Americans, who believed that democracy and the war
effort were equally important. The Chicago Defender, an African American newspaper, argued
that clearly the military interned Japanese Americans in internment camps for crimes they did not
commit, other than their appearance.78 From their perspective, the same as with other groups
that actually looked into the facts behind the evacuation, the interment was “the result of pure
racialism.”79
The news of what was happening to Japanese Americans in the internment camps raised
concerns for African American communities as they were afraid that they, too, might suffer the
same fate.80 George Schuyler, an African American writer for the Pittsburgh Courier, argued that
“it [would] be easy to denationalize millions of Afro-American citizens,” so in that case, he added
that “we must champion their cause as ours.”81 This was a strategy to unify African Americans
and other minorities to face the already undemocratic United States.82 Some anti-Japanese
groups adhered to the executive order so well because they aimed to deprive minorities of their
rights as well. Schuyler also believed that the Native Sons of the Golden West, whose extremely
fascist views were similar to the Ku Klux Klan and the German American Bund, aimed to
remove Japanese Americans from the West Coast. One such case was when they denied Japanese
Americans and other minority citizens access to vote, a violation of the First and Fifteenth
Amendments.83 To African Americans, unity with Japanese Americans was the key to achieve
equality in a society that routinely trampled on the rights of people of color.
African American communities, particularly those in Baltimore, also used their Christian
beliefs to argue against removal. Margaret Lewis, a black female editor of the newspaper the
Afro-American, argued in response to the internment, “The principles of our democracy is founded
– tolerance, liberty, the respecting of the human personality regardless of race, creed, or color,
even though not at all times observed – is the ideal. There could be nothing more Christian than
the ideal.”84 The “ideal” was a reminder that they, too, believed that nothing was more important
than the Constitution, a document that established the foundations of democracy. Lewis even
added that the terrible conditions in the camps that Japanese Americans endured was un-Christian.
She described them as “inadequate,” “crowded,” and “unbearable” during the summer months
due to the exhaustive heat.85 African Americans related the Japanese American experiences to
their own mistreatment by higher officials and violations of their political, social, and economic
rights.
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Although African Americans did receive some work benefits from the Fair Employment
Practice Committee in 1941, their treatment by whites was not significantly different from
Japanese Americans. In fact, some African Americans on the West Coast were even at risk of
following the same fate as Japanese Americans, even if the evacuation did not directly apply to
them. If a non-Japanese person was married to a Japanese person, then the former, too, faced
internment, especially if it was an African American or Hispanic spouse. Charles Williams, an
African American photographer for a local Los Angeles newspaper, nearly faced internment
because he married a Nisei woman.86 When the evacuation commenced, Williams and his wife
managed to do “the smart but perfectly legal thing” by escaping the West Coast and migrating to
Chicago, where they began a new life.87 While very few African American newspapers, such
as the New Journal and Guide based in Norfolk, Virginia, reported this incident, it was still
important news for African American communities. Charles Williams’s story justifies the reason
many African Americans cared for defending Japanese American rights. They praised Williams
for his bravery in helping himself and his wife leave the area without military supervision. If
anything, their escape for freedom from military authorities was almost comparable to when
Harriet Tubman led slaves to freedom on the Underground Railroad in the mid-nineteenth century.
African Americans were not the only minority group to voice their opinion against the
Japanese American internment. Jewish Americans on the West Coast also responded with
concern to the treatment of Japanese Americans. In fact, Jewish and Japanese Americans both
suffered from systematic racism, although it was possible for Jews to pass as gentiles. Similar to
African Americans, Jewish Americans identified with Asian Americans’ long-standing struggle
for equality. In the late 1930s, attacks on Jews increased, and well-known public officials like
Charles Lindbergh and Father Coughlin helped legitimize antisemitism in the United States.88
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, some Jews on the West Coast worried about the fate of
Japanese Americans. The day after the attack, two rabbis, Samuel Koch of Seattle, Washington,
and Irving Reichert of San Francisco, California, warned the public to not panic as they expressed
concerns with white West Coast residents’ bitter attention toward Japanese Americans.89 Koch
argued that “it is not unlikely that hotheads will endeavor to embarrass them in various ways”
despite the fact that Japanese Americans had no role “in the folly of Japan.”90 Reichert expressed
similar concerns, and he argued, “we must not commit the unpardonable offense of visiting upon
the heads of the innocent” and that “we Jews ought to be among the first to cry down the unjust
persecution of the foreign-born in our midst whose patriotism is equal to ours.”91 Reichert and
Koch’s arguments showed that Jewish leaders on the West Coast were wise enough to show
Americans that hysteria should not solve the problem with Japanese Americans and that they
assumed the latter group was affiliated with the enemy because of their appearance.
The Jewish press was also critical in combating racism towards Japanese Americans. As
historian Ellen M. Eisenberg argued, Jewish support and advocacy for equality were “staples” in
the Jewish press on the West Coast, something that the government did not seem to fully grasp.92
Scribe, a Jewish American newspaper in Portland, Oregon, reacted negatively to FDR’s executive
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order. It described supporters of the mass removal of Japanese Americans as “unthinking persons”
who “forget the basic concepts of freedom for which America fights.”93
The Jewish press of the Pacific Coast believed that the executive order was certainly an
unthinkable act and acknowledged it violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
However, unlike African Americans, Jewish Americans, as a whole, did not believe that fighting
for equal rights and fair treatment for Japanese Americans was just as important as supporting
the war effort. While the evacuation concerned Jewish Americans less in other parts of the
United States, West Coast Jews struggled balancing their contribution to the war effort and their
support for Japanese Americans’ rights.94 Therefore, they remained mostly silent because the
mass genocide that Hitler aimed toward their European counterparts prompted them to focus on
the war effort in Europe.95
Franklin Roosevelt’s executive order that led to the Japanese American internment received
more mixed reactions from the public than what the March 1942 poll shows. Most Americans
supported evacuation and felt relieved once it took place, while at least some important parts
of American society felt that it went against democracy, something that US soldiers overseas
fought for. Based on the arguments of those who opposed the evacuation, the internment had a
negative effect on Japanese Americans as the government ignored their civil liberties. Japanese
Americans and those who supported them during World War II knew the fundamental principles
of the Constitution. Because most Americans were in favor of the evacuation, those who opposed
it struggled to vocally address racism through protest. In today’s nation, racism continues to
shape government policy and the ideas and actions of some Americans. People in the United
States see the government separating Hispanic children from their families.96 They see other
people using racist sentiments towards those of Chinese descent because of the spread of the
coronavirus.97 It is obvious not all have learned from the mistakes that hysteria caused in World
War II. The question remains whether these mistakes of today will be allowed to stand again or if
benevolence can address and solve problems.
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